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CRIMINAL LAW




Cross-examination has been labeled as the most
efficient engine ever devised for the discovery of
truth,1 and defense lawyers traditionally refer to it
as "the bulwark of liberty." 2 The prosecutor, how-
ever, uses cross-examination to fulfill more than
just an obligation to a particular client; he is
charged not merely with the task of convicting a
person accused of a crime, but rather with the
broader responsibility of seeking justice.3 The pros-
ecutor, therefore, may consider cross-examination
to be the sword of justice.
The prosecutor exercises his right of cross-
examination' in an effort to strengthen his own
cases as well as to weaken the case of the defense. 6
This is accomplished by discrediting the testimony
of the witness on the stand, using the testimony
to discredit or minimize the testimony of other
witnesses, using that testimony to corroborate the
favorable testimony of prosecution witnesses, or
using it to contribute independently to the prose-
cution's own case.7
* Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern
District of Illinois. B.A. University of Illinois; J.D.
Northwestern University School of Law (1973); Mem-
ber Illinois Bar.
I See WioGoRE, EVIDENCE §1367 (Chadbourn rev.
1940) [hereinafter cited as WiGmoRE].
2STRYKER, TE ART or AnvocAcY (1954).
8 See ABA CODE or PioErssIoNA-. R-SPONsiBIuTY,
CANON 7; ABA ST-ANmDAws RELATINGo TO HE PROS-
ECUTION FUNCTION 1.1(c); State v. Wyman, 270 A.2d
460, 463 (Me. 1970) ("While they may strike hard
blows, they must refrain from improper and illegitimate
tactics solely calculated to produce a conviction. It is
just as much their duty to see that the accused has a
fair trial, as it is to bring about a just conviction of
the guilty.").
'See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Brown v. United States,
234 F.2d 140 (6th Cir. 1956), reh. denied, 356 U.S. 948
(1958) (the right of cross-examination belongs to the
state as well as to the accused); State v. Reeh, 434
S.W.2d 416 (Tex. 1968).
6 See State v. Redford, 27 Utah 2d 379, 496 P.2d
884 (1972); DuCAme, THE ART or T=E ADVOCATE
(1964).
6 See DuCAN N, supra note 5; Sears v. State, 282
N.E.2d 807 (Ind. 1972).
7TucKER, EXAMINATION, CROss-ExAInNATioN AND
The purpose of this article is to examine the
permissible methods by which these trial tactics
can be accomplished. To do so, attention has been
given to the general areas of allowable inquiry as
well as to the specific form required of individual
questions.8 The words "proper," "allowable," "ac-
ceptable," and their opposites have been used to
refer to the general judicial opinion of the matter
under discussion. Not all techniques or particular
questions labeled as "improper" automatically
require the reversal of a conviction, but the con-
scious entry into a frowned upon area may bring
a prosecutor into conflict with the high professional
standards to which he should aspire.
I TMn LImTAuONS Or SCOPE
The general background of a witness is almost
always an area of legitimate inquiry. Questions
may be asked pertaining to residence,9 marital
status0 and employment.E One may ask about
a witness' previous whereabouts 2 or general knowl-
edge of matters pertaining to the crime in ques-
tion.' 3 These general questions are governed by
IMPEACHMENT, THE PROSECUTOR's DEsKBOOx
(N.D.A.A. 1971); BYRNE, EXAuNATION or WiT-
issEs, Tum Pnosxcuioa's DEsKuoox (N.D.A.A.
1971).
'See Sears v. State, 282 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. 1972)
(any doubt as to the legitimacy of a question should
be resolved in favor of the examiner). The holding of
this case is tempered by numerous examples cited
infra.
9Commonwealth v. Arsenault, 280 N.E.2d 129
(Mass. 1972).
10 Commonwealth v. Libby, 266 N.E.2d 641 (Mass.
1971) (tended to show adultery); Porter v. State, 440
P.2d 249 (Wyo. 1968) (questions of marriage and child
custody).
n People v. Suriwka, 2 Ill. App. 3d 384, 276 N.E.2d
490 (1971); People v. Hough, 102 Ill. App. 2d 287,
243 N.E.2d 520 (1968); Bolin v. Commonwealth, 407
S.W.2d 431 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 946
(1967).
12 State v. Brooks, 107 Ariz. 320, 487 P.2d 387
(1971) (proper to ask defendant's whereabouts at the
time of his arrest).
13 Butler v. State, 285 Ala. 387, 232 So. 2d 631
(1970); State v. Harrington, 178 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa
1970).
CROSS-EXAMINATION
the rules of allowable scope only when the answers
become prejudicial to the defendant' 4 Such general
questions, as well as all others on cross-examina-
tion, may be asked in leading form.'6
Other than a few preliminary questions, the
scope or breadth of permissible cross-examination
depends upon the rules of the jurisdiction. The
crucial question here is: must the examiner be con-
fined in his questioning to those matters which
were testified to on direct examination?
The traditional or "English" rule of cross-exam-
ination allows the examiner to question the witness
about any subject which is relevant to the case in
chief. The cross-examiner is not limited to those
subjects which have been opened by the direct
examiner. This "wide open" rule is followed in
only a minority of jurisdictions in the United
States.'6 It generally applies, subject to the limita-
tions of the fifth amendment, to defendants as
well as to non-party witnesses. 7 The "wide open"
14 See People v. Hough, 102 Ill. App. 2d 287, 243
N.E.2d 520 (1968) (questions about employment
record tending to show instability were proper)- Bolin
v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. 1966, cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 946 (1967) (questions concerning
parasitic relationship with mother, inability to hold
job for any length of time were found to be proper.
This decision is probably wrong.); Commonwealth v.
Arsenault, 280 N.E.2d 129 (Mass. 1972) (residence
was prison). See also Prince v. State, 461 S.W.2d 413
(rex. 1970) (proper to cross-examine defendant re-
garding his attitude towards police, white people and
his legal rights).
15 See Butler v. State, 285 Ala. 387, 232 So. 2d 631
(1970); PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 611.
16 See Riddle v. Dorough, 279 Ala. 527, 187 So. 2d
568 (1966) (all matters within the issues of the case);
Brown v. State, 45 Ala. A pp. 391, 231 So. 2d 167
(1970); State v. Gilreath, 107 Ariz. 318, 487 P.2d 385
(1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 921 (1972) (all matters
within knowledge of witness having relevancy to the
issues at trial. Proper to inquire as to reason for marital
disputes with murder victim wife); State v. Taylor, 9
Ariz. App. 290, 451 P.2d 648 (1969) (anything bearing
on credibility that sheds light on the case is permitted);
State v. Richardson, 258 La. 62, 245 So. 2d 357 (1971);
State v. Williams, 250 La. 64, 193 So. 2d 787 (1967);
Rush v. State, 254 Miss. 641, 182 So. 2d 214 (1966)
(cross-examination should not be interfered with ex-
cept because of "irrelevancy, trespass beyond ad-
missible ground, or extremes of continual aimless
repetition"); State v. Penley, 277 N.C. 704, 178 S.E.2d
490 (1971) (questions must only be material according
to the judge); State v. Huskins, 209 N.C. 727, 184
S.E. 480 (1936); State v. McGee, 55 S.C. 247, 33
S.E. 353 (1899) (any question pertinent to the case).
17 See Thomas v. State, 249 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1971)
(could ask accused about his knowledge of a prosecu-
tion witness); State v. Warren, 271 So. 2d 527 (La.
1973); State v. Jones, 263 La. 1012, 270 So. 2d 489
(1972) (defendant subject to cross-examination on en-
tire case); State v. Giles, 253 La. 533, 218 So. 2d 585
(1969). But see State v. West, 249 Mo. 221, 161 S.W.2d
966 (1942) (statute limits cross-examination of de-
rule has received significant impetus through the
recently proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
Those rules have adopted the practice of allowing
cross-examination on any matter relevant to the
case (including credibility)'8 One can reasonably
expect that the federal example will lead to greater
acceptance of the "wide open" rule.'9
The vast majority of the states presently sub-
scribe to the view that cross-examination must be
limited to those matters testified to on direct
examination."0 Subject to fifth amendment limita-
tions, the guidelines which govern the prosecutor's
inquiry generally apply to defendants as well as
to non-party witnesses. Cross-examination may be
based upon matters "covered on," ' "gone into
on," " "touched on," 2 responsive or relevant to,"
fendants and their wives to the scope of the direct, all
others can be crossed on the entire case).
1
8 PxROPos-D FED. R. EviD. 611(b) provides "A
witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant
to any issue in the case, including credibility. In the
interests of justice, the judge may limit cross-examina-
tion with respect to matters not testified to on direct
examination." The comment following the rule states
that it does not purport to resolve the constitutional
questions raised by a defendant's fifth amendment
waiver.
The proposed federal rule represents an about-face
from the rule proposed in 1969 which limited cross
examination to the scope of the direct.
Other jurisdictions providing by statute for the
wide open rule are Missouri supra note 17, and LA.
Rmv. STAT., ch. 15, §280 (1967).
19 Commentators have long advocated the "wide
open" rule due to the desire to provide for maximal
discovery of the truth. WiGmoRE §§1887-88; Mc-
CoRmic, LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. Cleary, 1971)
§27 [hereinafter cited as McCoRmci].
20 See Sawyer v. United States, 202 U.S. 150 (1906);
Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S.
448 (1840) (one of the earliest cases standing for the
limited rule); United States v. Prionas, 438 F.2d 1049
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 977 (1971); Lewis v.
United States, 373 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 880 (1967); People v. Lynn, 16 Cal. App. 3d
259, 94 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1971); State v. Stevens, 93
Idaho 48, 454 P.2d 945 (1969); People v. Clark, 96
Ill. App. 2d 247, 238 N.E.2d 220 (1968); People v.
Sisti, 87 Ill. App. 2d 107, 230 N.E.2d 500 (1967);
State v. Harrington, 178 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1970);
State v. Broten, 176 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1970); State v.
A~lnut, 261 Iowa 897,156 N.W.2d 266 (1966); Jenkins v.
State, 14 Md. App. 1, 285 A.2d 667 (1971); State v.
Dalton, 433 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1968); State v. McClin-
ton, 418 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1967); People v. Rahming, 26
N.Y.2d 411, 259 N.E.2d 727 (1970).
2See Storie v. State, 254 Ind. 301, 258 N.E.2d 849
(1970).
"See State v. Coyne, 452 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. 1970)
(defendant on direct said he made an untrue statement
to police, proper to cross on it).
2See State v. Bagley, 339 Mo. 215, 96 S.W.2d 331
(1936).
24 See State v. Mirschl, 208 Kan. 111, 490 P.2d 917
(1971); State v. Roth, 200 Kan. 677, 438 P.2d 58
(1968).
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connected with 25 and within the fair purview of
the direct examination. 6 Cross-examination, how-
ever, is not limited to a mere categorical review of
the direct examinationY
In addition to a large body of supporting case-
law,2 this limited rule of cross-examination has
been formally codified in certain jurisdictions.29 A
major argument for this limited rule is that it pro-
motes the orderly presentation of the case.30 Quite
interestingly, however, a reason given by the
drafters for the adoption of the new "wide" federal
rule is that it would save the time spent bickering
over objections regarding scope 2'
Under the majority view, the asking of questions
outside the scope of the direct is often enough in
itself to require reversal.n Whether a reversal is
required will depend upon the merits of each indi-
vidual casen and may hinge upon the existence of
15 See Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 39
U.S. 448 (1840).
26 See State v. Dalton, 433 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1968).
22 See People v. Eisenberg, 266 Cal. App. 2d 606, 72
Cal. Rptr. 390 (1968); State v. Dalton, 433 S.W.2d
562 (Mo. 1968); State v. Bagley, 339 Mo. 215, 96
S.W.2d 331 (1936).
28 See, e.g., cases cited note 20 supra.
29 PRopOSE FED. R. Evam. 611(b) (1969) (the
drafters of this rule, however, did an about-face within
three years for the rule finally proposed by the Supreme
Court embraced the "wide open" rule), note 18 supra;
CAL. Evm. CoDE §773 (West 1966).
20 See Wills v. Russell, 100 U.S. 621, 625-26 (1879);
McCoRMacK §27.21PRoposED FED. R. Evn. 611, Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes. The limited rule came under severe
criticism bv the ABA's Committee for the Improve-
ment of the Law of Evidence (1937-38) which wrote,
The rule limiting cross-examination to the precise
subject of the direct examination is probably the
most frequent rule (except the Opinion rule)
leading in trial practice today to refined and techni-
cal quibbles which obstruct the progress of the
trial, confuse the jury, and give rise to appeal
on technical grounds only. Some of the instances
in which Supreme Courts have ordered new trials
for the mere transgression of this rule about the
order of evidence have been astounding. We
recommend that the rule allowing questions upon
any part of the issue known to the witness... be
adopted ....
2 2 See Dixon v. United States, 303 F.2d 226 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) (defendant's wife testified to time he left
house, was crossed as to whether he gave her money
when he returned); Wilson v. United States, 4 F.2d
888 (8th Cir. 1925); State v. McClinton, 418 S.W.2d
55 (Mo. 1967); People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 411,
259 N.E.2d 727 (1970) (error to widen cross to lay
foundation for rebuttal); Rodriguez v. State, 442
S.W.2d 376 (Tex. 1969) (defendant questioned re-
garding the truthfulness of a co-indictee's testimony at
a separate trial); State v. Belwood, 27 Utah 214, 494
P.2d 519 (1972) (cross far exceeded scope).
13 See, e.g., State v. McClinton, 418 S.W.2d 55 (Mo.
1967).
prejudice to the accused's substantive rights.8
Other errors in the course of a trial may be com-
pounded by questioning outside the scope of the
direct 5 The permissible scope of inquiry may be
greatly broadened, however, by sweeping denials of
guilt by the defendant on direct examination.86
jurisdictions which follow the limited rule in
cross-examination generally allow one exception.
Cross-examination to impeach need not be limited
to the scope of the direct,87 since it would be a
rare occasion indeed when a direct examiner would
raise the issue of his own witness' veracity,n8 mem-
ory,"9 or bias.4 The defendant himself is generally
subject to this exception.' The limited scope rule
34 Id.2
5See, e.g., People v. Pearson, 2 Ill. App. 3rd 861,
277 N.E.2d 544 (1972) (cross of defendant as to failure
to call witnesses when they were equally accessible to
the state was compounded since outside the scope of
the direct).26See, e.g., People v. Eisenberg, 266 Cal. App. 2d
606, 72 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1968); State v. Lamborn, 452
S.W.2d 216 (Mo. 1970) (sweeping denial of guilt
rendered proper the question, "Did you take little
Mary Elizabeth's head and slam it up against the
wall?").
17 See United States v. Roselle, 432 F.2d 879 (9th
Cir. 1970), reh. denied, 402 U.S. 924 (1971) (error was
deminimus); State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 454 P.2d
945 (1969); Kennamer v. State, 59 Okla. Crim. 146,
57 P.2d 646 (1936).
20 See United States v. Dillon, 436 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.
1971) (can cross to test truthfulness); Lewis v. United
States, 373 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
880 (1967) (can cross to test truthfulness); State v.
Manning, 162 Conn. 112, 291 A.2d 750 (1971) (can
cross to explore credibility); DeLilly v. State, 11 Md.
App. 676, 276 A.2d 417 (1971) (questions tending to
test accuracy, veracity, character, or credibility are
proper); Chism v. Cowan, 425 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1967)
(any question is permitted which tends to test ac-
curacy, veracity or credibility, however irrelevant or
however it may disgrace him as long as the witness
isn't exposed to a criminal charge).
31 See United States v. Hoffman, 415 F.2d 14 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969); Lewis v. United
States, 373 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
880 (1967); DeLilly v. State, 11 Md. App. 676, 276
A.2d 417 (1971).
10 See Wills v. Russell, 100 U.S. 621 (1879); Lewis v.
United States, 373 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied, 389
U.S. 880 (1967).
41 See United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 922 (1972) (defendant
can be impeached like any other witness); United
States v. Bland, 432 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971) (defendant can be im-
peached like any other witness); United States v.
justice, 431 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1970) (defendant can be
impeached like any other witness); United States v.
Franklin, 429 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 967 (1970) (defendant can be crossed as to




is not relaxed in pre-trial proceedings,4' but greater
flexibility is allowed after conviction, such as in
sentencing hearings.4'
The discretion of the trial judge plays a major
role throughout the various phases of cross-exami-
nation," but nowhere is it as dominant as in the
determination of proper scope." This discretionary
power is left undisturbed except when flagrantly or
grossly abused,4' and when the defendant has been
4 See Shull v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 469 (Ky.
1971) (defendant in suppression hearing could be
crossed only within the scope of the direct; the testi-
mony could not be admitted at trial); People v. Lacy,
25 App. Div. 2d 788, 270 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1966) (de-
fendant could not be crossed on the merits in a con-
fession suppression hearing). See also People v. Morrin,
31 Mich. App. 301, 187 N.W.2d 434 (1971).
43 See People v. Butler, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511, 421 P.2d
703 (1967) (can cross-examine defendant about life
history and activities, criminal and otherwise); People
v. Adkins, 41 I11. 2d 297, 242 N.E.2d 258 (1968) (de-
fendant could be crossed as to details of other crimes
to which he had pled guilty).
"See', e.g., United States v. Cobb, 449 F.2d 1145
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (within court's discretion to with-
hold rulings in advance of direct); United States v.
Huff, 442 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (impeachment of
defendant and defense witness within court discretion);
United States v. Pledger, 409 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.
1969); Howard v. United States, 389 F.2d 287 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (wide discretion regarding reliability). See
also United States v. Thomas, 345 F.2d 431 (7th Cir.
1965); Rizzo v. United States, 295 F.2d 638 (8th Cir.
1961); People v. Sommerville, 88 Il. App. 2d 212,
232 N.E.2d 115 (1967), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 823
(1968); State v. Broten, 176 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1970);
Cornwall v. State, 6 Md. App. 178, 251 A.2d 5 (1969);
State v. Daye, 281 N.C. 592, 189 S.E.2d 481 (1972).
But see People v. Lynn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 259, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 16 (1971) (no discretion as to waiver of fifth
amendment).46See United States v. Henon, 457 F.2d 798 (9th
Cir. 1972); United States v. White, 451 F.2d 351
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972);
United States v. Talk, 418 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1969);
Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 883 (1968); Harris v. United
States, 371 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Bowe, 360 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966); Chapman v. United
States, 346 F.2d 383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
909 (1965); United States v. Ruehrup, 333 F.2d 641,
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 903 (1964); United
States v. Greenberg, 268 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1959); Bell v.
United States, 185 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951); Madden v. United States,
20 F.2d 289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 554 (1927);
in re Hogan, 309 F. Supp. 945 CD. Del 1970); People
v. Smythe, 270 N.E.2d 431 (Ill. 1971); People v.
Duncan, 127 Ill. App. 2d 305, 262 N.E.2d 274 (1970);
People v. Clark, 96 Ill. App. 2d 247, 238 N.E.2d 220
(1968); State v. Harrington, 178 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa
1970); Alexander v. Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 334
(Ky. 1971); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 356 Mass. 442,
252 N.E.2d 880 (1969); Commonwealth v. Nunes, 351
Mass. 401, 221 N.E.2d 752 (1966).
46 See Enriquez v. United States, 293 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1961) (prosecution should not have unlimited
rights); United States v. Kretske, 220 F.2d 785 (7th
unduly prejudiced. 7 The trial judge has the dis-
cretionary power to limit to scope of "wide open"
cross-examination as well as to expand the scope
of limited cross. 4"
As previously noted,49 cross examination in a
jurisdiction following the rule of limited scope is
not confined to a mere categorical review of those
matters gone into on direct examination. 0 Numer-
ous tests have been formulated by the courts to
express the relationship that proper cross-examina-
tion must bear to the direct. Many of these appear
to require identity of transaction or dose proximity
in time and space.5 More liberal is the view that
cross-examination may cover all reasonable and
logical inferences of the direct.5' Typically, cross-
examination is permitted if it tends to clarify,5 '
Cir.), rev'd, 350 U.S. 807 (1955) (error only if discretion
is abused); People v. Swingle, 28 App. Div. 2d 1063, 284
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1967) (discretion not disturbed unless
injustice present or plain abuse).4TSee United States v. Pledger, 409 F.2d 1335 (5th
Cir. 1969) (reverse if probative value outweighed by
prejudice).
4"See PRoposED FED. R. Evm. 611(b), supra note
18 ("In the interests of justice, the judge may limit
cross-examination with respect to matters not testified
to on direct examination." This is to avoid confusion
and protraction of the case). See also PRoPosED FED.
R. Evm. 611(a):
Control by judge-The judge shall exercise reason-
able control over the mode and order of inter-
rogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as
to (1) make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2)
avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) pro-
tect witnesses from harassment or undue em-
barrassment.
49 See cases cited note 27 supra; State v. Jensen, 189
N.W.2d 919 (Iowa 1971); State v. Huffer, 424 S.W.2d
776 (Mo. 1968).
50 But there is some case law which holds that if the
cross-examiner goes beyond the bounds of the direct
and draws out a new fact, the witness becomes the
examiner's own and impeachment on that new fact is
not permitted. See Pollard v. State, 201 Ind. 180,
166 N.E. 654 (1929); State v. Spurr, 100 W.Va. 121,
130 S.E. 81 (1925). An extension of the direct will not
require reversal, however, unless damaging to the
defendant's case. See State v. Kelley, 161 N.W.2d
123 (Iowa 1968). This combination of rules appears to
put the prosecutor in a most disadvantaged position.
If he draws a favorable fact he is reversed, yet a nega-
tive fact may stand unchallenged.
51 See McCoRMcK §21; State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43,
501 P.2d 727 (1972).
2 See People v. Doebke, I Cal. App. 3d 931, 81
Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969) (defendant implied on direct
that he didn't sell narcotics to an undercover man by
saying he had none to sell, but he never actually denied
the sale. Cross as to marijuana delivery was proper).
"See United States v. Crawford, 438 F.2d 441
(8th Cir. 1971); State v. Sweazea, 460 S.W.2d 614
(Mo. 1970) (defendant testified he had been drinking,
could cross as to amount was proper); State v. Baca,
80 N.M. 488, 458 P.2d 92 (1969) (crossed on prior
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qualify,M elaborate,5" explain,"
6 modify57 or dis-
credit-I the testimony offered on direct examina-
criminal charges which were mentioned on direct);
State v. Anaya, 79 N.M. 43, 439 P.2d 561 (1968)
(questioning as to penitentiary sentence was proper);
Rapp v. State, 418 P.2d 357 (Okla. 1966); Crumsey
v. State, 460 S.W.2d 858 (Tenn. 1970) (defendant
testified as to prior guilty pleas, cross to clarify was
proper).
See Leeper v. United States, 446 F.2d 281 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1021 (1972) (cross
proper which embraces any matter germane to direct,
qualifies or destroys it, or tends to elucidate, modify,
explain, contradict or rebut testimony given in chief).
See also People v. Eisenberg, 266 Cal. App. 2d 606,
72 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1968).
55 See Issac v. United States, 431 F.2d 11 (9th Cir.
1970) (defendant testified to a guilty plea, could cross
as to nature of charge); United States v. D'Antonio,
362 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 385 U.S. 900
(1966) (government agent called as a defense witness
to testify that the search of defendant's trailer yielded
no ink, bond paper, or a printing press; could properly
cross as to what was found: metal punch, welding rods,
miscellaneous auto keys, walkie talkies and a police
radio); People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 299 P.2d 243
(1956), cerf. denied, 355 U.S. 846 (1957) (defendant
mentioned schooling, could cross as to attendance;
defendant testified to his height 6'6', it was collateral
but not requiring reversal to question if he attempted
to stretch his height to 6'8" to gain an army dis-
charge); State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286, 460 P.2d
711 (1969) (defendant testified to prior trouble, could
question what kind of trouble); State v. Baca, 80
N.M. 488, 458 P.2d 92 (1969) (questioning additional
criminal conduct); State v. Anaya, 79 N.M. 43, 439
P.2d 561 (1968); Griffith v. State, 430 S.W.2d 197
(Tex. 1968) (could fill out fragmentary information
regarding prior convictions); State v. Solomon, 5
Wash. App. 412, 487 P.2d 643 (1971) (cross as to
whereabouts on night in question after denial of
presence at crime scene).
56See People v. Conrad, 81 Ill. App. 2d 34, 225
N.E.2d 713 (1967), aff'd, 41 Ill. 2d 13, 241 N.E.2d
423 (1968) (proper cross regarding defendant's ac-
tions while inebriated and unable to control self;
proper to cross a medical witness in order to explain
his direct testimony); Blair v. Commonwealth, 458
S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1970) (can cross as to prior convic-
tion brought out without explanation on direct);
Lewis v. State, 458 P.2d 309 (Okla. 1969); State v.
Etheridge, 74 Wash. 2d 102, 443 P.2d 536 (1968)
(could cross as to use of stolen credit cards referred to
on direct).
5 See People v. Conrad, 81 Ill. App. 2d 34, 225
N.E.2d 713 (1967), aff'd, 41 Ill. 2d 13, 241 N.E.2d
423 (1968); Rapp v. State, 418 P.2d 357 (Okla. 1966);
State v. Baca, 80 N.M. 488, 458 P.2d 92 (1969);
State v. Anaya, 79 N.M. 43, 439 P.2d 561 (1968).
Is See United States v. Crawford, 438 F.2d 441
(8th Cir. 1971); State v. Miranda, 3 Ariz. App. 550,
416 P.2d 444 (1966) (could cross as to why defendant
was a passenger in his own vehicle); Sherwood v.
State, 271 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1972) (direct testimony
about honorable discharge from army, could cross as
to misconduct while in service); People v. Hough, 102
Ill. App. 2d 287, 243 N.E.2d 520 (1968); State v.
Baca, 80 N.M. 488, 458 P.2d 92 (1969); State v.
Anaya, 79 N.M. 43, 439 P.2d 561 (1968); State v.
Garcia, 78 N.M. 136, 429 P.2d 334 (1967) (could cross
to determine completeness of father's information);
tion. Also proper are questions which tend to elicit
additional relevant details regarding matters ex-
plored on direct.59 Within limits, a witness may be
asked the whereabouts of persons mentioned in
direct testimony,"5 and often the examiner may
even probe into the witness' personal associations."
When discussing the permissible scope of cross-
examination courts frequently use the phrase "the
door has been opened." This rather imprecise legal
shorthand refers to the privilege of the cross-
examiner to tender questions on subjects "opened"
in direct testimony.6 ' These subjects often relate
to alibis,6' theories of defense, 64 items of evidence,"5
Lewis v. State, 458 P.2d 309 (Okla. 1969); State v.
Bauman, 77 Wash. 2d 938, 468 P.2d 684 (1970) (can
counter testimony of good conduct with questions as
to bad conduct; can counter claim that defendant was
a peaceful man with questions regarding fighting).
" See United States v. Lacob, 416 F.2d 756 (7th
Cir. 1969), reh. denied, 397 U.S. 1003 (1970) (why
checks in question were not produced earlier; what
relationship did they have to defendant's law prac-
tice-tax evasion charge); Kemnitz v. United States,
369 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1966); Moore v. United States,
217 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1963), ajJ'd, 332 F.2d 372
(3d Cir. 1964) (other relevant and material facts on
same issue); State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727
(1972) (location, identification of participants in-
volved in, and movements of grain transfers); State v.
Huffer, 424 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. 1968) (statements made
to police officer made relevant by defendant's denial
on direct that he kicked the officer); Bailey v. State,
479 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn. 1972).
60 See United States v. Free, 437 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (a brief foray is permitted, but no searching
inquiry since the individual played a minor role in
the case); Stevens v. United States, 319 F.2d 733
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (could cross about failure to produce
the "Johnny Williams" who supposedly lent the
defendant a stolen car). See also Sears v. State, 282
N.E.2d 807 (Ind. 1972).
61 See Leeper v. United States, 446 F.2d 281 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1021 (1972) (ques-
tions about companionship with co-conspirators);
Gafford v. State, 440 P.2d 405 (Alas. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1120 (1969) (did defendant go to funeral of
decedent); State v. Kelley, 161 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa
1968) (questions of defendant regarding membership
in a gang, could ask for a list of names of associates
since none was of such infamous character that it would
prejudice him by association).
2See Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912);
Jenkins v. State, 14 Md. App. 1, 285 A.2d 667 (1971);
State v. Dvisen, 403 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. 1966); State v.
Lee, 255 S.C. 309, 178 S.E.2d 652 (1971) (could cross
on collateral matters opened on direct).
6See State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85, 407 P.2d 59
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 979 (1966) (alibi witness
opens door to questions regarding his whereabouts).
4See State v. Broten, 176 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1970)
(fist fighting ability of manslaughter defendant).
0 See United States v. Teague, 445 F.2d 114 (7th
Cir. 1971) (government agent, called as a defense
witness, asked if a lineup was held. Could cross him as
to a reason for no lineup, i.e., no doubt as to defendant's
identity); United States v. Prionas, 438 F.2d 1049
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personal histories6" and the defendant's actions. 0
Often questions which have been asked on direct
examination are repeated verbatim by the cross-
examiner.60 Although the "opened door" test is
quite a liberal one, the connection with the direct
examination must still be more than tenuous.
69
(8th Cir.), rel. denied, 402 U.S. 977 (1971) (exhibits
bearing a certain name, could ask if defendant ever
used that name); Williams v. State, 238 So. 2d 137
(Fla.), cert. denied, 241 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1970) (de-
fendant states he offered to take a polygraph, could
cross as to why he didn't); Kiraly v. State, 212 So. 2d
311 (Fla. 1968), reh. denied, 221 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1969)
(reference on direct to illegal confession opened door
to cross on it); State v. Jackson, 195 N.W.2d 687
(Iowa 1972) (a glove found in the assault victim's room
and one found on defendant's person were in evidence
and discussed on direct, could inquire if they were his);
Gilbreath v. State, 412 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. 1967) (simi-
larity between signature on defendant's confession and
a questioned bill of sale).06 See United States v. Hykel, 461 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.
1972) (arrest); Sinclair v. Turner, 447 F.2d 1158
(10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1048 (1972)
(could cross as to homosexual conduct); United States v.
Fiorillo, 376 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1967) (could cross as to
defendant being ejected from the garbage business
after testifying about his good character); McCowan
v. United States, 376 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 839 (1967) (education opened, crossed as to
years at law school; intimacy with government witness
also opened by testimony that defendant was in-
vestigating her on official police business); Maxfield v.
United States, 360 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), rek. denied,
385 U.S. 964 (1966) (could cross as to business ac-
tivities)- United States v. Laverick, 348 F.2d 708
(3d Cir.5, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 940 (1965) (could cross
as to finances, savings account, investments); People v.
Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956) (de-
fendant mentioned he was a marine, could cross about
dishonorable discharge); People v. Goodsin, 261 Cal.
App. 2d 723, 68 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1968) (could cross as
to pror use of narcotics); People v. Yonder, 44 IBI.
2d 376, 256 N.E.2d 321 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
975 (1970) (could cross as to sources of income);
State v. Broten, 176 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1970) (could
cross as to Golden Gloves activity of manslaughter
defendant); State v. Fahy, 201 Kan. 366, 440 P.2d 566
(1968) (could cross as to prior juvenile court charge
continuously referred to on direct); Pyeath v. State,
462 S.W.2d 952 (Teax. 1971) (could cross as to charges
pending against a defense witness).
67See United States v. Robinson, 327 F.2d 959
(7th Ci.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964) (amount
of drinking on day in question); DeRose v. United
States, 315 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
846 (1963) (conversation with a narcotics agent);
Madden v. United States, 20 F.2d 289 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 275 U.S. 554 (1927).
MSee Crain v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.2d 839
(Ky. 1972) (question regarded prior felony); Pooler v.
State, 462 S.W.2d 256 (Tenn. 1970) (regarded de-
fendant's relationship with another person arrested).69 See People v. Matola, 259 Cal. App. 2d 686, 66
Cal. Rptr. 610 (1968) (testimony regarding pre-arrest
activities does not open door to post-arrest events);
State v. Taylor, 198 Kan. 290, 424 P.2d 612 (1967)
(defendant's criticism of lineups is not tantamount to
him holding himself as an expert on lineups and does
When that connection is established, however,
even questioning which is highly damaging to the
accused will be permitted.0
It is widely held that when a person (including a
defendant) assumes the witness stand, his credi-
bility is automatically put in issue,7' and cross-
examination to attack that credibility is war-
ranted. Other cases reach the same conclusion by
stating that by taking the stand the witness puts
his character for truthfulness in issue and he may
be cross-examined on itY2 One must be careful to
not open door to cross as to how many lineups he has
been in before); fles v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d
170 (Ky. 1972) (defendant's statement on direct that
he lived in Indianapolis for seven years did not open
door to extensive cross regarding time spent living in
penal institutions); State v. Crowder, 119 Wash. 450,
205 P.2d 850 (1922) (declared acquaintance with
prosecuting witness does not open door to questions
regarding intimacy with her); State v. Lampshire, 74
Wash. 2d 888, 447 P.2d 727 (1968) (mention of pros-
ecuting witness' phone bill does not open door to cross
on defendant's unpaid bill).
70 See United States v. Teague, 445 F.2d 114 (7th
Cir. 1971); Monroe v. United States, 320 F.2d 277
(5th Cir. 1963), affd, 435 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1970)
(crossed as to false name and ownership of a bag of
heroin); United States ex rel. Walker v. Follette, 311
F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 443 F.2d 167
(2d Cir. 1971) (a defendant hoping to open a sensitive
subject to take the sting out of it cannot expect the
same protection from the court that he would get if
the prosecution had opened the area of inquiry. Here
the defendant brought out and was crossed on prior
convictions).
71 United States v. Hykel, 461 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.
1972) (cross of defendant's credibility subject to court
discretion); Harris v. United States, 371 F.2d 365
(9th Cir. 1967) (wide scope to cross on credibility-
financial stake); Fagundes v. United States, 340
F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965) (defendant's credibility
opened); Sorrells v. State, 44 Ala. App. 481, 213 So.
2d 687 (1968) (defendant's credibility opened); Braxton
v. State, 11 Md. App. 435, 274 A.2d 647 (1971);
Boone v. State, 2 Md. App. 80, 233 A.2d 476 (1967)
(defendant's credibility in issue even if stand taken
solely to demonstrate lack of voluntariness of a prior
statement); People v. Koontz, 24 Mich. App. 336, 180
N.W.2d 202 (1970) (defendant's credibility in issue,
could be crossed on prior convictions); People v.
Brown, 23 Mich. App. 625, 179 N.W.2d 235 (1970)
(defendant's credibility in issue, could be crossed on
prior criminal record); Jones v. State, 453 P.2d 393
(Okla. 1969); (defendant taking stand puts veracity
in issue, impeached on bad checks passed); Common-
wealth v. Scoleri, 432 Pa. 571, 248 A.2d 295 (1968),
vacated and remanded for resentencing, 408 U.S. 934
(1972) (defendant's credibility in issue, could be crossed
like any other witness); Commonwealth v. Connolly,
217 Pa. Super. 201, 269 A.2d 390 (1970) (can impeach
defendant's credibility with prior felony or mis-
demeanor crmenfalsi convictions). See also PROPOSED
FED. R. Evm. 607; CAL. Ev. CODE §785 (West
1966).
72 See United States v. Skidmore, 123 F.2d 604 (7th
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 800, reh. denied, 315
U.S. 828 (1942) (defendant); Fowler v. State, 7 Md.
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distinguish, however, between character for truth-
fulness (similar to credibility) and general charac-
ter evidence (which may include such diverse
traits as loyalty, responsibility and good citizen-
ship)Y This latter type of character evidence is
generally initiated by specific testimony 4
Subject to the limitations of the fifth amend-
ment,75 the scope of the cross-examination of a
defendant is normally no different from that of
any other witness6 The accused's credibility, for
App. 264, 254 A.2d 715 (1969) (defendant, crossed on
prior convictions); Minor v. State, 6 Md. App. 82, 250
A.2d 113 (1969) (defendant); Robinson v. State, 4 Md.
App. 515, 243 A.2d 879 (1968) (witness); Ervin v. State,
4 Md. App. 42, 241 A.2d 142 (1968) (defendant puts
character in issue when he takes stand for limited pur-
pose); Robinson v. State, 3 Md. App. 666, 240 A.2d 638
(1968) (defendant takes stand for limited purpose);
Boone v. State, 2 Md. App. 80, 233 A.2d 476 (1967) (de-
fendant); People v. Britter, 27 Mich. App. 404, 183
N.W.2d 595 (1970) (defendant, crossed on prior convic-
tions); State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 269 A.2d 161 (1970)
(defendant). See also PROpOSED FED. R. Evm. 608(a).
IN order to determine the credibility of a witness,
CAL. Evm. CoDE §780 (West 1966) provides that the
following may be considered (a) His demeanor while
testifying and the manner in which he testifies. (b)
The character of his testimony. (c) The extent of his
capacity to perceive, to recollect, or to communicate
any matter about which he testifies. (d) The extent of
his opportunity to perceive any matter about which
he testifies. (e) His character for honesty or veracity
or their opposites. (f) The existence or nonexistence of
a bias, interest, or other motive. (g) A statement pre-
viously made by him that is consistent with his tes-
timony at the hearing. (h) A statement made by him
that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony
at the hearing. (i) The existence or nonexistence of any
fact testified to by him. (j) His attitude toward the
action in which he testifies or toward the giving of
testimony. (k) His admission of untruthfulness. But see
Commonwealth v. Barron, 438 Pa. 259, 264 A.2d 710,
appeal dismissed, 439 Pa. 614, 266 A.2d 476 (1970)
(defendant's taking stand and mention of his parole
does not put character in issue).
7 See State v. Wyman, 270 A.2d 460 (Me. 1970);
Braxton v. State, 11 Md. App. 435, 274 A.2d 647
(1971).74See Hattaway v. United States, 416 F.2d 1178
(5th Cir. 1969) (testimony that defendant was raised
in a good Christian home and was concerned about her
children put general character in issue); Sorrells v.
State, 44 Ala. App. 481, 213 So. 2d 687 (1968) (de-
fendant only puts character in issue with affirmative
evidence or testimony). See also State v. Hartsell, 272
N.C. 710, 158 S.E.2d 785 (1968); State v. Hudson, 1
Wash. App. 813, 463 P.2d 786 (1970).75See Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th
Cir. 1925).76 See generally the excellent discussion in Carlson,
Cross Examination of the Accused, 52 CoRNELL L.Q.
705 (1967). See also United States v. Davenport, 449
F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Vigo, 413
F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1969); Cline v. United States, 395
F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Jackson,
344 F.2d 922 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 880
(1965); Hug v. United States, 329 F.2d 475 (6th Cir.),
example, may be subjected to the close scrutiny of
the prosecutor's questionsY. The cross-examination
of a defendant is governed, of course, by the discre-
tion of the trial judge,78 who traditionally permits a
searching inquiry within the bounds of fairness. 9
Statutory limitations in some jurisdictions, how-
ever, severely circumscribe the prosecutor's field8P
The accused does not subject himself to cross-
examination on other issues in the case when he
takes the stand on preliminary matters such as in
a suppression hearing or to show his state of mind
when asserting an insanity defense.8n This does
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 818 (1964); United States v.
Palumbo, 317 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1963); United States
v. Fratello, 44 F.R.D. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Burton v.
State, 207 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1968); State v. Schroeder,
201 Kan. 811, 443 P.2d 284 (1968); State v. Domino,
234 La. 950, 102 So. 2d 227 (1958); Raimondi v. State,
12 Md. App. 322, 278 A.2d 664 (1971); State v. Dalton,
433 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1968); State v. Shipman, 354 Mo.
265, 189 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1945); State v. Rhodes, 10
N.C.App. 154, 177 S.E.2d 754 (1970); State v. Mc-
Guinn, 6 N.C.App. 554 170 S.E.2d 616 (1969)- State
v. Lindsey, 81 N.M. 173, 464 P.2d 903 (1969), cer1.
denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970); State v. Porter, 14 Ohio
St. 2d 10, 235 N.E.2d 520 (1968); Gable v. State,
424 P.2d 433 (Okla. 1967); Harris v. State, 466 S.W.2d
761 (Tex. 1971); Coleman v. State, 442 S.W.2d 338
(Tex. 1969); Black v. State, 440 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.
1969) (defendant could be impeached, discredited,
attacked, sustained, bolstered up, made to give evi-
dence against himself, and crossed as to new matters
with the exception of a prior conviction on the same
charge or the failure to testify at an earlier hearing);
State v. Robideau, 70 Wash. 2d 994, 425 P.2d 880
(1967) (material and germane fact which shows un-
trustworthiness); Porter v. State, 440 P.2d 249 (Wyo.
1968).
7 See United States v. Pennix, 313 F.2d 524 (4th
Cir. 1963); Hobbs v. State, 243 Ark. 881, 422 S.W.2d
849 (1968); Wright v. State, 243 Ark. 221, 419 S.W.2d
320 (1967); People v. Tinsley, 128 Ili. App. 2d 440,
262 N.E.2d 4 (1970); People v. April, 97 Il. App. 2d
1, 239 N.E.2d 285 (1968); State v. McClain, 404
S.W.2d 186 (Mo. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1016
(1967); State v. McElroy, 22 Ohio App. 2d 103, 258
N.E.2d 460 (1970).78 See Speers v. United States, 387 F.2d 698 (10th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 956 (1968); People
v. Burnis, 49 111. 2d 98, 273 N.E.2d 605 (1971); Stone
v. State, 254 Ind. 301, 258 N.E.2d 849 (1970); Shuemak
v. State, 254 Ind. 117, 258 N.E.2d 158 (1970).79See People v. Russel, 27 Mich. App. 654, 183
N.W.2d 845 (1970); State v. Ross, 275 N.C. 550, 169
S.E.2d 875 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1970).
80 State v. Johnson, 261 Iowa 661, 155 N.W. 2d 512
(1968); Sensabaugh v. State, 426 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.
1968). See IowA CoDE ANN., ch. 781, §13 (1950) which
provides:
When the defendant testifies in his own behalf,
he shall be subject to cross examination as an
ordinary witness, but the state shall be strictly
confined therein to the matters testified to in
the examination in chief.
81 
PRoposED Fa. R. EviD. 1041(b). This is designed
to encourage the participation of the accused in pre-
liminary matters. It is necessitated by the scope of the
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not mean that he may artificially limit the scope
of the cross-examination regarding the substantive
issues of the case.8 2 As a general rule, for example,
a defendant who testifies to part of a conversation
or transaction can be examined by the prosecutor
as to the rest of it.P
Cross-examination which tests the overall reli-
ability of a witness' direct testimony without being
inherently prejudicial,M is dearly within the scope
of the direct examination 8' There are a number of
specific areas of inquiry, however, whose connec-
tion with the direct must be demonstrated with
greater specificity in order to remain permissible.
For example, cross-examination regarding particu-
lar actions of the defendant which were gone into
on direct is proper86 Examination of this nature
"wide open" federal rule. United States v. Grimes, 421
F.2d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 932
(1970) (insanity defense, defendant took stand only to
show state of mind, prosecutor could not inquire if he
committed the crime); Shull v. Commonwealth, 475
S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1971) (suppression hearing); People v.
Macintosh, 14 Mich. App. 755, 165 N.W.2d 895 (1968)
(defendant took stand to establish existence of a speech
defect, no reason to impeach credibility); People v.
Lacy, 25 App. Div. 2d 788, 270 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1966)
(cross on merits not allowed in suppression hearing).
12 See United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971) (defendant can-
not limit cross to only those facts which are favorable);
United States v. Doremus, 414 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1969)
(defendant cannot limit himself to favorable issues);
People v. Zerillo, 36 Cal. 2d 222, 214 P.2d 31 (Dist. Ct.
App.), ajf'd, 223 P.2d 223 (1950); People v. Lynn, 16
Cal. App. 3d 259, 94 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1971)- State v.
Richardson, 258 La. 62, 245 So. 2d 357 (1971) (defend-
ant replied, "I'll answer that partially;" could ask, "you
don't want to answer it fully?"); People v. Johnson, 27
N.Y.2d 119, 261 N.E.2d 644, 313 N.Y.S.2d 728, cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 966 (1971) (defendant cannot limit
cross with omissions in his direct testimony).
83 See, e.g., Tafero v. State, 223 So. 2d 564 (Dist. Ct.
App. Fla. 1969).
84 See, e.g., United States v. Huff, 442 F.2d 885 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (likelihood of prejudice if defense witness is
asked if she testified at a preliminary hearing in order
to imply that her story was a recent fabrication).
85 See Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir.
1967); People v. Fields, 271 Cal. App. 2d 500, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 358 (1969) (why does alibi witness remember that
particular day so distinctly?); Salisbury v. State, 222
Ga. 549,150 S.E.2d 819 (1966), (did alibiwitness tell her
story to any law enforcement officers?); People v.
Jordan, 38 Ill. 2d 83, 230 N.E.2d 161 (19673 (reliability
of measurements made at the crime scene); State v.
Mooring, 445 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1969).
86See McBride v. United States, 409 F.2d 1046 (10th
Cir. 1969), a.f'd, 446 F.2d 229 (1971)(defense witness);
United States v. Mousley, 201 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Pa.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 966 (1963) (defendant's
failure to turn records over to I.R.S.); Alexander v.
Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. 1971)(receipt,
transport and sale of stolen goods); State v. Fulford,
290 Minn. 236, 187 N.W.2d 270 (1971)(knife threats
made to deceased); Pierce v. State, 213 So. 2d 769
is frequently used to establish the element of in-
tent.P Questions which delve into the ultimate
issue of guilt itself, i.e., "Did you take little Mary
Elizabeth's head and slam it up against the
wall?", ss are often proper,"9 but the limits of scope
will be quite strictly construed.9"
Direct examination which establishes a particu-
lar theory of defense opens the door for the prose-
cutor to cross-examine and undermine that the-
ory.91 Common examples are the defenses of in-
(Miss. 1968) (similar checks passed elsewhere); State v.
Spenser, 486 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1972)(defendant's use of
identification taken from robbery victim); Jenkins v.
State, 484 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1972) (defendant threatened
prosecution witness). But see United States v. Masters,
450 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1044
(1972) (questions regarding use of marijuana improper
since only bore a minute relationship to the smuggling
charge); United States v. Thomas, 345 F.2d 431 (7th
Cir. 1965)(questions regarding methods of narcotics
dilution and sale objected to).
87See United States v. Higuchi, 437 F.2d 835 (9th
Cir. 1971)(use of aliases); Witt v. United States, 414
F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1969); Candalaria v. People, 493
P.2d 355 (Colo. 1972)(frequent purchases of cough
medicine from robbed drug store, robbery proceeds
included cough medicine); State v. Hale, 206 Kan. 521,
479 P.2d 902 (1971)(arson plan to hide evidence);
State v. Walker, 6 N.C.App. 740, 171 S.E.2d 91 (1969)
(statement made to police regarding need for money to
get a pregnant girl out of trouble).
88See State v. Lamborn, 452 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. 1970)
(defendant makes a sweeping denial of guilt on direct).
89 See Hobbs v. State, 243 Ark. 881, 442 S.W.2d 849
(1968) (did defendant rob the filling station on the
night in question?); People v. McClellan, 71 Cal. 2d
793, 457 P.2d 871, 80 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1969) (was de-
fendant just coming from robbing a liquor store?);
State v. Ragona, 232 Iowa 700, 5 N.W.2d 907 (1942);
State v. Hale, 206 Kan. 521, 479 P.2d 902 (1971) (pos-
session of stolen shotgun); State v. Penley, 277 N.C.
704, 178 S.E.2d 490 (1971) (who planned the escape?);
Levasseur v. State, 464 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn. 1970) (did
defendant's wife aid and abet?).
Questions regarding collateral criminal conduct may
also be permitted. State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91
(N.D. 1965); State v. Howard, 486 P.2d 130 (Ore. 1971)
(did defendant suborn perjury?); State v. Conley, 3
Wash. App. 579, 476 P.2d 544 (1970) (possession of
stolen credit cards). But see State v. Jensen, 189 N.W.2d
919 (Iowa 1971). Accusations of crime may fall within
the scope of proper cross. See also Coleman v. United
States, 295 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 842 (1962) (counter accusations by co-defendants).90 See United States v. Kroll, 402 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1043 (1969) (question--would
you submit to induction now?-was irrelevant since
the issue was whether defendant knowingly failed to
report in the past?); State v. Jensen, 189 N.W.2d 919
(Iowa 1971) (defendant can only be asked the ultimate
question if it was asked on direct).
9"See United States v. Harding, 432 F.2d 1218 (9th
Cir. 1970) (defendant claimed someone else put the
smuggled aliens in his car trunk, could cross as to his
knowledge of alien smuggling rumors); Lewis v. United
States, 373 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
880 (1967) (explanation of money found on his person
when arrested); Jones v. United States, 296 F.2d 398
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sanity0 ' and self defense. 93 Depending on the court
and the scope of the direct examination, the prose-
cutor may be able to establish particular elements
of the crime, 4 or even build his theory of the case
on cross-examination. 5
(D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 327 F.2d 867
(1963) (defendant claimed lack of recollection of chain
of events leading up to the shooting, crossed as to other
rational acts performed, i.e., request to see a lawyer);
Branch v. United States, 171 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1948)
(defense of persecution); People v. Harris, 7 Cal. App.
3d 922, 87 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1970) (claimed shooting acci-
dental); People v. Wilson, 254 Cal. App. 2d 489, 62
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1967); People v. Jones, 6 Ill. App. 3d
669, 286 N.E.2d 87 (1972) (defense witness who had
been arrested and released was crossed as to his valid
reason for release, an alibi); McCranney v. Common-
wealth, 449 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1970) (can request elab-
oration and detail of defense theory); State v. Keegan,
296 A.2d 483 (Me. 1972) (claim of arrest without justi-
fication at wife's insistence, prior assault charge ex-
amined); Commonwealth v. Howard, 356 Mass. 452,
253 N.E.2d 345 (1969) (claimed entrapment, asked if
he ever went to the police); State v. Phillips, 480 S.W.2d
836 (Mo. 1972) (claimed too drunk to form intent,
could cross as to ability to drive a truck from the scene);
State v. Harvey, 449 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1970) (claimed
alibi); State v. Adams, 26 Utah 377, 489 P.2d 1191
(1971) (attempt to show unjustified police harassment,
proper to cross on prior fights and shooting upon the
Moose Lodge).
A conviction may be reversed, however, if the ques-
tioning is prejudicial and not relevant to the defense
asserted. People v. Hicks, 133 Il. App. 2d 424, 273
N.E.2d 450 (1971) (defense of justifiable force, ques-
tion-are you a peaceful man, have you ever been
drunk, have you ever been high or loaded, have you
ever shot the M-1 carbine, have you ever threatened
anyone with it?); People v. Sisti, 87 Ill. App. 2d 107,
230 N.E.2d 500 (1967) (no supporting evidence of
prosecutor's assertions).92 See Hawes v. State, 48 Ala. App. 565, 266 So. 2d
652 (1972) (could bchavior have been caused by drink-
ing); People v. Murray, 247 Cal. App. 2d 730, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 21 (1967) (religious beliefs bearing on insanity);
Chaffin v. State, 227 Ga. 327, 180 S.E.2d 741 (1971)
(asked defendant's previous lawyer why the insanity
defense was not used in the first trial); Tarrants v.
State, 236 So. 2d 360 (Miss. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 920 (1971) (could examine all aspects of defend-
ant's life); State v. Johnson, 69 Wash. 2d 264, 418
P.2d 238 (1966) (passive nature tied to insanity de-
fense, could cross as to conviction for threatening wife's
life).93 See State v. Mayo, 487 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1972)
(proper to cross on prior encounters with deceased, i.e.,
did defendant stab him in the abdomen on a prior
occasion); Commonwealth v. James, 433 Pa. 508, 253
A.2d 97 (1969) (proper to question prior encounters,
i.e., did defendant stab deceased three weeks prior to
his death?); Mosby v. State, 482 S.W.2d 256 (Tex.
1972) (proper to ask if defendant knew victim was
seven months pregnant).
94 See Eberbart v. State, 121 Ga. App. 663, 175
S.E.2d 73 (1970) (hypothetical questions embodying
facts sought to be proved are pro per); People v. Lloyd,
5 Mich. App. 717, 147 N.W.2d 740 (1967) (questions
concerning possession of a gun in an armed robbery
prosecution). But see Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d
818 (8th Cir. 1925) (attempt to establish an independ-
Quite dearly falling within the scope of proper
cross-examination are those questions which are
directed towards the refutation of specific state-
ments made on direct.96 A claim that the defendant
never owned a firearm can be attacked with ques-
tions regarding a weapons charge lodged against
him,9 ' and the assertion that the accused works
every day can be contradicted with conflicting
employment records.0s Similarly, denials of actual
guilt,9  particular acts,100 associations.' or of the
truth of alleged facts' 0' will open the door to cross-
ent element in the government's case which was outside
the scope of the direct was reversible error).
5See United States v. Williams, 455 F.2d 361 (9th
Cir. 1972) (proper if government assured it would sup-
port that theory with evidence); Bennett v. People,
168 Colo. 360, 451 P.2d 443 (1969) (attempt to show
illegal source of funds in defendant's possession); State
v. Mathis, 47 N.J. 455, 221 A.2d 529 (1966), (cross to
show increased money in defendant's possession after
the crime is proper); Commonwealth v. Koch, 446 Pa.
469, 288 A.2d 791 (1972) (questions concerning firearms
handling to show intent).
"' See Daugherty v. State, 225 Ga. 274, 168 S.E.2d
155 (1969) (dates); People v. Parisie, 5 Ill. App. 3d
1009, 287 N.E.2d 310 (1972) (reasons for employment
termination); Commonwealth v. Ventola, 351 Mass.
703, 221 N.E.2d 395 (1966) (employment); People v.
Williams, 26 Mich. App. 218, 182 N.W.2d 347 (1970).
But see Hunter v. State, 48 Ala. App. 232, 263 So. 2d
690 (1972) (attempt to refute claim that defendant did
not know the murder rifle was in his car by repeatedly
asking if defendant shot the rifle at a car a year before
the fatal shooting was irrelevant and highly prejudicial);
State v. Frese, 256 Iowa 289, 127 N.W.2d 83 (1964)
(refuting claim that rape victim consented with guilty
verdicts of co-defendants was collateral and improper).
7See, e.g., Davis v. State, 216 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1968).
0 ' United States v. Rosebar, 463 F.2d 1255 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 463 F.2d
904 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (denied narcotics sale, could
question source of $735 on his person); United States
v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
907 (1967) (denied knowingly running numbers, asked
if he knew a man named Jones, a known numbers
racketeer); Drinkard v. State, 43 Ala. App. 294, 189
So. 2d 583 (1966); People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App. 2d
112, 53 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1966), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
616 (1968) (denied murder).
100 See People v. Duncan, 127 Ill. App. 2d 305, 262
N.E.2d 274 (1970) (defendant denied placing cartons in
a Hertz truck, asked if he rented one); Terry v. Com-
monwealth, 471 S.W.2d 730, (Ky. 1971) (defendant
claimed he never met the robbery victim); Smith v.
State, 223 So. 2d 657 (Miss. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1030 (1970) (KKK activities); State v. Donald-
son, 76 Wash. 2d 513, 458 P.2d 21 (1969) (collateral
acts of sexual misconduct).
101See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d
107 (Ky. 1971) (denied association with co-defendant,
crossed as to imprisonment together); Terry v. Com-
monwealth, 471 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1971) (improper to
cross alibi witness as to her associates in jail since not
connected with offense).
102 See State v. Martinez, 102 Ariz. 178, 427 P.2d 129
(1967) (crossed on questions regarding ownership of
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examination on those subjects. The characteriza-
tions of an individual on the witness stand as a
peaceloving, gentle person' 0 3 or a devoted family
man'04 invites cross-examination, as does his por-
trayal of the facts of the case so that they appear
inconsistent with guilt. 05
weapons); Carlson v; State, 84 Nev. 534, 445 P.2d 157
(1968) (denied sexual attractions for children, crossed
on attempt to kiss a child); Harris v. State 435 S.W.2d
502 (Tex. 1968) (defendant claimed he did not know
how his fingerprints got on a cash box, could ask,
"Must have somebody took and put them up there?").
103 See United States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 969 (1967) (peaceful social
worker, could cross as to ownership of two rifles);
French v. State, 415 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1967) (peaceful
alcoholic, could cross as to use of false leg to kick and
assault people, but approaching impropriety). See also
Cudjo v. State, 498 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1971) (witness
who had been assaulted by the defendant testified to
his peacefulness).
104 See United States v. Talk, 418 F.2d 53 (10th Cir.
1969) (claimed happily married, could ask if he as-
saulted wife); People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App. 2d 112,
53 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1966), cert. dismissed, 392 U.S. 616
(1968); People v. Longstreet, 2 Il. App. 3d 556, 276
N.E.2d 825 (1971) (claimed supported family, shown
to be on welfare); State v. Hansen, 22 Utah 2d 63, 448
P.2d 720 (1968), cerl. denied, 394 U.S. 992 (1969);
Ramer v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 79, 161 N.W.2d 209 (1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969) (family man spending
much time at home, proper to cross on time in a peni-
tentiary).
Other representations inviting cross-examination are
United States v. DeSapio, 435 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1970),
cer. denied, 402 U.S. 998 (1972) (defendant represented
himself as legitimate insurance employee, financial
sources could be crossed); Maxted v. United States,
405 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1969) (defendant portrayed as
anti-marijuana crusader, crossed as to a marijuana
charge lodged against him as being the real reason for
his work as an informer); McCune v. People, 499 P.2d
1184 (Colo. 1972) (wearing of an army uniform on the
stand, invited cross as to attempts to gain a discharge);
Yager v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 413 (1966),
(claimed to be intelligent and worthy of belief, could
cross to show his desire to embarrass public officials and
gain notoriety, i.e., he had stimulated fourteen official
prison investigations through the filing of civil suits).
105 See United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d
Cir. 1972) (cross on tax returns to show gambling
earnings); Melendez-Rodriquez v. United States, 441
F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1971) (defendant's assertion that he
would not jeopardize his pending immigration status
by smuggling aliens was countered by questions show-
ing a prior insensitivity to that status); Romero v.
People, 170 Colo. 234, 460 P.2d 784 (1969) (claimed he
and his murdered wife had reconciled differences and
were preparing to purchase a mobile home, cross to
show improbability of that claim with questions show-
ing bad debts and poor credit rating); People v. Scott,
82 Ill. App. 2d 109, 227 N.E.2d 72 (1967) (defendant
claimed it was unbelievable that anyone could be raped
in an elevator, properly crossed as to his prior convic-
tion for a rape in an elevator); State v. Edwards, 435
S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1968) (assertion that a confession was
induced by police officers telling defendant that his
wife would have nothing further to do with him if he
As previously stated, the witness' credibility
almost always is in issue.00 Since cross-examina-
tion regarding previous criminal convictions is a
major method of impeaching credibility, in that
sense at least, questions regarding prior criminal
activity are within the scope of the direct examina-
tion. When inquiry delving into past illegal conduct
is warranted by affirmative testimony on the
witness stand, however, the extent of that ques-
tioning is governed by the guidelines previously
discussed in this section. That inquiry is frequently
occasioned by the seemingly inexplicable denial
on direct examination of prior criminal involve-
ment for which there is a readily accessible record-
For whatever the reason, defendants and defense
witnesses routinely and falsely deny arrests,
°7 con-
victions0 s and the commission of criminal acts in
general.10 9 A frequent claim is "I haven't been in
did not confess was rebutted with questions showing
divorce suit and support and alimony motions had been
filed); State v. Miller, 258 S.C. 572, 190 S.E.2d 23
(1972) (defendant asserted he pled guilty every time
he was properly charged and therefore was innocent of
instant charge, crossed as to the penalty for armed
robbery to show his reluctance to plead guilty because
of the sentence he would receive, not because of inno-
cence).106 See notes 71-72 supra.
07 See State v. Lopez, 107 Ariz. 214, 484 P.2d 1045
(1971) (crossed on arrest and deportation proceedings);
Dixon v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1972)
(misdemeanor indecent exposure conviction used to
impeach denial of arrest on morals charge); Wither-
spoon v. State, 486 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1972) (testified
never in jail more than one day, crossed on three-and-
one-half year imprisonment for AWOL).
108 See Newman v. United States, 331 F.2d 968 (8th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 975 (1965); People v.
Bey, 42 Ill. 2d 139, 246 N.E.2d 287 (1969). See also
State v. Miles, 492 P.2d 497 (Ore. 1972) (claimed no
traffic convictions within last three years, crossed on
driving while intoxicated, driving without a license,
driving with a suspended license).
'
0 9 See United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (denied throwing
add on a plate glass window, had done exactly that in
a union dispute); People v. Doerr, 266 Cal. App. 2d 36,
71 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1968) (use of marijuana denied);
Berlin v. State, 12 Md. App. 48, 277 A.2d 468 (1971)
(claimed never sold drugs illegally before, had sold to
a policeman); Commonwealth v. French, 357 Mass.
356, 259 N.E.2d 195 (1970), vac. for resentencing, 408
U.S. 936 (1972) (denied loansharking); Commonwealth
v. Bastone, 211 Pa. Super. 509, 239 A.2d 863 (1968)
('9 never robbed anyone in my life," crossed on four
convictions); Hamilton v. State, 480 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.
1972) ('I never been inside a burglary before. I didn't
know nothing about how to rob or nothing." Properly
crossed as to other robberies where he was identified as
a participant); Guillory v. State, 400 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.
1966) (claim that defendant never tried to take any-
one's life, crossed on incident not resulting in a convic-
tion where he struck a person with an iron pipe). But
see People v. Jackson, 95 Ill. App. 2d 193, 238 N.E.2d
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any trouble since .... . 110 When the prosecutor is
able to refute these erroneous representations with
questions based upon a record of prior criminal
involvement, significant damage may be done to
the defendant's case.
When reference is made on direct examination
to prior criminal activity, the door is often opened
to relevant and legitimate inquiry into that area
on cross-examination."' This inquiry, however, is
not as broad as is permitted when the witness (in-
cluding the defendant) makes false representations
or denials,"' and, therefore, often results in preju-
dicial questioning."' If the jurisdiction's limita-
tions of scope are followed, however, the prosecutor
may explore the general area of the criminal be-
havior"4 as well as some details of a particular
offense." 5
196 (1968) ("I don't carry a knife." Improper to cross
on concealed weapons arrest without charge).
The denial must be in clear contradiction of the
record. United States v. Vigo, 435 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir.
1970), cerl. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971) (defendant
testified that she did not know anyone who was con-
victed of heroin charges who dealt with her co-defend-
ant. Cross-examination regarding her husband's heroin
conviction and friendship with her co-defendant was
improper because there was no evidence that he dealt
with the co-defendant); McKee v. State, 488 P.2d 1039
(Alas. 1971) (claim that defendant never stabbed or
raped anyone was not contradicted by a threatened
assault); People v. Matlock, 11 Cal. App. 3d 453, 89
Cal. Rptr. 862 (1970) ("I don't enjoy beating on one
at no time" was not a denial of prior assaults. Cross on
them was therefore error).
"' See State v. Lopez, 107 Ariz. 214, 484 P.2d 1045
(1971); State v. Elbert, 471 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1971)
(crossed on gambling and disturbing the peace); Heart-
field v. State, 470 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1971); Barnett v.
State, 445 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1969) (aggravated assault
and shoplifting).
1'See, e.g., People v. Otkins, 114 fl1. App. 2d 439,
252 N.E.2d 906 (1969).
1 See, e.g., People v. Parish, 6 Ill. App. 3d 587, 285
N.E.2d 606 (1972); People v. Hines, 87 Ill. App. 2d
283, 232 N.E.2d 111 (1967).
"See Rogers v. United States, 411 F.2d 228 (10th
Cir. 1969) (defendant mentioned jail stay, improper to
cross about various jails and compare them); People v.
Parish, 6 Ill. App. 3d 587, 285 N.E.2d 606 (1972) (de-
fendant's brother testified that defendant was afraid
of the police. Improper to extensively cross regarding
convictions, specific acts and sentences); People v.
Hines, 87 Ill. App. 2d 283, 232 N.E.2d 111 (1967)
(admission of narcotics conviction did not open door to
searching prejudicial cross concerning use of, type of,
addiction to and money spent on narcotics).
14 See Patterson v. United States, 413 F.2d 1001 (5th
Cir. 1969) (probation); United States v. Sisk, 390 F.2d
652 (4th Cir. 1968) (bank robbery); United States v.
Countryman, 311 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1962) (use of nar-
cotics); United States v. Coleman, 340 F. Supp. 451
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (prior record and knowledge of un-
related crimes); Howard v. State, 491 P.2d 154 (Alas.
1971) (gambling and co-habitating with a woman not
his wife); People v. Petty, 3 Ill. App. 3d 951,279 N.E.2d
To terminate the discussion of the scope of
cross-examination, a brief mention should be made
of re-cross and further cross. Re-cross follows re-
direct examination and is limited to the explana-
tion of new matters brought out on re-directUn It is
of course subject to the judge's discretion."7 Fur-
ther cross is an extension of the original cross-
examination. Subject to court discretion, a witness
may be recalled and his examination continued?' 8
For example, a defendant might be re-called re-
garding an alibi defense which was testified to by a
witness who followed the defendant's original
examination.un
II F= AImNDMENT LIMITATIONS
It is axiomatic that an accused who testifies on
his own behalf is subject to cross-examination, and
to some extent, therefore, waives his fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination." 0 (This is
509 (1972) (number of arrests); People v. Johnson, 2
Ill. App. 3d 53, 276 N.E.2d 107 (1971) (nature of crime);
Baker v. State, 249 Ind. 117, 231 N.E.2d 21 (1967)
(crimes); State v. Scroggins, 199 Kan. 108, 427 P.2d
603 (1967) (forgery); State v. Rush, 248 Ore. 568, 436
P.2d 266 (1968) (jail term); Commonwealth v. Smith,
432 Pa. 517, 248 A.2d 24 (1968) (prior arrests).
"5 See Martin v. United States, 404 F.2d 640 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); People v. Owens, 41 Ill. 2d 465, 244 N.E.2d
188 (1969) (asked about use of narcotics, what con-
stitutes an outfit); People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 551,
194 N.W.2d 709 (1972) (testified he dealt in illicit
guns, asked if he carried concealed weapons); State v.
Baca, 81 N.M. 686, 472 P.2d 651 (1970) (asked about
specific thefts); State v. McDaniel, 272 N.C. 556, 158
S.E.2d 874, rev'd 392 U.S. 665, a.'d, 274 N.C. 574, 164
S.E.2d 469 (1968) (asked about type of weapon used in
prior assault); Commonwealth v. Flagg, 212 Pa. Super.
344, 242 A.2d 921 (1968) (asked about specific juvenile
offenses); Harmon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 442, 185
S.E.2d 48 (1971) (asked about what degree was the
murder charge).
16See McCopmcx §32; LA. Rxv. STAT., ch. 15,
§281 (1967). Bt see State v. Warren, 271 So. 2d 527
(La. 1973) (although recross is limited to scope of re-
direct, no abuse in some leeway); State v. Giles, 253
La. 533, 218 So. 2d 585 (1969) (defendant subject to
re-cross on entire case).
17 See People v. Daniels, 16 Cal. App. 3d 36, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 628 (1971); State v. Harder, 3 N.C. App. 426,
165 S.E.2d 43 (1969).
11 See Williams v. State, 45 Ala. App. 138,227 So. 2d
135 (1969) (defendant foundation laid for his impeach-
ment); People v. Barboza, 212 Cal. App. 2d 920, 28
Cal. Rptr. 805 (1963) (defendant); State v. West, 17
N.C. App. 5, 193 S.E.2d 381 (defendant).
119 See, e.g., Parkam v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 458, 192
N.W.2d 838 (1972).
2
0 See the discussion of this area in Carlson, supra
note 76. Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 683 (3d Cir.
1966); Bolling v. United States, 18 F.2d 863 (4th Cir.
1927); Zilka v. Beto, 334 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex.
1971); United States ex rel. Smith v. United States,
358 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1966).
The waiver of the privilege is not suspended when the
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not true for an ordinary witness who does not cast
aside the protection of the fifth amendment by the
act of taking the witness stand.) What is quite
unclear, however, is the breadth of that waiver.
In this regard one must distinguish between the
"scope of the direct" and the "waiver of the Fifth,"
for as Dean McCormick has explained,
Clearly the two matters are not identical, and
fundamentally different factors are involved
in each. The scope of cross-examination is es-
sentially a matter of control over the order of
production of evidence; the primary policy
being served is the orderly conduct of the
trial. The waiver of the privilege, however, in-
volves the extent to which an accused must
forfeit the protection of the privilege to place
his own version of the facts before the trier
of fact."
This dicotomy is most acute in jurisdictions
favoring the "wide open" rule of cross-examina-
tion. The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence for
example, which provide for the "wide open" rule,
make clear that they do not attempt to control the
extent of an accused's waiver.lu In the absence of
clear constitutional guidelines provided by Su-
preme Court litigation, the various jurisdictions
use their formulations of permissible scope as a
standard or gauge by which the fifth amendment
waiver can be judged.
The fifth amendment has been deemed waived
consistent with the scope of the direct examination
accused temporarily leaves the witness stand. See State
v. Coty, 229 A.2d 205 (Me. 1967).
The defendant is not subject to cross-examination by
having made unsworn statements. See Smith v. State,
124 Ga. App. 510, 184 S.E.2d 225 (1971); Wright v.
State, 113 Ga. App. 436, 148 S.E.2d 333 (1966); Shof-
feitt v. State, 107 Ga. App. 217, 129 S.E.2d 572 (1963).
But see Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76 (9th
Cir. 1963) (defendant acting as own counsel, made
continued unsworn statements in spite of fifth amend-
ment warning by the judge, who eventually asked a
few questions while the defendant was examining a
witness).
A defendant may be subjected to cross if he performs
a demonstration of some sort before the jury. See
Machin v. State, 213 So. 2d 499 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.),
cert. denied, 221 So. 2d 747 (1968) (running to demon-
strate lack of a limp which the guilty party was sup-
posed to have). At least one court has ruled that if the
defendant is unrepresented by counsel, an instruction
about the waiver of the fifth amendment or taking the
stand does not serve as a waiver. See People v. Glaser,
238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 880 (1966).
2n See McComaicx §132.
inSee PROpOSED FED. R. Evm. 611(b).
by some courts,sa sometimes with language advis-
ing caution by the prosecutor 24 Other courts have
taken the position that the waiver is quite broad"5
and may include "whatever has legitimate bearing
upon the question of guilt," 126 or "all matters per-
taining to the prosecution." '' Most frequently,
however, courts construe the waiver as including all
matters relevant toP related to,12 or within the
extent of the direct examination.:" The waiver may
be significantly extended, therefore by a general
denial of guilt.18 '
There is scant case law on the question of
whether a waiver necessarily must extend to all
counts of a multi-count indictment, but the few
"'See Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304
(1900); Harrold v. Territory of Oklahoma, 169 F. 47
(8th Cir. 1909); People v. Ing, 65 Cal. 2d 603, 422
P.2d 590, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1967); Commonwealth v.
Camm, 443 Pa. 253 277 A.2d 325 (1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1046 (19725.
"'See People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 457 P.2d
841, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969) (prosecutor must make his
own case without assistance from defendant's silence or
compelled testimony).
"2 See United States v. Doremus, 414 F.2d 252 (6th
Cir. 1969) (all inquiries pertinent to the issue on trial);
State v. Zappia, 8 Ariz. App. 549, 448 P.2d 119 (1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 861 (1969); Sanders v. State, 260
So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1972) (any relevant issue); May v.
State, 211 So. 2d 845 (Miss. 1968) (anything relevant to
the case, once a cloak of immunity is cast off, it cannot
be resumed at will). See also PnoPosED FED. R. Evm.
608(b) which provides that questions regarding prior
conduct of the defendant may be asked if they are
probative of the truth and not remote.
26 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 163 Mass. 411,
40 N.E. 189 (1895).
InSee, e.g., Lumpkins v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.2d
535 (Ky. 1968).
1'See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, reh.
denied, 356 U.S. 948 (1958); United States v. Dana,
457 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1972); Nash v. United States,
405 F.2d 1047 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lyon,
397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846
(1968); United States v. ex rel. Irwin v. Pate, 357 F.2d
911 (7th Cir. 1966); Carpenter v. United States, 264
F.2d 565 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959);
Howard v. Sigler, 325 F. Supp. 272 (D. Neb. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 454 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1972);
State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 178 S.E.2d 449 (1971).
"'1 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)
(defendant must take into account the matters which
may be brought out on cross); Sandy v. United States,
386 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1004
(1968).
"'See Melendez-Rodriquez v. United States, 441
F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1971). See also DeRose v. United
States, 315 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
846 (1963) (testified about pretrial statements, could
be crossed on them); People v. Kadison, 243 Cal. App.
2d 162, 52 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1966) (cannot limit testi-
mony and cross to favorable facts).
"'See People v. Eaton, 275 Cal. App. 2d 584, 80
Cal. Rptr. 192 (1969); People v. Ing, 65 Cal. 2d 603,
422 P.2d 590, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1967).
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cases on point indicate that the answer is in the
affirmative 32 This holding has been severely
criticized by commentators in light of the fact that
if the counts were severed, the defendant would
have the option of testifying at each particular
trial."
It is well settled that a prosecutor may not cross-
examine the accused regarding his silence at the
time of the arrest or his request for the assistance of
counsel.i34 Nevertheless, there are avenues of in-
quiry in this area which can be explored under the
proper circumstances. The courts have defined a
legal "twilight zone" where the accused's right to
silence merges with an obligation to give the police
the explanation that he offers to the jury at trial."' 5
The theory here, is that if the defendant tells the
court that he found burglary proceeds on the
ground and was arrested while on his way to deliver
them to the police, it is reasonable to ask why he
didn't say that to the arresting officers." 6 Although
there is authority to the contrary,13 most courts
"'See People v. Perez, 65 Cal. 2d 615, 422 P.2d 597,
55 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1967), writ dismissed, 395 U.S. 208
(1969) (defendant denied two counts of a four count
indictment, the court finding that he was subject to
inquiry on them all); see also United States v. Baker,
262 F. Supp. 657 (D.C. 1966), rea'd on other grounds,
401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (court postponed sev-
erance motion for a later determination of the prejudice
to defendant). But see State v. Grody, 153 Conn. 26,
211 A.2d 674 (1965) (by taking stand at trial defendant
did not waive the privilege insofar as habitual crim-
inality portion of the indictment was concerned).
"'See McCoimcK §132.
"3 See Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st
Cir. 1965) (questions regarding silence and request for
an attorney); People v. Williams, 26 Mich. App. 218,
182 N.W.2d 347 (1970); State v. Hovey, 80 N.M. 373,
456 P.2d 206 (1966) (no error since guilt not inferred
from the question which was unrelated to details of the
crime); People v. Finney, 39 N.Y.2d 749, 332 N.Y.S.2d
83 (1972); State v. Young, 27 Ohio St. 2d 310, 272
N.E.2d 353 (1971), vac. for resentencing, 408 U.S. 940
(1972).
"5 See Johnson v. People, 172 Colo. 406, 473 P.2d 974
(1970) (no direct reference to refusal to speak to police);
Reilly v. State, 212 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1968) (questions
related to impeachment of story rather than to his
silence).
16 See Sims v. Salyton, 333 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Va.
1971) (questions about defendant's failure to tell police
he heard the fatal shotgun blast); Kelley v. State, 478
S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1972) (questions also were proper
regarding failure to allow a vehicle search).
"vSee United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th
Cir. 1969); Sharpe v. United States, 410 F.2d 969 (5th
Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th
Cir. 1969) (distinguished from a situation where the
defendant fully denies ever making any statement to the
police); United States ex rel. Young v. Follette, 308 F.
Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (harmless error in light of
the evidence); State v. Greer, 17 Ariz. App. 162, 496
P.2d 152 (1972); People v. Knight, 20 Cal. App. 3d
hold that when a defendant presents a detailed
exculpatory explanation"' or alibi3 at trial, it is a
proper test of the story's credibility to question if
that story had ever been offered previously. Oc-
casionally, the door will be opened to this inquiry
by the defendant on direct examination broaching
the subject of his prior silence. 140 Questions of an
45, 97 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1970) (harmless error to ask
about verbal reaction to arrest due to overwhelming
evidence and failure to move to strike); Hines v. People,
497 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1972); Cowan v. Commonwealth,
407 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1966) (asked why he did not
turn himself in if it was self defense); State v. Elmore,
467 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1971) (self defense claim, no duty
to assert it while in jail); State v. Griffin, 120 N.J.
Super. 13, 293 A.2d 217 (1972) (self defense claim, the
court distinguished between questions on pre-Miranda
and post-Miranda silence and finds that only the latter
is improper); State v. Lopez, 503 P.2d 1180 (N.M.
1972) (claimed he thought he was helping a neighbor
move and was not aware he was participating in a
burglary until he was arrested).
m See United States v. Driscoll, 449 F.2d 894 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972); United States
v. Ramires, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 404
U.S. 987 (1971) (claim of duress by police officer);
United States v. Pledger, 409 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1969)
(claim that he thought a federal agent he assaulted
was a hijacker); People v. Thompson, 25 Cal. App. 3d
132, 101 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1972) (arguably an attempt
to test credibility of story); People v. Davidson, 1 Cal.
App. 3d 292, 81 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1969) (claim that a
third man" committed the crime); People v. Queen,
8 Il. App. 3d 858, 290 N.E.2d 631 (1972); State v.
Crowe, 207 Kan. 473, 486 P.2d 503 (1971); State v.
Wade, 206 Kan. 347, 479 P.2d 811 (1971); People v.
Bobo, 41 Mich. App. 362, 200 N.W.2d 335 (1972)
(claimed saw two men running near crime scene, this
cross differs from making an evidentiary point of the
refusal to make a statement); People v. Calhoun, 33
Mich. App. 141, 189 N.W.2d 743 (1971) (defendant
blamed robbery on an apparently imaginary character
named Billy); People v. Russel, 27 Mich. App. 654,
183 N.W.2d 845 (1970) (defense to murder was that
he was making a citizen's arrest on a reckless driver);
State v. Burt, 107 N.J. Super. 390,258 A.2d 711 (1969),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (self defense and acci-
dental shooting, distinguishes between comment on
silence and failure to present a reasonable explanation);
Taylor v. State, 188 S.E.2d 850 (S.C. 1972).
It is proper to question on the defendant's course of
action following the arrival of the police. See Ester v.
United States, 253 A.2d 537 (D.C. 1969). If the de-
fendant makes exculpatory statements at the time of
his arrest, he may be questioned as to omissions or
inconsistencies. See United States v. Cordova, 421 F.2d
471 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 941 (1970).
"39 See United States v. White, 378 F.2d 908 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 984 (1967); People v. Far-
ley, 267 Cal. App. 2d 214, 72 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1968);
State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279 (1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969); State v. Robideau,
70 Wash. 2d 994, 425 P.2d 880 (1967).
140 Tafero v. State, 223 So. 2d 564 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1969); People v. Garda, 3 Ill. App. 3d 695, 279 N.E.2d
506 (1972) (reference to his willingness to be extradicted
communicated to a public defender); People v. Shugar,
29 Mich. App. 139, 185 N.W.2d 178 (1970); State v.
Vol. 65
CROSS-EXAMINATION
alibi witness regarding his prior silence do not raise
the fifth amendment issue' (unless of course the
answer would expose him to a criminal prosecu-
tion).,-
It is violative of the fifth amendment and there-
fore improper to question a defendant regarding his
silence at an earlier trial,4' at the trial of a co-de-
fendant T 4 in a preliminary hearing,14' or before a
grand jury."' Similarly, inquiry into an earlier
guilty plea to the instant charge is not allowed. 47
Questions which may expose the defendant to
additional criminal charges may be asked if the
subject matter falls within the initial fifth amend-
ment waiver."' If the defendant does legitimately
invoke the fifth amendment during the course of
cross-examination, the prosecutor should be careful
not to draw improper, adverse inferences from the
assertion of the privilege.149
Davidson, 457 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. 1970) (claim that he
was not allowed to tell his story to the police and refused
to sign a statement afterwards).
"'People v. McCorry, 51 Ill. 2d 343, 282 N.E.2d
425 (1972); People v. McMath, 104 Ill. App. 2d 302,
244 N.E.2d 330 (1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970);
Holtzdaw v. State, 451 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1970).
2 State v. Miller, 485 S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1972) (homo-
sexual behavior).
"' Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961) (de-
fendant took the stand for the first time in his third
trial and bolstered his insanity defense by babbling.
The prosecutor caused reversal with the question
"Willie, you were tried on two other occasions. This
is the first time you have gone on the stand, isn't it
Willie?").
'44See Messier v. State, 428 P.2d 338 (Okla. 1967);
Dean v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 666, 166 S.E.2d 228
(1969). Bit see Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494
(1926); Funderbunk v. State, 12 Md. App. 481, 280
A.2d 4 (1971).
14" See, e.g., People v. Jordan, 7 Mich. App. 28, 151
N.W.2d 242 (1967) (this is the classic example of the
one question too many).
1
46 See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391
(1957); United States v. Williams, 464 F.2d 927 (8th
Cir. 1972); State v. Boscia, 93 N.J. Super. 586, 226
A.2d 643 (1967); People v. Leo, 23 N.Y.2d 556, 245
N.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
147 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henderson, 217 Pa.
Super. 329, 272 A.2d 267 (1970).
"'3 See People v. Harris, 18 Cal. App. 3d 1, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 468 (1971) (forgery); State v. Hemphill, 460
S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1970) (concealed weapons charges);
State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972).
But see Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943)
(privilege applicable); UTAH CODE AN. §78-24-9
(1953) ("... he need not give an answer which will
have a tendency to subject him to punishment for a
felony .... "). The privilege is not available to a de-
fendant who fears incriminating a co-defendant, State
v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727 (1972); nor to a
defendant who seeks to avoid examination regarding
prior felony convictions, Stubbs v. State, 243 A.2d 57
(Me. 1968).
"'9 See Birns v. Perini, 426 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1970),
III CRARACTER. WITNESSES
As mentioned previously,"" a defendant (or a
witness) on direct examination may authorize in-
quiry into limited areas of his character by repre-
senting himself in a particular light"' For example,
he may testify to his reputation for peace and quiet
and be cross-examined to refute that assertion. 1
Questions which explore the defendant's specific
character for truth and veracity are governed by
the rules of scope or by legislation." 3 If it has not
been put in issue, however, the prosecutor should
cautiously avoid the villification of an accused's
general character, for the courts will no longer
entertain a quest for "the villain of the piece." -4
In addition to offering evidence of his good char-
acter while on the witness stand himself, a defend-
ant may choose to call upon a character witness to
testify to his noteworthy reputation in the com-
munity. Although the presentation of a character
witness may lead to particularly devastating cross-
examination, this type of witness is called to the
stand with great regularity. It has been said that
character evidence alone may raise a reasonable
doubt of guilt, 15' and apparently this feeling is
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971) (nor was there a de-
liberate attempt to force the invocation of the privilege).
1"0 See notes 103-04 supra.
"1 See PROPOSED FED. R. Evim. 404(a)(1) (evidence
of a pertinent trait of the accused's character can be
used to rebut his assertion that his character is incon-
sistent with guilt); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-447 (1964)
(character evidence tending to prove conduct may be
admitted only after introduced by the defendant).
12 See, e.g., Kinnett v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d
417 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 924 (1967).
15 See PROPOSU FED. R. Evm. 608(a) which pro-
vides: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked
or supported by evidence in the form of reputation or
opinion, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evi-
dence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness." The comment following the rule
recognizes cross-examination of this nature as being
recognized by the bulk of judicial authority). Similarly,
CAL. Evm. CoDE- §786 (West 1966) provides: "Evi-
dence of traits of his character other than honesty or
veracity, or their opposites, is inadmissible to attack or
support the credibility of a witness." See also KA-.
STAT. Ai2. §60-422(c) (1964) which provides that
"evidence of traits of his (the witness') character other
than honesty or veracity or their opposites shall be
inadmissible."
M McCo mcx §41. See also State v. Briscoe, 78
Wash. 2d 338, 474 P.2d 267 (1970). But see McGowen
v. State, 221 Tenn. 442, 427 S.W.2d 555 (1968) (proper
attack on a defendant's character to question his homo-
sexual activities). As with other areas of cross-examina-
tion, the courts exercise a broad power of discretion.
United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
115See, e.g., Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S.
361 (1896).
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shared by many experienced members of the crimi-
nal bar.'56
When a witness is called to testify that the ac-
cused has a reputation for peacefulness, honesty, or
other qualities of character which are inconsistent
with the conduct that is charged, the witness may
be broadly cross-examined"' in order to discredit
his reliability.1" This cross-examination provides a
vehicle by which negative information concerning
the defendant's background, which would not
otherwise be admissible, may be laid before the
trier of fact. 59
The cross-examination of a character witness
delves into his familiarity with the defendant's
reputation 62 and may focus either on his sources of
information, or the frequency with which he dis-
cussed the issue. 62 It also may disparage the stand-
156 in the 1973 bribery trial of seventh circuit Judge
(and former Governor of the State of Illinois) Otto
Kerner, Paul Connelly, a veteran trial lawyer, called
to the witness stand approximately eighteen character
witnesses including General William P. Westmoreland
and Roy Wilkins.
1 See United States v. Straughan, 453 F.2d 422
(8th Cir. 1972) (wide latitude); United States v. Gosser,
339 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1964), rek. denied, 382 U.S. 922
(1965) (broad latitude); Lane v. Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963) (wide lati-
tnde).
" See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948); United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Benson, 369 F.2d 569 (6th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 903 (1968); State v.
Elliot, 25 Ohio St. 2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971),
vacated for resentencing, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Little, 295 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1972); Brown v.
State, 477 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1972). See generally Cap-
lan, Defendants' Character Testimony in the Criminal
Case (N.D.A.A. 1971).
159 See, e.g., People v. Swingle, 28 App. Div. 2d 1063,
284 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1967). This type of searching in-
quiry will be grounds for reversal if the witness being
examined has not actually testified as a character wit-
ness. See also State v. Fierro, 108 Ariz. 268, 496 P.2d
129 (1972) (parole officer asked if he made the state-
ment that he always thought the defendant was a
rapist); Hurt v. State, 480 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. 1972)
(psychiatrist asked about thirteen acts of criminal
conduct).
160 See United States v. Polack 442 F.2d 446 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (19h); Commonwealth,
v. Little, 295 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1972); Smotherman v.
State, 455 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1970) (limited contact
with the defendant in recent years). See also Strickland
v. State, 269 So. 2d 340 (Miss. 1972) (proper to ask a
character witness if he was familiar with the instant
case, since no details were explored). One may ask the
witness' personal opinion of the accused's character.
See United States v. Benton, 457 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir.
1972). But see State v. Thompson, 472 S.W.2d 351
(Mo. 1971) (improper to ask character witness if he
and his father were the only ones who thought the
accused had a good reputation, but no reversal).
161See United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132 (7th
Cir. 1972) (opportunity to acquire information, num-
ards he applied to reach his character assessment.
The primary method of examination is to question
the witness' knowledge of the various components
of the defendant's reputation. The particular form
that these questions must take has been fashioned
quite precisely by the courts.
The leading case in the area is Michelson v.
United States,162 which represents the majority view
that questions which inquire as to the witness'
knowledge of negative aspects of the defendant's
life history must be asked with the prefix "Have
you heard... ?" 10 A few jurisdictions allow the
questions to be asked in the older "Do you
know ... ?" form.62 While the use of the latter,
which is generally considered improper form, will
not always require reversal, 65 the appellate courts
have severely rebuked prosecutors who have devi-
ated from the Michelson standard.
166
Although the prosecutor may not question a
her of people spoken to, and how long the reports have
prevailed); United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 287
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Harrison v. State, 120 Ga. App. 812,
172 S.E.2d 328 (1970) (statements of particular indi-
viduals).
162 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
'
2 See United States v. Machado, 457 F.2d 1372
(9th Cir. 1972); State v. Pierce, 208 Kan. 19, 490 P.2d
584 (1971); State v. Hinton, 206 Kan. 500, 479 P.2d
910 (1971); Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.
1972); Johnson v. State, 459 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1970);
Whitaker v. State, 421 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1967); Smith
v. State, 411 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1967).
I" See State v. Newte, 188 Neb. 412, 197 N.W.2d
403 (1972) (any prejudice vitiated by defendant's own
admission on direct examination). See also Valdez v.
State, 472 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. 1971); State v. Briscoe,
78 Wash. 2d 338, 474 P.2d 267 (1970) (but the jurisdic-
tion is moving towards the accepted form; here asked,
do you know or have you heard).
6 I See Veith v. State, 267 So. 2d 480 (Ala. 1972)
(not grounds for reversal)- Robinson v. State, 44 Ala.
App. 205, 205 So. 2d 524 4967) (improper but not re-
versible); Comi v. State, 202 Md. 472, 97 A.2d 129
(1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 898 (1953) (questions
objectionable in form only); People v. Stedman, 41
Mich. App. 393, 200 N.W.2d 370 (1972) (not auto-
matically reversible error). But see Palmer v. State, 47
Ala. App. 235, 252 So. 2d 657 (1971) (reversible to ask
the witness, a police officer, if he ever arrested the
accused). An alternate form such as, "Has there been
any report made to you?" may be proper. See Campbell
v. State, 480 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1972).
166 In Gandy v. United States, 386 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1004 (1968), the court wrote:
Prosecutors, however, would be well advised to
carefully acquaint themselves with the opinion in
Michelson, clearly a masterpiece in the field, and
particularly that language (T)he form of the in-
quiry, 'Have you heard?' has general approval,
and 'Do you know?' is not allowed.
See also Wilcox v. United States, 387 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 917 (1972); Bryan v. United




character witness regarding traits or behavior of
the defendant which are irrelevant to the areas
opened in direct examination,16 he may inquire if
the witness has heard of certain illegal acts com-
mitted by the accused' such as assaults'69 or even
sexual crimes' 70 Similarly, the prosecutor may in-
quire if the witness has heard negative rumors
about the defendant which may have circulated
throughout the community.'7
16 See PROPOSED FED. R. Evim. 405(a) United;
States v. Grey, 422 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970). See also United States v.
Wooden, 420 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (twenty drunk-
eness arrests); Aaron v. United States, 397 F.2d 584
(5th Cir. 1968) (illicit love affair); Gross v. United
States, 394 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1013 (1970); United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582
(2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964) (if
defense witness offers irrelevant evidence his testimony
should be stricken rather than allow prosecutor to
introduce irrelevant prejudicial information); Hamilton
v. State, 43 Ala. App. 192, 186 So. 2d 108 (1966), cert.
denied, 279 Ala. 687, 186 So. 2d 114 (1966) (did defend-
ant "cat" around); People v. Redmond, 50 Ill. 2d 313,
278 N.E.2d 766 (1970); Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d
617 (Tex. 1972). But see State v. McCody, 458 S.W.2d
356 (Mo. 1970) (questions need not refute only those
specific traits testified to).
168 See PnorosED FED. R. Evm. 405(a) provides
that "On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into
relevant specific instances of conduct." See also United
States v. Pingleton, 458 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1972) (stole
a gum machine); Gross v. United States, 394 F.2d 216
(8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1013 (1970);
Green v. State, 45 Ala. App. 549, 233 So. 2d 243 (1970)
(reputation for carrying a long knife); Anderson v.
State, 44 Ala. App. 388, 210 So. 2d 436 (1968); Banks
v. State, 133 Ga. App. 661, 149 S.E.2d 415 (1966) (but
reversible to ask inaccurate hypothetical question and
not allow an explanation by the witness); People v.
Stedman, 41 Mich. App. 393, 200 N.W.2d 370 (1972);
Carter v. State, 84 Nev. 592, 446 P.2d 165 (1968);
State v. Elliot, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806
(1971), vacated for resentencing, 408 U.S. 939 (1972).
But see United States v. Rudolph, 403 F.2d 805 (6th
Cir. 1968) (prejudicial to cross on an unrelated crime,
a murder plot, no relevance to guilt or innocence of
crime charged); People v. Hunt, 132 Ill. App. 2d 314,
270 N.E.2d 243 (1971) (prejudicial to ask if witnesses
knew defendant carried a blackjack); People v. Meyers,
94 Ill. App. 2d 340, 236 N.E.2d 786 (1968) (improper
to ask about specific acts, but no error since already
brought out by accused on direct). See also the rule in
State v. Smith, 5 N.C. App. 635, 169 S.E.2d 4 (1969)
(cannot ask about specific bad acts unless admitted
by the defendant on direct).
16 See e.g., Smith v. State, 411 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.
1967).
170 SeePeople v. Wrigley, 70 Cal. Rptr. 116, 443 P.2d
580 (1968) adultery leading to a marriage breakup);
Hart v. State, 447 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1969) (sodomy);
State v. Wilson, I Wash. App. 1001, 465 P.2d 413
(1970) (two acts, indecent liberties with a child).
71 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948); United States v. Longfellow 406 F.2d 415
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 998 (1969); Aaron v.
United States, 397 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Blane, 375 F.2d 249 (6th Cir.), re/. denid,
The character witness may be questioned regard-
ing his knowledge that the person upon whose
reputation he has reported has been accusedr2 ar-
rested' " or convicted of a crimePl While there is
some authority which supports the view that minor
offenses such as traffic violations 7 5 should not be
mentioned, juvenile offenses appear to be proper
subjects of inquiry in a few jurisdictions' 7 There
is no limitation concerning the remoteness of any
389 U.S. 998 (1967) (newspaper stories); United States
v. Gosser, 339 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1964), reh. denied,
382 U.S. 922 (1965) (rumored associations with a known
gambler); United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582 (2d
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964); People v.
Harris, 7 Cal. App. 3d 922, 87 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1970);
People v. Kramer, 259 Cal. App. 2d 452, 66 Cal. Rptr.
638 (1968) (defendant rumored to perform abortions);
Steigler v. State, 277 A.2d 662 (Del. 1971), vacatedfor
resentencing, 408 U.S. 939 (1972) (rumors of adultery
and embezzlement); Miller v. State, 418 P.2d 220
(Okla. 1966); State v. Nuckols, 152 W.Va. 736, 166
S.E.2d 3 (1968).
in See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 194, 457 P.2d
433 (1969).
'73See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948); United States v. Dalton, 465 F.2d 32 (5th Cir
1972); United States v. Hykel, 461 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.
1972); United States v. Wells, 437 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir.
1971) (state and federal arrests and indictments);
United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Hendron v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 175
(Ky. 1972) (three arrests); State v. Daniels, 262 La.
475, 263 So.2d 859 (1972) (driving while intoxicated
and attempted rape); State v. Newte, 188 Neb. 412,
197 N.W.2d 403 (1972); Commonwealth v. Little, 295
A.2d 287 (Pa. 1972) (aggravated robbery, prostitution,
solicitation to commit sodomy); Blanco v. State, 471
S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1971) (six arrests). But see People v.
Hannon, 381 Ill. 206, 44 N.E.2d 923 (1942) (error to
question regarding arrests not connected with instant
charge).
174 See United States v. Rudolph, 403 F.2d 805 (6th
Cir. 1968); State v. Kirtdoll, 206 Kan. 208, 478 P.2d
188 (1970); People v. Basemore, 36 Mich. App. 256,
193 N.W.2d 335 (1971) (military larceny conviction);
Pitman v. State, 487 P.2d 716 (Okla. 1971) (driving
while intoxicated conviction; divorce on adultery
grounds); Correll v. State, 475 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn.
1971); Garner v. State, 469 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. 1971);
McGowen v. State, 221 Tenn. 442, 427 S.W.2d 555
(1968) (forfeit of city appearance bond for soliciting
males); Blanco v. State, 471 S.W.2d 70 (Teax. 1971)
(fine for concealed pistol, felony by carrying a gun into
a bar where a shooting took place); State v. Wilson, 1
Wash. App. 1001, 465 P.2d 413 (1970) (sexual involve-
ment with a child reduced to lewd and disorderly
charges).
175 See Gaines v. State, 481 S.W.2d 835 (rex. 1972)
(traffic offenses or offense peculiar to military law);
Pace v. State, 398 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1965) (traffic
offenses or minor offenses peculiar to the military, minor
AWOL likened to a wife fussing when her husband
comes in late).
176 See Lee v. State, 486 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1971);
Bartley v. State, 457 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1970); Hart v.
State, 447 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1969); State v. Briscoe,
78 Wash. 2d 338, 474 P.2d 267 (1970) (assault, larceny,
shoplifting).
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of these occurrences, provided the witness was
acquainted with the accused at that time.Y'
It would appear that when dealing with a matter
of record such as an arrest or a conviction, the
cross-examiner should be permitted to use the 'Do
you know?" form of the question.lw The Michelson
guideline, however, has had such widespread in-
fluence, that most of the reported cases reflect the
use of the "Have you heard?" form even when
dealing with factual realities such as these.'P'
1
7
7See Michelson, v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948) (an arrest so remote that the rumors may have
died, may be excluded within the court's discretion, but
here two witnesses knew the defendant at the time;
therefore a twenty-seven year old arrest was properly
used on cross); United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719 (3d
Cir. 1971) (thirteen year old courts martial conviction
within judge's discretion); United States v. Silverman,
430 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1970), reh. denied, 403 U.S. 924
(1971) (fourteen year old assault arrest, twenty-nine
year old forgery arrest); People v. Hurd, 5 Cal. App.
3d 865, 85 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1970) (seven arrests dating
back to 1945); State v. Hastings, 477 S.W.2d 108 (Mo.
1972) (twenty-five year old conviction, witness knew
defendant all his life); State v. Whittle, 52 N.J. 407,
245 A.2d 367 (1968) (1944 counterfeiting conviction, two
witnesses knew defendant at the time); Lewis v. State,
486 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1971).
There is the general limitation, however, that a char-
acter witness cannot be examined about conduct of the
accused which occurred after the instant charge. See
United States v. Jordan, 454 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1971)
(reversible error); United States v. Lacob, 416 F.2d 756
(7th Cir. 1969), reh. denied, 397 U.S. 1003 (1970) (grand
theft indictment following instant indictment, improper
but not reversible); United States v. Ripso, 338 F. Supp.
662 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (with the exception in this case that
since the indictment was not returned until after an-
other arrest had taken place, the second arrest was
properly brought out); Anderson v. State, 44 Ala. App.
388, 210 So. 2d 436 (1968) (questions of later crimes
answered in negative, prejudice removed); State v.
Butler, 6 Ohio App. 2d 193, 217 N.E.2d 237 (1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 11 Ohio St. 2d 23, 227 N.E.2d
627 (1967) (error since post incident character is irrele-
vant). It may also be improper to cross-examine re-
garding incidents occurring after the defendant left
the community of the witness. See Awkard v. United
States, 352 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But see United
States v. Pingleton, 458 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1972) (could
question if reputation affected by instant charge);
United States v. Null, 415 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1969)
(instant charge inquiry permitted); United States v.
Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968) aj'd, 413 F.2d 804
(1969) (proper to question on present indictment and
consent decree enjoining further similar conduct);
Shimon v. United States, 352 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(error to question on similar conduct to instant charge).78 McCoRwcK §191; Cori v. State, 202 Md. 472,
97 A.2d 129, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 898 (1953); Avery v.
State, 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972); State v.
Donaldson, 76 Wash. 2d 513, 458 P.2d 21 (1969) ("do
you know" form approved). The "do you know" form
with regard to matters of record has been specifically
ruled against by a few courts. See Potts v. State, 502
P.2d 1287 (Okla. 1972); Webber v. State, 472 S.W.2d
136 (Tex. 1971).
"'9 Acts: United States v. Stringi, 378 F.2d 896 (3d
If a character witness has answered that he has
not heard the negative rumors which may have cir-
culated, or the reports of criminal arrests or convic-
tions, the jury may conclude that the witness is not
sufficiently qualified to testify about the accused's
reputation. If the witness has admitted knowledge
of these things, but still was willing to speak favor-
ably of the defendant's reputation, the jury is then
free to consider what sort of standards the witness
has applied. This is brought into focus for the jurors
by the very effective technique (in those jurisdic-
tions which permit it) of asking the witness at the
end of his examination, now that he has heard
these things is his opinion still the same, or in the
alternative, if he had considered these matters be-
fore, what would his opinion have been. 80 The wit-
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967); Balwin v. State,
282 Ala. 653, 213 So. 2d 819 (1968); Bond v. State, 44
Ala. App. 65, 202 So. 2d 173 (1967); People v. Ogg, 258
Cal. App. 2d 841, 66 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1968); People v.
Alamo, 23 N.Y.2d 630, 246 N.E.2d 496, cert. denied,
396 U.S. 879 (1969); Jones v. State, 479 S.W.2d 307
(Tex. 1972).
Arrests: Zaragoza-Almeida v. United States, 427 F.2d
1148 (9th Cir. 1970) (arrested and deported); People v.
Hurd, 5 Cal. App. 3d 865, 85 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1970)
(additionally, this case holds that a character witness
can be questioned on an arrest for which a pardon has
been granted); Jones v. State, 484 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.
1972); Cooper v. State, 470 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1971);
Sanders v. State, 453 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1970).
Convictions: Coleman v. United States, 420 F.2d
616 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People v. Hinman, 253 Cal. App.
2d 896, 61 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
923 (1968); Hamilton v. State, 197 So. 2d 469 (Miss.
1967); Morton v. State, 460 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1970);
King v. State, 414 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1967). See also
United States v. Gosser, 339 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1964),
re/. denied, 382 U.S. 922 (1965) (guilty plea to robbery
charge).
-ruthSee United States v. Pope, 409 F.2d 371 (7th Cir.
1969) ("would your appraisal of the reputation of Mr.
Pope he different if you knew that for the past six years
he'd been carrying on an illicit relationhp with an-
other woman?"); Robinson v. State, 47 Ala. App. 689,
260 So. 2d 419 (1972) (witness said he felt reputation for
truth and veracity was still good in spite of a mixture
of arrests and convictions for theft, firearms violations,
desertion and non-support, and assault and battery);
People v. Hinman, 253 Cal. App. 2d 896, 61 Cal. Rptr.
609 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 923 (1968) (if you had
heard this, would it change your opinion); Garrison v.
State, 122 Ga. App. 757, 178 S.E.2d 744 (1970) (proper
in this jurisdiction to ask what would opinion be if the
present arrest had been known); Kinnett v. Common-
wealth, 408 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 924 (1967) (would this effect your evaluation of
the defendant's reputation?); Comi v. State, 202 Md.
472, 97 A.2d 129, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 898 (1953)
(would knowledge of prior arrests and charges change
your mind?); State v. Hastings, 477 S.W.2d 108 (Mo.
1972); State v. McCody, 458 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. 1970)
(would their opinion be the same in light of arrests or
convictions for burglary, theft, robbery and carrying
concealed weapons). But see State v. Kidwell, 199 Kan.
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ness may therefore be put in the position of either
withdrawing his earlier testimony or dearly demon-
strating to the jury that he-attributes little impor-
tance to the unattractive behavior that has been
discussed, in which case the weight of his opinion is
therefore reduced.'P
The cross-examination of character witnesses
obviously entails the possibility of significant
prejudice to the defendant's case. The prosecutor,
therefore, must cautiously avoid unduly emphasiz-
ing the negative material with which he is
dealing, for the courts are quick to remind him
that this mode of cross-examination is meant to at-
tack the witness and not the accused.m Addi-
tionally, he is held to a very strict standard of good
faith.P The questions he propounds to the witness
1752, 434 P.2d 316 (1967), aff'd, 204 Kan. 200,460 P.2d
614 (1969) (witness asked if she considered the de-
fendant's "crime" but did not specify what crime was
being referred to, prosecutor refused to clarify, preju-
dicial error); People v. Eli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 916, 424 P.2d
356, cerl. denied, 389 U.S. 888 (1967).
181 See United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964).
1
2See People v. Harris, 270 Cal. App. 2d 863, 76
Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969) (prejudicial to cross extensively
as to defendant's prior acts of violence); Bird v. State,
481 P.2d 773 (Okla. 1971) (continuous cross regarding
defendant's father's alleged arson was prejudicial);
Billingsley v. State, 473 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1971) (error
when examining a character witness to read portions of
a letter written by defendant dealing with drugs and
being high).
18 See United States v. Wooden, 420 F.2d 251 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) ("care must be taken to exclude questions
which merely tend to traduce and besmirch the de-
fendant, while having no substantial impact on the
credibility of the witness"); Shimon v. United States,
352 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Raimondi v. State, 12
Md. App. 322, 278 A.2d 664 (1971); State v. Beyor, 129
Vt. 472, 282 A.2d 819 (1971) (improper to use character
witness cross-examination techniques when the only
character testimony was the witness's last statement
that the defendant was a good boy); State v. Donald-
son, 76 Wash. 2d 513, 458 P.2d 21 (1969). The court
need not give a preliminary ruling as to the allowable
scope, however, since it is unknown what subjects the
witness will broach. United States v. Evanchik, 413
F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1969).
184 See United States v. Salazar-Gaeta, 447 F.2d 468
(9th Cir. 1971); Gross v. United States, 394 F.2d 216
(8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582
(2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964); People
v. Kramer, 259 Cal. App. 2d 452, 66 Cal. Rptr. 638
(1968) (good faith present when questions based on re-
ports from students, pharmacists, narcotics officer and
a "reliable source"; State v. Hinton, 206 Kan. 500, 479
P.2d 910 (1971); State v. Hastings, 477 S.W.2d 108
(Mo. 1972); Carter v. State, 84 Nev. 592, 446 P.2d 165
(1968); State v. Elliot, 25 Ohio St. 2d 249, 267 N.E.2d
806 (1971), vacated for resentencing, 408 U.S. 939 (1972)
(reversible error if questions propounded in bad faith);
Kizer v. State, 468 P.2d 156 (Okla. 1970); Miller v.
State, 418 P.2d 220 (Okla. 1966); Brown v. State, 477
S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1972).
must be founded either in fact or upon reasonable
belief. Random inquiries are not tolerated by the
courts 185 To avoid this possibility, the courts have
increasingly begun to undertake judicial examina-
tions of the proposed questions before they-are
aired before the jury' 8 6 In this way, unsubstan-
tiated charges and inherently prejudicial material
can be screened and kept from the ears of the
jurors.
IV. ExxaRT WiTmssxs
The permissible limits of prosecutorial cross-
examination are quite broad when dealing with an
expert witness.'l As one court has said,
185 See, e.g. People v. Eli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 916, 424 P.2d
356, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 888 (1967); Raimondi v.
State, 12 Md. App. 322, 278 A.2d 664 (1971).
186 See United States v. West, 460 F.2d 374" (5th Cir.
1972) (preferred procedure is to have in camera pro-
ceeding); United States v. Macbado, 457 F.2d 1372 (9th
Cir. 1972) (improper not to have demonstrated the
basis of a petty theft charge); United States v. Jordan,
454 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1971); Gross v. United States,
394 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Dilbrizzi,
393 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1968) (hearing is an added pre-
caution); People v. Eli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 916, 424P.2d 356,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 888 (1967); State v. Hinton, 206
Kan. 500, 479 P.2d 910 (1971). The court in State v.
Steensen, 113 A.2d 203, 206 (N.J. 1955) laid out the fol-
lowing guidelines for the preliminary inquiry into the
questions to be asked of a character witness. The court
advised that the judge satisfy himself:
(1) That there is no question as to the fact of the
subject matter of the rumor, that is, of-the
previous arrests, conviction, or other pertinent"
misconduct of the defendant;
(2) That a reasonable likelihood exists that the
previous arrest, conviction or other pertinent
misconduct would have been bruited about
the neighborhood or commission of the offense
on trial;
(3) That neither the event or conduct nor the
rumor concerning it occurred at a time too
remote from the present offense;
(4) That the earlier event or misconduct and the
rumor concerned the specific trait involved in
the offense for which the accused is on trial;
and
(5) That the examination will be conducted in the
proper form, that is: Have you heard', etc.
not 'Do you know,' etc.
The court added that "if the conclusion is reached to
allow the interrogation, the jury should be informed
of its exact purpose either at the conclusion thereof or
in the charge." 113 A.2d at 206.
11 See. People v. Nye, 78 Cal. Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 393
(1969) ("the nature and scope of the cross-examination
allowed in the case of an expert witness is entirely-
different from that allowed in the case of an ordinary,
witness."); Scott v. People, 166 Colo. 432, 444 P.2d
388 (1968); State v. Konzukonis, 100 R.I. 298, 214 A.2d
893 (1965) (wider latitude than ordinary witness if
relevant); Zebrowski v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 715, 185
N.W.2d 545 (1971) (greater latitude than with an or-
dinary witness, within court discretion); State v. He-
1974
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Once an expert offers his opinion, however,
he exposes himself to the kind of inquiry which
ordinarily would have no place in the cross-
examination of a factual witness. The expert
invites investigation into the extent of his
knowledge, the reasons for his opinion includ-
ing facts and other matters upon which it is
based and which he took into consideration;
and he may be subjected to the most rigid
cross-examination concerning his qualifica-
tions, and his opinion and its sources.'3
Experts are properly cross-examined regarding
their educational background and professional
qualifications,"19 their experience,19 as well as the
possible existence of a special interest in the out-
come of the case. Inquiries into financial remunera-
tion"' as well as bias towards a particular defend-
antl 2 or type of case"9 are properly made.
A major portion of an expert's cross-examination
is directed towards questioning the grounds for his
opinion. In this regard, the prosecutor may inquire
as to the facts that were relied upon to reach the
witness' ultimate conclusion.1 94 The expert may be
bard, 50 Wis. 2d 408, 184 N.W.2d 156 (1971) (leeway
in cross of an expert).
1m People v. Jones, 225 Cal. App. 2d 598, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 454 (1964).
"'9See CALsp. EvID. CODE §721(a)(1) (West 1966);
Simpson v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 195, 145 N.W.2d 206
(1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 969 (1967). See generally
Trimble, Cross-examination of the Defense Psychiatrist:
A Suggested Outline (N.D.A.A. 1971); Leahy, Examin-
ing, Cross-examining, and Impeaching Expert Witnesses
(N.D.A.A. 1971); Flannery, Meeting the Insanity De-
fense, 51 J. Cms. L.C. & P.S. 309 (1960).
goSee e.g., State v. Vennard, 159 Conn. 385, 270
A.2d 83 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1011 (1971)
(psychiatrist asked if she ever examined a person ac-
cused of a crime before).
"'See CAIS . Evm. CODE §722(b) (West 1966).
Paragraph (a) provides that the fact that an expert has
been appointed by the court may be revealed before
the jury.
191 See e.g., United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970); United
States v. Hoffman, 415 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1969).
"'3See United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970) (did he previ-
ously testify as a defense witness in two similar cases.
This was an attorney testifying as an expert on immi-
gration matters); United States v. Hoffman, 415 F.2d
14 (7th Cir. 1969) (attorney called as an insurance
expert could be asked if thirteen of the companies he
represented had gone bankrupt).
194 See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 705 which provides.
"The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts on data on cross-examination.";
CALIF. EviD. CODE §721(a)(3) West 1966; United
States v. Retolaza, 398 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1032 (1969); People v. Nye, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 395 (1969) (photos of victim as re-
lated to doctor's opinion that defendant had no sexual
asked if he ever reached a different conclusion. 5 If
relevant facts have been omitted by the expert, the
prosecutor may ask if his opinion would have
differed if those facts had been relied upon as
well.196 Alternate theories or conclusions can be
offered and comment upon them requested." Ad-
missions or other statements of the defendant are
also proper subjects of inquiry if they have been
relied upon by the expert or may otherwise be
relevant to his opinions."'
The prosecutor may call into question the com-
pleteness of the investigation performed by the
expert witness. 99 For example, a defense psychia-
trist may be asked how many times he interviewed
interest in her); State v. Tusner, 81 N.M. 450, 468
P.2d 421, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 506, 469 P.2d 151
(1970).
"'See McCoimcE §35.
"6See People v. Jones, 225 Cal. App. 598, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 454 (1964); People v. Woody, 3 Mich. App. 729,
143 N.W.2d 619 (1966), aff'd, 380 Mich. 332, 157
N.W.2d 201 (1968) (prosecutor raised stints in boys
training school, escape, burglary, murder, assaults and
penitentiary time, could ask if these altered his opinion);
McCoa ec §14.
19' See United States v. Julian, 450 F.2d 575 (10th
Cir. 1971) (proper to ask would a defendant who desired
incarceration refuse to identify himself to the F.B.I.
when apprehended?); Zebrowski v. State, 50 Wis. 2d
715, 185 N.W.2d 545 (1971); State v. Hebard, 50 Wis.
2d 408, 184 N.W.2d 156 (1971) (proper to cross if de-
fendant would have killed five persons had a police
officer been present?). But see State v. Cuchinelli, 261
La. 769, 261 So. 2d 217 (1972) (improper to ask, would
it be safe to return a person like that to society? Harm-
less error because unanswered).
1'8 See Carr v. State, 43 Ala. App. 642, 198 So. 2d 791
(1967) (could cross a medical witness as to whether
defendant's calling the sheriff and saying he would
surrender to the sheriff but not to a city policeman indi-
cates that he knew he had done something wrong);
People v. Nye, 78 Cal. Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 395 (1969)
(defendant's testimony at first trial used on cross of
expert to show conflict and possible lying); People v.
Whitmore, 251 Cal. App. 2d 359, 59 Cal. Rptr. 411
(1967); Tarrants v. State, 236 So. 2d 360 (Miss. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920 (1971) (could examine all as-
pects of defendant's life); State v. Turner, 81 N.M. 571,
469 P.2d 720 (1970) (if considered by expert, proper to
ask about defendant's admission of two assaults, a rape
and two burglaries). But see Hurt v. State, 480 S.W.2d
747 (Tex. 1972) (questions regarding thirteen prior
criminal acts constituted reversible error, psychiatrist
could not be crossed like a character witness).
Inquiry as to a defendant's statements is improper
pursuant to ALAS. STAT. §12.45.100 (1972) which pro-
vides:
No statement made by the accused in the course
of an examination into his sanity or mental ca-
pacity ... may be admitted into evidence against
the accused on the issue of guilt in a criminal pro-
ceeding.
"' See People v. Jones, 225 Cal. App. 2d 598, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 454 (1964) (history of sexual offenses); Simpson
v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 195, 145 N.W.2d 206 (1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 965 (1967).
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the defendant, whether he performed psychological
tests, and whether he bases his opinion mainly on
the reports of others.200 Additionally, the psychia-
trist may be asked questions going to the heart of
the insanity defense, i.e., is the defendant faking?2"'
Where an expert witness has first hand informa-
tion, as where a forensic pathologist has examined a
body to determine the cause of death, or where a
psychiatrist has personally examined the defend-
ant, specific questions may be asked about his
opinions. Where, however, the expert is lacking
first hand information but his opinion is neverthe-
less desired or even if he has first hand information
but is being asked to speculate about the possibility
of certain facts changing his testimony, the prose-
cutor may tender hypothetical questions. In this
regard, the courts exercise a broad discretionary
power. 2m Some courts will permit the asking of
hypothetical questions which are based on facts not
in evidence,20 and the offer of a prosecutor to prove
up any fact which the expert testifies would change
his opinion may increase the likelihood of ac-
ceptance.G4
Virtually all courts, to some extent, allow the use
of treatises in the cross-examination of expert wit-
nesses °5 The majority view is that an expert may
be cross-examined with a treatise if he has relied
upon that particular work in reaching his opinion,
if he recognizes it as authoritative in the field, or if
200 See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032
(5th Cir. 1971); Brown v. State, 45 Ala. App. 391, 231
So. 2d 167 (1970) (question-did you ask him whether
or not he had been convicted of a penitentiary offense?).201 See People v. Bandhauer, 83 Cal. Rptr. 184, 463
P.2d 408 (1970) (proper to ask doctor if he knew that
defendant had seen numerous other "knowledgeable"
prisoners and therefore simply that his symptoms
might be faked); Bateman v. State, 10 Md. App. 630,
272 A.2d 64 (1971) ("Doctor, if I tell you this case was
originally set for trial in February and the insanity plea
was not filed until after the case was originally set for
trial, would that indicate perhaps this insanity is a
newly made up idea?" Here it was proper to demon-
strate that the accused had no history of mental disease
and made no effort to seek treatment until the case was
set for trial. Additionally, the defendant's amnesia
symptom was incongruous with normal medical stan-
dards).212 See United States v. Kiliyan, 456 F.2d 555 (8th
Cir. 1972); Tarrantsv. State, 236 So. 2d360 (Miss. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920 (1971) (seven page hypotheti-
cal question permitted).203 See Carr v. State, 43 Ala. App 642 198 So. 2d 791
(1967); Zerega v. State, 260 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971); Ze-
browski v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 715, 185 N.W.2d 545
(1971). Contra, Sallee v. Ashlock, 438 S.W.2d 538 (Ky.
1969).
204See, e.g., People v. Jones, 225 Cal. App. 2d 598,
37 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1964).20
5 See MCCO- McK §321.
the work itself has been admitted into evidence.20 6
The very liberal minority view permits this exami-
nation if the examiner merely is able to establish
the authenticity of the work by evidence or judicial
notice.207
The hearsay objection that is offered in connec-
tion with learned treatise examination, is also
raised with regard to cross-examination using re-
ports of other experts or hospital records. These
objections are untenable if the expert has himself
relied on these sources to reach his conclusions.21
The final point should be made that an expert wit-
ness appointed by the court is subject to normal
cross-examination by both the prosecution and the
defense.
V CRoss-EAMNATION OF COURT WITNESSES
AND CRoss-ExAhM!NATION BY THE
COURT ITSELF
It can be categorically asserted that witnesses
may be called to stand by the court itself.2 0 9 It is
equally clear that court witnesses are subject to
cross-examination by counsel for both sides. This
modification of the confrontation principle is sup-
206 See Brown v. United States, 419 F.2d 337 (8th
Cir. 1969) (works recognized by witness as authorita-
tive); CAIF. Evm. CODE §72(b) (West 1966):
If a witness testifying as an expert testifies in the
form of an opinion, he may not be cross-examined
in regard to the content or tenor of any scientific,
technical, or professional test, treatise, journal, or
similar publication unless: (1) The witness referred
to, considered, or relied upon such publication in
arriving at or forming his opinion; or (2) such pub-
lication has been admitted in evidence.
217 See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Me-
morial Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326, N.E. 2d 253 (1965). For
a discussion of Darling see Note, Use of Authoritative
Treatises on Cross-examination, 15 DE PAU.L. REv. 492
(1966); 41 NoRE DA M LAWYER 607 (1966); 17 SYRA-
cusE L. REv. 566 (1966); 29 U. Cm. L. R1v. 255 (1966);
1966 U. IL. L. F. 225: 69 W. VA. L. Rxv. See also 38
TENN. L. REv. 449 (1971).
210 See United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th
Cir. 1971); Jarrett v. State, 500 P.2d 1027 (Wyo. 1972).
It also is proper to use the reports of the prosecution
expert. See State v. Risden, 106 N.J. 226,264 A. 2d 214
(1970). If the witness' report is used to impeach him,
it is error not to introduce the entire report. See People
v. Plummer, 37 Mich. App. 657,195 N.W.2d 328 (1972).209 See McComasnc §8; PROP, FED. R. Evm. 614 (a),
706. See also United States v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1053 (1972) (the court
properly called a witness at the prosecutor's request, so
that he could be cross-examined as to intimidation at-
tempts by the defendant). But it is improper to call a
court witness so the prosecutor can extensively cross-
examine him on the basis of prior statements under the
guise of impeachment. People v. McKee, 39 Ill. 2d 265,
235 N.E.2d 625 (1968)- People v. Dandridge, 120 Ill.
App. 209, 256, N.E.2d 76 (1970).
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ported by both case law'10 and legislation.2 " The
courts will generally apply the same guidelines of
scope and propriety with regard to a court's witness
as they would with an adverse witness.212
Judges occasionally take an active role in the
examination of witnesses. This is more frequent,
however, in the federal courts than in state courts.
The examination is generally directed towards the
clarification of confusing or unresponsive testi-
mony,23 but may at times be a piercing inquiry.
21
A judge who plays too aggressive a role in the
course of the trial, however, may precipitate the
reversal of a guilty verdict,2 15 for as Justice Learned
Hand has said,
Prosecution and judgment are too quite
separate functions in the administration of
justice; they-must not merge.21
VI CROSS-EXAMnING ONm's OWN WMEss
At common law, the party who called a witness
was forbidden from impeaching that witness. This
no See Estrella-Ortega v. United States, 423 F.2d 509
(9th Cir. 1970); Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 265
(8th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 431 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1970); Brady
v. State, 190 So. 2d 607 (La. 1966); Moitesi v. State,
220 Tenn. 354, 417 So. 2d 554 (1967).
21 See PRoPosED FED. R. Evin., 614 (a): "The judge
may on his own motion or at the suggestion of a party,
call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-ex-
amine witnesses thus called." The Federal Rules of
Evidence specifically provide for the court appointment
of' expert witnesses, (with rights of cross-examination
included, of course).21 See United States v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1053 (1972); Sutton v.
State, 239 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1970); People v. Marino, 44
Ill. 2d 562, N.E.2d 770 (1970). But see People v. Kim-
brough, 131 Ill. App. 2d 36, 266 N.E.2d 431 (1970),
where the court held that cross-examination must be
limited to direct issues, and that collateral matters can-
not be raised-213 See McCoRpmc §8; United States v. Sorce, 308
F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1962), cert denied, 377 U.S. 957
(1964) (When a defendant or other witness gives unre-
sponsive, evasive, or contradictory answers, the judge
is not obliged to remain inert. It may become his duty
to intervene.) A typical example of permissible judicial
inquiry is Whalen v. United States, 367 F.2d 468 (5th
Cir. 1966), where the defendant was questioned as to
what number of prior felony convictions were on his
record.
214 Consider, for example, the active role that was
played by D.C. District Court Judge John J. Sirica in
the trial of the Watergate Seven.
1 See United States v. Wyatt, 442 F.2d 858 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (reversal where extensive questioning opened
new areas); United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868
(4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1044 (1970) (re-
versal caused by exhaustive, chiding, hostile examina-
tion of the defendant); Jackson v. United States 329
F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1964), aft'd, 351 F.2d 821 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (where extensive, prejudicial examination of
witnesses required reversal).
216 See United States v. Manzano, 149 F.2d 923 (2nd
Cir. 1945).
rule was based upon the principle that the calling
party vouched for the credibility of his witness,
and therefore should not attack that credibility.
Recently, however, this theory has come under
severe criticism because witnesses may not chosen
by the application of strict screening standards.
217
For this reason, there has been a recent move away
from the common law position. Some legislation,
including the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
now provides that either party may impeach any
witness on the stand.28 Similarly, a small body of
case law supports the modem position.
19 Although
the impeachment may be on the grounds of bias,
interest, or character," ° it typically is in the form
of an attack based upon a prior inconsistent state-
ment.21
The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence may be
expected to give significant impetus to the move-
ment towards more liberal impeachment. In the
meantime, the majority view is that one's own
witness may be impeached only if the calling party
has been surprised and his case damaged.22 The
21See the general discussion, McComucK § 38, and
PROPOSED FED. R. Evi. §607, advisory Committee's
Note.
218 See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 607. See 'also CA..
Evm. CODE 785 (West 1966); Iur. REv. SmrT., ch. 110,
§60 (1971); KA. STAT. ANN. §60-420 (1964). The lib-
eral hearsay provisions of the proposed federal rules
have given rise to §806, which reads in part: "If the
party against whom a hearsay statement has been ad-
mitted calls the decarant as a witness, the party is en-
titled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-
examination." PRoPosED FED. R. EviD. 806.
219 See State v. Micheal, 103 Ariz. 46, 436 P.2d 595
(1968), aff'd, 107 Ariz. 126, 483 P.2d 541 (1971); People
v. Freeman, 20 Cal. App. 3d 488, 97 Cal. Rptr. 717
(1971); State v. Gardner, 2 Ore. App. 265, 467 P.2d 125
(1970); People v. Chacon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d
106 (1968); State v. Scott, 502 P.2d 753 (Kan. 1972);
State v. Armstrong, 207 Kan. 681, 486 P.2d 1322
(1971); State v. Harden, 206 Kan. 365, 480 P.2d 53
(1971); State v. Franklin, 206 Kan. 527, 479 P. 2d 848
(1971); Barger v. State, 2 Md. App. 565, 235 A.2d 752
(1967); State v. Fronning, 186 Neb. 463, 183 N.W. 2d
920 (1971); State v. Williams, 12 N.C. App. 161, 182
S.E.2d 592 (1971), cert. denied, 279 N.C. 514,183 S.E.2d
691 (1971).
22 See McCosmcK §38; State v. Harden, 206 Kan.
365, 480 P.2d 53 (1971); State v. Franklin, 206 Kan.
527, 479 P.2d 848 (1971); Barger v. State, 2 Md. App.
565, 235 A.2d 752 (1967).221 See e.g., Troublefield v. United States, 372 F.2d
912 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Coleman v. United States, 371
F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945
(1967). But see the interesting rule in Cain v. State, 113
Ga. App. 477, 148 S.E.2d 508 (1966), where the court
held that the party cannot impeach its witness with a
prior inconsistent statement unless it was made to the
impeaching party or to a law enforcement officer and
turned over to the prosecutor.
m See United States v. Watson, 450 F.2d 290 (8th
Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 405 U.S. 993 (1972); Bushaw v.
United States, 353 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1965), cerl. denied,
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surprise must constitute more than a minor change
in the recited facts.2m Also, surprise may not be
claimed if the prosecutor has had as little as fifteen
minutes warning that the witness would not testify
as originally expected. 4 The damage must be real
and substantial, rather than just the failure to give
evidence helpful to the prosecution's case. For ex-
ample, innocuous statements or claims of "I don't
know" or I don't remember" do not constitute
sufficient damage.m These limitations are based on
384 U.S. 921 (1966); State v. Potts, 205 Kan. 47, 468
P.2d 78 (1970); State v. Grey, 257 La. 1070,245 So.2d
178 (1971); State v. Hamilton, 249 La. 392, 187 So.2d
417 (1966); Green v. State, 243 Md. 154, 220 A.2d 544
(1966); State v. Harvey, 253 S.C. 328, 170 S.E.2d 657
(1969); Norwood v. State, 486 S.W.2d 776 ('rex. 1972).
See also United States v. Cunningham, 446 F.2d 194 (2d
Cir. 1971); cerf. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Bartley v.
United States, 319 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Baldwin
v. State, 5 Md. App. 22, 245 A.2d 98 (1968); Sanders v.
State, 1 Md. App. 630, 232 A.2d 555 (1967); State v.
Wright, 11 Ohio App. 2d 31, 227 N.E.2d 650 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 431 Pa. 21, 244 A.2d 734
(1968); Cherl v. State, 472 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1971).
But see Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alaska 1971);
State v. Quattrochi, 103 R.I. 115, 235 A.2d 99 (1967).
m See Gaskins v. State, 10 Md. App. 666 272 A.2d
413 (1971), cerl. denied, 404 U. S. 1040 (1972); See also
Smith v. State, 479 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1972); United
States v. Johnson, 427 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1970); Com-
monwealth v. Brabbam 433 Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378
(1969). The judge may allow the prosecutor to examine
the witness outside the presence of the jury to demon-
strate surprise. (State v. Robertson, 102 R.I. 623, 232
A.2d 781 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1036 (1968).
2HSee Jackson v. State, 124 Ga. App. 488,184 S.E.2d
185 (1971). See also Doss v. United States, 431 F.2d 601
(9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Miles, 413 F.2d 34
(3d Cir. 1969); Ewing v. United States, 386 F.2d 10
(9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 991 (1968); Hooks
v. United States, 375 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1967); Bushaw
v. United States, 353 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1965); cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966); Weaver v. State, 446 P.2d
64 (Okla. 1968); Zanders v. State, 480 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.
1972); State v. Green, 71 Wash. 2d 372, 428 P.2d 540
(1967). But see Gaitan v. People, 167 Colo. 395, 447
P.2d 1001 (1968), here prosecutor avoided questioning
the witness in an in camera proceeding to prevent
foreknowledge because he was afraid she would change
her testimony. He was still allowed to claim surprise at
trial but the court evidenced some disapproval.
225 See United States v. Dunmore, 446 F.2d 1214 (8th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972); United
States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); United States v. Miles,
413 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Duff, 332
F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1964); Gibbs v. State, 193 So.2d 460
(Fla. 1967); Russell v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 694
(Ky. Ct. App. 1966); Commonwealth v. Knudsen, 443
Pa. 412, 278 A.2d 881 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 866
(1972); Zanders v. State, 480 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. 1972).
In United States v. WMngola, 424 F.2d 710 (2d Cir.
1970), impeachment was allowed when a witness who
previously had said that he stole checks for the de-
endant, testified in court that they never had conversa-
tions about dealings in stolen checks. Bid see United
States v. Washabaugh, 442 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1971),
where a witness who claimed lack of memory could be
impeached.
the theory that the only reason for the impeach-
ment of one's own witness is to remove the adverse
effects of his unexpected testimony. 2 6
While courts frequently use the term "hostile
witness" to refer to a witness who has given sur-
prising and damaging testimony to the party who
called him,.2 the term also refers to a witness who
may be evasive, unwilling, or recalcitrant.228 In
those situations, judges in some jurisdictions, by
the exercise of their discretion, may allow the call-
ing party to cross-examine the witness. 9
VII IMPEACMENT BY PMOR
INCONSISTENT STATeMeNTS
When the person on the witness stand, whether
he is a defense witness, a prosecution witness, a
court witness, or the defendant himself, testifies to
facts which are inconsistent with assertions he has
made at an earlier time, that person's credibility
may be impeached through cross-examination
based upon his prior inconsistent statements.o Al-
a2 See United States v. Dobbs, 448 F.2d 1262 (5th
Cir. 1971).
m2 See United States v. Dobbs, 448 F.2d 1262 (5th
Cir. 1971); United Statesv. DeBose, 410 F.2d 1273 (6th
Cir. 1969), cert denied, 410 U.S. 920 (1971); Crowder v.
United States, 294 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Mich. 1967),
af'd, 406 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1969); Hudson v. State,
267 So. 2d 494 (Ala. 1972); State v. Hamilton, 249 La.
392, 187 So.2d 417 (1966).
mSee United States v. Stubin, 446 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.
1971) (witness was hostile, recalcitrant, and unwilling);
United States v. Mitchell, 408 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930 (1969) (witness was uncoop-
erative); United States v. Duff, 332 F.2d 702 (6th Cir.
1964) (witness was recalcitrant); State v. Collins, 204
Kan. 55, 460 P.2d 573 (1969) (witness was recalcitrant);
State v. Kietze, 85 S.D. 502, 186 N.W.2d 551 (1971)
(witness refused to answer questions and gave evasive
replies).
229 See, e.g., United States v. Stubin, 446 F.2d 457 (3d
Cir. 1971); United States v. Holsey, 414 F.2d 458 (10th
Cir. 1969), a.fd, 437 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Mitchell, 408 F.2d 996 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 930 (1969); Lerma v. United States, 387 F.2d
187 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 907 (1968); Goings
v. United States, 377 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1967). cerl.
denied, 393 U.S. 883 (1968); United States v. Duff, 332
F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1964); Caldwell v. State, 243 So.2d
422 (Fla. 1971); State v. Collins, 204 Kan. 55, 460 P.2d
573 (1969); Brown v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.2d 520
(Ky. 1969); State v. Fournier, 267 A.2d 638 (Me. 1970);
Commonwealth v. Douglas, 354 Mass. 212, 236 N.E.2d
865 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 960 (1969); People v.
Seligman, 35 App. Div. 2d 591, 313 N.Y.S.2d 593
(1970); State v. Minneken, 27 Ohio St.2d 155, 271
N.E.2d 821 (1971). The prosecution is not bound by
the answer of a hostile witness. See People v. Woodfork,
29 Mich. App. 633, 185 N.W.2d 826 (1971). See also
Rotolo v. United States, 404 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1968),
where a 15 year old government witness in a prosecution
for transport of a minor for prostitution was properly
asked leading questions because of her upset and
nervous condition.
230 See, e.g., United States v. Washabaugh, 442 F.2d
JEREMY MARGOLIS
though under the modem view, prior inconsistent
statements under certain circumstances may be an
exception to the hearsay rule and admissible as
substantive evidence,2 3' that matter is outside the
scope of this article. For presentpurposes, prior in-
consistent statements will be discussed not as a
method of proving that a particular fact or state-
ment is true but rather as a method of showing that
the witness who materially changes his story is
generally unworthy of belief (The majority view
limits this type of examination for the latter pur-
pose 32 and requires that the jury be given a limit-
ing instruction.23 3).
Prior inconsistent statements may have been
given to the prosecutor himself,2 ' to the police,23'
to probation or parole officers2386 or to a psychia-
1127 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Pisente, 453 F.2d
412 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hicks, 420 F.2d
814 (5th Cir. 1970); United States ex. rel. Lewis v.
Yeager, 285 F.Supp. 780 (D.N.J. 1968), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 961 (1971); Bond v. State, 120 Ga. App. 555,
171 S.E.2d 634 (1969); Stutzman v. State, 250 Tnd. 467,
235 N.E.2d 186 (1968); People v. Miles, 23 N.Y.2d
527, 245 N.E.2d 688 (1968); Kennedy v. State, 443 P.2d
127 (Okla. 1968); Sierra v. State, 476 S.W.2d (Tex.
1971); Thumarn v. State, 466 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1971);
Dove v. State, 402 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1966).
21 See PROPOSED FED. R. EviD. 801; CAL. Evim.
CODE 1235 (West 1966).
= The bulk of the case law holds that prior incon-
sistent statements may be used for impeachment only,
and not as substantive evidence. See United States v.
LaRose, 459 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1972); Benson v.
United States, 402 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1968); Jones v.
United States, 385 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United
States ex. rel. Smith v. Reinckie, 354 F.2d 418 (2d Cir.
1965); People v. Luna, 37 Ill.2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586
(1967); People v. Svizzero, 84 Ill. App. 2d 251; 228
N.E.2d 604 (1967); Stutzman v. State, 250 Ind. 467,
235 N.E.2d 186 (1968); State v. Nobles, 14 N.C. App.
340,188 S.E.2d 600 (1972).
3 See Colber t v. State, 124 Ga. App. 283, 183 S.E.2d
476 (1971); Minor v. State, 6 Md. App. 82, 250 A.2d
113 (1969).234 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970);
United States v. Caruso, 465 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Lopez, 355 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966); State v. Lancaster,
25 Ohio St. 2d 83, 267 N.E.2d 291 (1971).
2
3' See, e.g., Moore v. Beto, 320 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.
Tex. 1970); Realmuto v. Wallack, 254 F. Supp. 1006
(S.D. N.Y. 1966); Minor v. State, 6 Md. App. 82, 250
A.2d 113 (1969); State v. Baca, 80 N.M. 488, 458 P.2d
92 (1969); Carter v. State, 414 S.W.2d 663 (Tex.
1967).
2
31 See, e.g., United States v. Mayersohn, 413 F.2d
641 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd, 452 F.2d 521 (1971) (probation
report compiled before defendant withdrew his guilty
plea); People v. Alesi, 67 Cal.2d 856, 434 P.2d 360, 64
Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967) (statements given in rehabilita-
tion center on advice of counsel). But see People v.
Harrington, 2 Cal. 3d 991, 471 P.2d 961, 88 Cal Rptr.
161 (1970) (where admission to probation officer with-
out advice of counsel were not sufficiently reliable for
impeachment purposes).
trist.2 7 Inconsistent testimony may have been
offered to a grand jury,23 ' at a coroner's inquest,
23'
in a previous trial,21' in depositions, 1 or affi-
davitsso or in the preliminary proceedings of the
instant trial 24 This list by no means exhausts the
sources of prior inconsistent statements.2"
As with most other areas of cross-examination,
the trial judge exercises a broad discretionary
power over impeachment based upon prior incon-
sistent statements. That discretion must be in-
voked to determine whether there is a sufficient
discrepancy between the present testimony and
the prior statement to warrant the impeachment of
the witness. While it does not require a Solomon to
recognize the discrepancies in the testimony of a
witness who in court says that A killed B, but when
in the grand jury room said that C killed B, less
obvious inconsistencies defy categorization and in-
:wSee, e.g., People v. Acosta, 18 Cal. App. 3d 895,
96 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971). But see note 198 supra.
'3' See, e.g., United States v. Guglielmini, 425 F.2d
439 (2d Cir. 1970); Collaher v. United States, 419 F.2d
520 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969);
United States v. Budzanoski, 331 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D.
Pa. 1973), aff'd, 462 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1972). But see
State v. Terrebone, 256 La. 385,236 So. 2d 773 (1970)
(grand jury secrecy cannot be violated for impeach-
ment purposes).
219 United States ex rel. Musil v. Pate, 427 F.2d 930
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971); People
v. Byers, 50 DI1. 2d 210, 278 N.E.2d 65 (1972); State v.
Jacques 296 A.2d 246 (Vt. 1972).
24'See, e.g., People v. Peckham, 249 Cal. App. 2d 941,
57 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1967); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436
S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); State v. Atkinson, 485 P.2d
1117 (Ore. Ct. App. 1971); Stafford v. State, 481 S.W.2d
831 (Tex. 1972); State v. Kramer, 72 Wash. 2d 904,
435 P.2d 970 (1967). Contra Commonwealth v. Rasom,
446 Pa. 457, 288 A.2d 762 (1972).241 See, e.g., Keener v. State, 456 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.
1970); Griffin v. State, 455 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1970).212 See, e.g., United States v. Cantome, 426 F.2d 902
(2d Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 827 (1970); Smith v.
United States, 312 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962), aJI'd, 332
F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Moore v. Beto, 320 F. Supp.
469 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
213 See, e.g., Woody v. United States, 379 F.2d 130
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 961 (1967); Humphrey
v. United States, 236 A.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Com-
monwealth v. Raveneil, 448 Pa. 162, 292 A.2d 365
(1972).
24For example, a newspaper article may be the
source of a prior inconsistent statement. See United
States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971) (defense
counsel was able to cross-examine a witness based upon
a newspaper interview wherein the witness claimed that
the defendant appeared to be high on LSD); Pallota v.
United States, 404 F.2d 1035 (1st Cir. 1968), rev''d on
other grounds, 443 F.2d 594 (1st Cir. 1970) (counsel
could impeach a witness where the witness had given
a different newspaper account). A statement not
adopted by the witness may not be used to impeach.




vite judicial discretion.? Generally speaking, if
the witness omits a material fact which he should
not reasonably have done,u 6 or if he alters a mate-
rial fact in his testimony, he is subject to confronta-
tion with his prior statement. A stricter standard
may be applied by some courts when the person to
be impeached is the defendant.sa Whether or not a
lay witness may be impeached by a prior incon-
sistent opinion, will also depend upon the view of
the jurisdiction, but commentators have suggested
that the answer should be in the affirmative.?
9
The foundation requirements for prior incon-
sistent statement impeachment stem from an 1820
English opinion, Queen Caroline's Case.no A portion
of that opinion reads,
If it be intended to bring the credit of a wit-
ness into question by proof of anything he may
have said or declared touching the cause, the
witness is first asked, upon cross-examination,
whether or not he has said or declared that
which is intended to be proved.nl
That requirement of asking the witness if he made
the statement has been carried down through the
years and expanded. Currently, the majority view
requires that the witness be told the date, time,
place, substance of, and person to whom the state-
ment was made.52 His memory having been re-
245 See, e.g., Oliver v. State, 239 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1970); Stafford v. State, 481 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.
1972).
246 See State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 193 S.E.2d 71
(1972). In State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d
581 (1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967), the court
specifically rejected the vo untay-ivoluntrnis-
tinction as being irrelevant. See also State v. Paul, 83
N.M. 619, 495 P.2d 797 (1972).
2
4 McCopMcx §34. But the prosecutor can't force
the issue. A prosecutor who pushes the witness to ob-
tain a contradiction may cause a reversal. See, e.g.,
People v. Taylor, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350, 501 P.2d 918
(1972), where the witness denied possessing narcotics
which had been found in an illegal search fell prey to
the prosecutor who continually and improperly raised
the issue. Proper impeachment would have required
that the witness/defendant make the denial on his
own. Accord People v. Schwartz, 30 App. Div. 2d 385,
292 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1968).
218 United States ex. rel. Dixon v. Cavell, 284 F.
Supp. 535 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (a defendant must deny
more than elements of the crime); Commonwealth v.
Burkett, 211 Pa. Super. 299, 235 A.2d 161 (1967),
a.ffd, 215 Pa. Super. 733, 256 A.2d 138 (1969) (more
pinpointed inconsistency needed than the mere denial
of elements of the crime).24
9 See McCoRmcK §35.
250 See 2 Brod. & Bing 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820).
251 Id. at 313.
2
0 See McCoamcx §37. See also United States v.
Harris, 441 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1971); Gill v. Turner,
freshed, the witness must then be given the oppor-
tunity to explain away or deny the statement.P A
witness who claims that he does not know or can-
not remember if he made the statement does not
thereby escape impeachment.P Having properly
laid the required foundation, the prosecutor may
introduce the prior statement into evidence at his
next opportunity to offer evidence."'
The rigid requirements of a proper foundation
have been relaxed in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, through the abolition of the rule of
443 F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bohle,
445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); Troublefield v. United
States, 372 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1967) Thomas v. United
States, 363 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1966); Edwards v. State,
279 Ala. 371, 185 So. 2d 513 (1971); Thigpen v. State,
49 Ala. App. 233, 270 So. 2d 666 (1971) 209 So. 2d
896 (1968); State v. Miller, 16 Ariz. App. 92, 491 P.2d
481 (1971); People v. Brown, 6 III. App. 3d 500, 285
N.E.2d 515 (1972); People v. Rodgers, 36 Mich. App.
211, 193 N.W.2d 412 (1971); Hooks v. State, 197 So. 2d
238 (Miss. 1967); Bullock v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 809,
193 N.W.2d 889 (1972). No foundation needs to be
laid if the subject matter of the statement is material
to the pending inquiry. See State v. Mack. 282 N.C.
334, 193 S.E.2d 71 (1972). There are cases which hold
that it is improper to lay the foundation for impeach-
ment and not follow it up with proof of the inconsistent
statement. See, e.g., United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d
54 (7th Cir. 1971); People v. Williams, 105 Ill. App.
2d 25, 245 N.E.2d 17 (1969). It is improper to ask each
question of a lengthy prior statement. See, e.g., People
v. Bacon, 2 Ill. App. 3d 324, 276 N.E.2d 782 (1971)
(77 for one witness, 98 for another), But see State v.
Walker, 148 Mont. 216,419 P.2d 300 (1966), where each
question and answer was properly called to witness'
attention.
253 See PRoPosED Fir. R. Evr. 613 (a):
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent state-
ment by a witness is not admissible unless the wit-
ness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny
the same and the opposite party is afforded an
opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the
interests of justice otherwise require ....
Accord, KAN. STAT. Am'. 60-422(b) (1964). See also
United States v. Cirillo, 468 F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1968);
Commonwealth v. Dennison, 441 Pa. 334, 272 A.2d
180 (1971). The prosecutor need produce the person
to whom the prior statement was made; United States
v. Caruso, 465 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1972); Pedersen v.
State, 420 P.2d 327 (Alas. 1966); nor does the fact
that the defendant wasn't present when a witness made
a prior statement preclude its use, State v. Covington,
432 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. 1968). See also the interesting
rule in Cain v. State, 113 Ga. App. 477, 148 S.E.2d
505 (1966).
2 54 "Don't remember" allows impeachment. See
United States v. Washabaugh, 442 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir.
1971); People v. Luna, 69 Ill. App. 291, 216 N.E.2d
473 (1967); People v. Dozier, 22 Mich. App. 528, 177
N.W.2d 694 (1970); State v. Miles, 73 Wash. 2d 67,
436 P.2d 198 (1968). Contra People v. Sam, 454 P.2d
700, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1969). People v. Forgash, 38
Mich. App. 474, 196 N.W.2d 873 (1972).
255 See McCopMcK §37, PxoposED FED. R. Evm.
613 (b).
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Queen Caroline's Case.2 16 Under the proposed rules,
therefore, the statement need not be shown to the
witness, but it must be shown to opposing counsel
upon his request. This is to avoid the allegation
that a nonexistent statement has been fabricated.
The prosecutor is held to a good faith standard,
and, therefore, asking a witness if he has made
prior inconsistent statements when there is no
reason to believe that he did so has been criticized
as improper. 2s Prosecutors have also encountered
criticism when they have attempted to play for the
witness (and thus, for the jury) a prior statement
recorded on tape. This has led to a number of re-
versed convictions.20 The safer procedure with
regard to taped statements (except in those juris-
dictions which allow prior inconsistent statements
as substantive evidence) is to play the tape for the
witness using individual earphones,259 or to make
certain that the jury is given a cautionary instruc-
tion limiting the tape to impeachment use only.
k The requirement fostered by Queen Caroline's
Case that a prior inconsistent statement must be
shown to the witness to refresh his memory, has
been traditionally applied with at least as much
rigor to written statements as it has to oral state-
ments. 20 just as the Queen's authority has begun to
slip with regard to oral statements, a few jurisdic-
tions no longer require that a written statement be
shown to the witness in order to impeach him."'
In Walder v. United States,6 2 a defendant who
made the broad sweeping claims that he never in
his life possessed, handled, sold or given away nar-
cotics, was impeached by reference to narcotics
which were unlawfully seized from him on a prior
256 See PRoPosED FED. R. Evn). 613 (a).257 See People v. Woodell, 2 Ill. App. 3d 257, 274
N.E.2d 105 (1971).
211 See State v. Gonya, 107 R.I. 594, 268 A.2d 729
(1970) (error although tapes garbled, no transcript
made available); Weaver v. State, 446 P.2d 69 (Okla.
1968) (no cautionary instruction). But see People v.
Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 3d 290, 100 Cal. Rptr. 198
(1971) (jurisdiction allows use as substantive evidence).
259 This was done United States v. McKeever, 271
F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959).
260 See, e.g., Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alaska
1971); Commonwealth v. Wilson. 431 Pa. 21, 244 A.2d
734 (1969), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1969). See also
Pallota v. United States, 404 F.2d 1035 (1st Cir. 1968)
(newspaper article); State v. Carleton, 82 N.M. 537,
484 P.2d 757 (1971) (uncertified, unauthenticated
notes). However, the use of a letter written by the de-
fendant to his wife was improper and violative of the
marital privilege. See McCravey v. State, 455 S.W.2d
174 (Tenn. 1970).
261 See PRoposED FED. R. Evm. 613 (a); KAN. STAT.
AiNN. §60-422(a)(1964). See also Commonwealth v.
Williams, 443 Pa. 85, 277 A.2d 781 (1971).
26 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
occasion. The pending charges were unrelated to
this prior seizure and therefore the illegally seized
evidence did not tend to prove guilt; it only tended
to show the defendant's unreliability. The Supreme
Court, finding that this impeachment was proper,
wrote,
The defendant went beyond a mere denial of
complicity in the crimes of which he was
charged and made the broad sweeping claim
that he had never dealt in or possessed any
narcotics.... He must be free to deny all the
elements of the case against him without
thereby giving leave to the Government to in-
troduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally
seized by it, and therefore not available for its
case in chief. Beyond that, however, there is
hardly justification for letting the defendant
affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in
reliance on the Government's disability to
challenge his credibility.22





3 Id. at 65.
2- 400 U.S. 222 (1971). The decision received some
criticism. See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York:
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971);
Note, 1971 WAsm. L.Q. 441 (1971). Prior to the Harris
decision, courts were divided over the issue. Contra
Bosley v. United States, 426 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th
Cir. 1968); United States ex rtd. Hill v. Pinto, 394
F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1967); Wheeler v. United States, 382
F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1967); Rolland v. Michigan, 320
F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1970), vacated, 439 F.2d
1203 (6th Cir. 1971); Velarde v. People, 171 Colo. 261,
466 P.2d 919 (1970); People v. Goree, 30 Mich. App.
490,186 N.W.2d 872 (1971); People v. Marsh, 14 Mich.
App. 518, 165 N.W.2d 853 (1968), rev'd on other grounds,
383 Mich. 495, 175 N.W.2d 780 (1970); State v. Brew-
ton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387 U.S.
943 (1967) Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229,
237 A.2d 209 (1968); State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86,
171 S.E.2d 398 (1970); Caldwell v. Commonwealth,
209 Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968). See notes 42
N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 772 (1967); 36 U. Ciuc. L. REv. 738
(1967). See also People v. McGrath, 31 Mich. App. 351,
187 N.W.2d 904 (1971); Spann v. State, 448 S.W.2d
178 (Tex. 1969). Accord United States v. Curry, 358
F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1965), reh. denied, 387 U.S. 949 (1967);
Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 972 (1964); People v. Durazo,
353 Cal. App. 2d 555, 61 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1967); People
v. Boodie, 26 N.Y.2d 779, 257 N.E.2d 657 (1970);
People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 221 N.E.2d 541 (1966);
State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818
(1969); Mullins v. State, 425 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1968);
State v. Burgess, 71 Wash. 2d 617,430 P.2d 185 (1967).
Of course a signed confession in proper form can be
used to impeach. See People v. Williams, 98 Ill. App.
2d 136, 240 N.E.2d 144 (1968).
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the court expanded the Walder principle to apply to
statements which are inadmissible as substantive
evidence because of deficiencies in the Miranda re-
quirements. In Harris, a defendant charged with
the sale of heroin to an undercover policeman took
the witness stand and admitted selling a substance,
but he claimed it was baking powder. He then was
impeached with contradictory statements he made
to the police following his arrest. These statements
were inadmissible in the case in chief due to the
lack of a showing in the record that the accused was
given his Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court
held, however, that they were useable for impeach-
ment purposes because,
Every criminal defendant is privileged to
testify in his own defense, or to refuseto do so.
But that privilege cannot be construed to in-
dude the right to commit perjury.... Having
voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was
under an obligation to speak truthfully and
accurately, and the prosecution here did no
more than utilize the traditional truth-testing
devices of the adversary process. Had incon-
sistent statements been made by the accused
to some third person, it could hardly be con-
tended that the conflict could not be laid
before the jury by way of cross-examination
and impeachment.
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way
of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances. We hold,
therefore, that petitioner's credibility was ap-
propriately impeached by use of his earlier
conflicting statements.
2 5
The court in Harris required, of course, that the
statements used for impeachment be trustworthy
in that they must be free from coercion,2 68 which
266 400 U.S. at 225.
266 This principle, of course, is almost without excep-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. McQueen, 458 F.2d
1049 (3d Cir. 1972); Smith v. United States, 312 F.2d
867 (D.C. Cir. 1962), afJ'd, 332 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Fernandez v. Delgado, 257 F. Supp. 673 (D.
Puerto Rico 1966); People v. Canard, 257 Cal. App. 2d
444, 65 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 912
(1968); State v. Vollhardt, 157 Conn. 25, 244 A.2d
601 (1968); People v. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d 216, 230 N.E.2d
827 (1967); Commonwealth v. Klaciak, 350 Mass. 679,
216 N.E.2d 417 (1966); State v. Kassow. 28 Ohio St.
141, 277 N.E.2d 435 (1971), vacated for resentencing,
408 U.S. 939 (1972); State v. Swanson, 9 Ohio App. 2d
60, 222 N.E.2d 844 (1967); Riddell v. Rhay, 79 Wash.
2d 248, 484 P.2d 907 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 974
(1971); Gaertmer v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d
370 (1967). But see People v. Sovientini, 34 App. Div.
2d 832, 312 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1970).
may necessitate a hearing on the voluntariness
question prior to impeachment. 27 The court also
said that there was no distinction in principle be-
tween statements relating to collateral issues and
statements which bear directly on guilt or inno-
cence 23s Statements, therefore, which go to the
central issue being litigated, but are inadmissible
due to technical Miranda violations, are usable for
impeachment 6 9
As already discussed, the Walder case allowed
impeachment by the use of illegally seized evidence.
With that principle established and broadened by
Harris to include evidence which may be probative
of guilt, the prosecutor now has significant latitude
with regard to impeachment by means of other-
wise inadmissible tangible evidence as well as
statements70
217 See Ruffin v. United States, 293 A.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); State v. Slobodian, 120 N.J. Super. 68, 293
A.2d 399 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 909 (1972);
People v. Torres, 32 App. Div. 2d 791, 302 N.Y.S.2d
396 (1969); State v. Dunlap, 16 N.C. App. 176, 191
S.E.2d 385 (1972). But see Rooks v. State, 250 Ark.
561, 466 S.W.2d 478 (1971).
2 See McCoxucK §43.
269 The Harris principle may be applied to Escobedo
and McNabb-Mallory situations as well. See Tate v.
United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (McNabb-
Mallory problem); Padgett v. Russell, 332 F. Supp. 41
(E.D. Pa. 1971) (Escobedo violation). In State v. Grant,
77 Wash. 2d 47, 459 P.2d 639 (1969), the court held
that a defense witness who was denied counsel could
be impeached with his statements.
The influence of the Harris decision has already been
felt in a number of cases. See People v. McIntyre, 467
F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cransom,
453 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
909 (1972); State v. Altman, 107 Ariz. 93, 482 P.2d
460,(1971); Rooks v. State, 250 Ark. 561, 466 S.W.2d
478 (1971); Retherford v. State, 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla.
1972); Estep v. State, 14 Md. App. 53, 286 A.2d 187
(1972); State v. Slobodian, 120 N.J. Super. 68, 293
A.2d 399 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 909 (1972);
State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551, 187 S.E.2d 111 (1972);
State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d I (N. D. 1971); Common-
wealth v. Williams, 443 Pa. 85, 277 A.2d 781 (1971);
Small v. State, 466 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. 1971).
270 See United States v. Blackwood, 456 F.2d 526
(2d Cir. 1972); Brooks v. United States, 449 F.2d 1296
(9th Cir. 1971); Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d
212 (4th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Debrow v.
Zelken, 324 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United
States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971); Lassof v. Grey, 207
F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Trowbridge v. State,
502 P.2d 495 (Okla. 1972). In Commonwealth v. Wright,
415 Pa. 55, 202 A.2d 79 (1964, rev'd 444 Pa. 588, 282
A.2d 266 (1971), the Pennsylvania supreme court
stated the conditions which it felt must be present in
order to impeach with illegally seized evidence. These
are: (1) the defendant must elect to take the stand;
(2) the testimony which conflicts must be more than a
denial of the elements of the crime; (c) the inadmissible
evidence can be received only to the extent that it does
not admit the acts which are the essential elements of
the crime charged. See also Commonwealth v. Reginelli,
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VIII IMI'EACIIMENT BY CONVICTION OF CRIME
At common law, a person who had been previ-
ously convicted of treason, a felony, or a mis-
demeanor involving dishonesty was rendered in-
competent to testify as a witness in any judicial
proceeding m While the belief that a criminal
record reduces the trustworthiness of a person's
testimony has remained ingrained in the law, the
policy of holding such a person incompetent to
testify has been rejected by both statutes and deci-
sions.V2 At the present time, therefore, the vast
majority of jurisdictions allow the prosecutor to
cross-examine defendants and defense witnesses
regarding prior criminal records for the purpose of
impeaching their credibility.P Exceptions to this
practice include Kansas and Pennsylvania, where
inquiry into the criminal record of the accused is
allowed only after he has put his character in
issue.n4
208 Pa. Super. 344, 222 A.2d 605 (1966), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 945 (1967). But see United States v. Birrell,
276 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the court
held that impeachment with evidence tainted by failure
to give Miranda warnings was improper.
' See McCoamcK §43.
m See PRoPosED Fed. R. Evm.; MicH. STAT. AmN.
§27A. 2158 (1962); Mnm. STAT. Amq. §595.07 (1964);
MISS. CODE AsN. ch. 8, §1692 (1972); Mo. STAT. ANN.
§491.050 (1952); WASH. CODE ANpw. tit. 10 §1.052.030
(1961). See also Brooks v. United States, 309 F.2d 580
(10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 916 (1966);
State v. Bitting, 162 Conn. 1, 291 A.2d 240 (1971);
State v. Shipp, 184 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1971); Common-
wealth v. Holloway, 212 Pa. Super. 250, 242 A.2d 683
(1971). An alternative motivation for impeachment by
prior conviction is discussed by Justice Keeton in his
dissenting opinion in State v. Owen, 253 P.2d 203, 224
(Idaho 1953):
Every attorney with even limited experience in
criminal practice, knows that impeachment of an
accused in a criminal case is not, in fact, the real
pUrpose of the examination. It simply pictures the
misconduct and villaining of the accused and prej-
udices the jury by injecting.
2 See MINN. STAT. A~w. §595.07 (1966); Mo. STAT.
ANN. §491.050 (1952); WASH. CODE AN. §10.52.030
(1962). See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967);
Parish v. State, 477 P.2d 1005 (Alaska 1970); People
v. Knightom, 250 Cal. App. 2d 221, 58 Cal. Rptr. 700
(1967); State v. Dunn, 91 Idaho 870, 434 P.2d 88
(1967); State v. Anderson, 159 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa
1968); State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1968);
People v. Cook, 24 Mich. App. 401, 180 N.W.2d 354
(1970); State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d
174 (1971); State v. Weaver, 3 N.C. App. 439, 165
S.E.2d 15 (1969).
Impeachment by prior conviction may also take
place in the penalty stage of a trial. See Stratman v.
State, 436 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. 1968); Mays v. State,
428 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1968). But see Brunfield v. State,
445 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1969).
17
4 See KAx. STAT. ANN. §60-421 (1964); PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 19, ch. 9, §19-711 (1964). See also State v.
DeLespine, 201 Kan. 348, 440 P.2d 572 (1968); State
Impeachment by prior criminal conviction is for
the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness
or defendant on the stand. It is improper, therefore,
to question a defense witness under the guise of im-
peachment, about the prior record of a defendant
who has not taken the stand himself.25
Prior crimes which are similar or identical to
those presently charged may serve the dual pur-
pose of impeachment and proof of motive, intent
and lack of mistake.27e The prosecutor must be
careful, however, since impeachment by similar
crimes tends to show that the accused has a propen-
sity to engage in illegal behavior. This latter pur-
pose is dearly improper.2n
While there is an abundance of case law which
upholds impeachment by "felonies" 2s or by prior
v. Cantrell, 201 Kan. 182, 440 P.2d 580 (1968); Com-
monwealth v. Barron, 438 Pa. 259, 264 A.2d 710,
appeal dismissed, 439 Pa. 614, 266 A.2d 476 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Bastome, 211 Pa. Super. 509, 239
A.2d 863 (1968).
25See, e.g., United States v. Comi, 336 F.2d 856
(4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 992 (1965) (de-
fendant's mother asked about his involvement in a con-
spiracy and his tax evasion); People v. Mays, 48 111. 2d
164, 269 N.E.2d 281 (1971) (defendant's mother crossed
as to his time in jail); State v. Rowell, 77 N.M. 124,419
P.2d 966 (1966) (defendant's mother asked about his
forgery conviction). Bia see Mays v. State, 428 S.W.2d
325 (Tex. 1968) (defendant's mother questioned in
penalty phase about the meaning of "conviction" after
she testified that her son had never been convicted of
a felony).
27 See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 404(b). See also
United States v. Fisher, 377 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1967),
reh. denied, 389 U.S. 998 (1967); Ivery v. State, 219
So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969); State v. Smith, 262 La. 39, 262
So. 2d 362 (1972); State v. Lee, 485 P.2d 660 (Ore.
1971).
277See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 404(b). See also
Tapia v. Rodriquez, 446 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1971);
People v. Washington, 32 App. Div. 2d 605, 299 N.Y.S.
2d 927 (1969); People v. Johnson, 31 App. Div. 2d 842,
298 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1969); People v. Childers, 28 App.
Div. 2d 725,281 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1967); State v. Fletcher,
279 N.C. 85, 181 S.E.2d 405 (1971); State v. Thomas,
17 N.C. App. 8, 193 S.E.2d 450 (1972).
271 See, e.g., United States v. Badgood, 453 F.2d 988
(5th Cir. 1972); United States v. White, 463 F.2d 18
(9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Michaelson, 453 F.2d
1248 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cook, 450 F.2d
339 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 925 (1972);
United States v. Kiraly, 445 F.2d 291 (6th Cir.) cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 915 (1971); United States v. Gibson,
444 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Harper,
443 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 966
(1971); United States v. Dandridge, 437 F.2d 1324
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934 (1971); United
States v. Mancuso, 423 F.2d 23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 839 (1970); United States v. Scarpellino, 431
F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. United States, 424
F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Greenberg,
419 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1969); Nutter v. United States,
412 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S 927
(1970); Burg v. United States, 406 F.2d 235 (9th Cir.
1969); United States v. Freeman, 412 F.2d 1181 (10th
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"convictions", 271 various jurisdictions have evolved
specific guidelines. For example, impeachment may
Cir. 1969); Montgomery v. United States, 403 F.2d
605 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969);
United States v. Berriel, 371 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 907 (1968); Whitfield v. United
States, 376 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
883 (1967); Singleton v. United States, 381 F.2d I (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1024 (1967); United States
v. Wade, 364 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1968); Helberg v.
United States, 365 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1010 (1967); Taylor v. Slayton, 341 F. Supp.
489 (W.D. Va. 1972); Cofflin v. Cox, 317 F. Supp. 86
(W.D. Va. 1970); Stevens v. Nelson, 302 F. Supp. 968
(N.D. Cal. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1020 (1970);
Dotsun v. Boles, 271 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. W. Va. 1967);
State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d 603, cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969); State v. Foggy, 101 Ariz.
459, 420 P.2d 934 (1966), aff'd, 107 Axiz. 307, 486 P.2d
789 (1971); State v. Bernal, 13 Ariz. App. 177, 475 P.2d
6 (1970); State v. Chance, 4 Ariz. App. 38, 417 P.2d
(1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 966 (1967); Swan v. State,
245 Ark. 154, 431 S.W.2d 475 (1968); People v. Bowen,
22 Cal. App. 3d 267, 99 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1971); People
v. House, 12 Cal. App. 3d 756,90 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1970);
People v. Long, 6 Cal. App. 3d 741, 86 Cal. Rptr. 227
(1970); People v. Harris, 272 Cal. App. 2d 506, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 406 (1969); People v. Aulisi, 264 Cal. App. 2d
149, 70 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1968); People v. Kelley 261
Cal. App. 2d 708, 68 Cal. Rptr, 337 (1968); People v.
Arzola, 258 Cal. App. 2d 124, 65 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1968);
People v. Johnson, 253 Cal. App. 2d 396, 61 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1967); People v. Hays, 250 Cal. App. 2d 373, 58
Cal. Rptr. 293 (1967); People v. Roberts, 55 Cal. Rptr.
412, 421 P.2d 420 (1966), stay denied, 386 U.S. 1001
(1967); People v. Molera, 242 Cal. App. 2d 736, 51
Cal. Rptr. 781 (1966); People v. DeGeorgio, 185 Cal.
App. 2d 413, 8 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1960); Lacey v. People,
166 Colo. 152, 442 P.2d 402 (1968); Miller v. State, 224
A.2d 592 (Del. 1966); Hinton v. Florida 201 So 2d 484
(Fla. 1967); State v. Dunn, 91 Idaho 870, 434 ?.2d 88
(1967); People v. Wright, 72 Ill. App. 2d 117, 218
N.E.2d 799 (1966); State v. Hackett, 200 N.W.2d 493
(Iowa 1972); State v. Anderson, 159 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa
1969); State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1968);
State v. Allnut, 261 Iowa 897, 156 N.W.2d 266, afJ'd,
158 N.W.2d 715 (Iowa 1968); Jenkins v. Common-
wealth, 477 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1972); Hood v. Common-
wealth, 448 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1968); Commonwealth v.
Nunes, 351 Mass. 401, 221 N.E.2d 752 (1966); State v.
Hackney, 420 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. 1967); State v. Kirby,
185 Neb. 240, 175 N.W.2d 87 (1970); State v. Jones,
183 Neb. 133, 158 N.W.2d 278 (1968); Franklin v.
State, 437 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. 1968); Vaughn v. State,
456 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1970); Phillips v. State, 450
S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1970); Munoz v. State, 435 S.W.2d
500 (Tex. 1968); Smith v. State, 414 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.
1967); State v. Sibley, 411 S.W.2d 187 (1967); State v.
Simmons, 28 Utah 2d 301, 501 P.2d 1206 (1972).
A felony charge which is reduced to a misdemeanor
prior to adjudication cannot be used to impeach. See
United States v. Thompson, 443 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.
1971) (fondling reduced to contributing to the de-
linquency of a minor); People v. Wright, 38 Mich.
App. 427, 196 N.W.2d 839 (1972) (larceny reduced to
disorderly conduct); People v. Rahar, 37 Mich. App.
577, 194 N.W.2d 77 (1972) (possession of drugs reduced
to being in an illegal establishment); People v. Farrar,
36 Mich. App. 294, 193 N.W.2d 363 (1971) (attempted
murder reduced to aggravated assault); State v.
Weaver, 3 N.C. App. 439, 165 S.E.2d 15 (1969) (felo-
nious assault retried as simple assault).
be limited to convictions of "infamous" crimes 0
or to "felonies and misdemeanors involving moral
turpitude." m The quality of "moral turpitude"
might be required of felonies as well.s2 Although
29 See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 455 F.2d 746
(5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bray, 445 F.2d 178
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1002 (1972);
United States v. Mills, 440 F.2d 647 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 837 (1971); Bandelow v. United States,
418 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 400 U.S. 967
(1970); Harris v. United States, 384 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.
1967); Reese v. United States, 353 F.2d 732 (5th Cir..
1965); United States v. Comi, 336 F.2d 856 (4th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 992 (1965); Stewart v.
State, 240 Ark. 701, 402 S.W.2d 116 (1966); People v.
Medina, 26 Cal. App. 3d 809, 103 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1972);
People v. Jones, 8 Cal. App. 3d 710, 87 Cal. Rptr. 625
(1970); State v. Fredericks, 154 Conn. 68, 221 A.2d
585 (1966); Harris v. State, 208 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1968);
Reid v. State, 285 N.E.2d 279 (Ind. 1972); Hensley v.
State, 268 N.E.2d 90 (Ind. 1971); Fisher v. State, 247
Ind. 529, 219 N.E.2d 818 (1966); Mason v. State, 242
Md. 707, 218 A.2d 682 (1966); Commonwealth v. Con-
nolly, 356 Mass. 617, 255 N.E.2d 191 (1970); People v.
Pollard, 39 Mich. App. 291, 197 N.W.2d 546 (1972);
People v. Payne, 37 Mich. App. 442, 194 N.W.2d 906
(1971); State v. Johnson, 291 Minn. 407, 192 N.W.2d
87 (1971); State v. Emerson, 286 Minn. 246, 175
N.W.2d 503 (1970); Ferrell v. State, 267 So. 2d 813
(Miss. 1972); Murray v. State, 266 So. 2d 139 (Miss.
1972); Emily v. State, 191 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1966);
State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 235 A.2d 111 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968); State v. Mustachio,
109 N.J. Super. 257, 263 A.2d 139 (1970), aff'd, 57 N.J.
265, 271 A.2d 582 (1970); State v. Christie, 91 N.J.
Super. 420,221 A.2d 20 (1966); State v. Lee, 404 S.W.2d
740 (Mo. 1966); State v. Lea, 193 S.E.2d 383 (N.C.
1972); State v. Wright, 192 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1972);
State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971);
State v. Gaiten, 277 N.C. 236, 176 S.E.2d 778 (1970);
State v. Sherman, 4 N.C. App. 386, 166 S.E.2d 836
(1969); State v. Weaver, 3 N.C. App. 439, 165 S.E.2d
15 (1969); Benefield v. State, 480 P.2d 626 (Okla.
1971); Torbett v. State, 449 P.2d 725 (Okla. 1969);
State v. Rush, 248 Ore. 568, 436 P.2d 266 (1968);
Beilah v. State, 415 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. 1967).
28 See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 270 N.E.2d 498 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1971); People v. Culver, 96 Ill. App. 2d 314,
238 N.E.2d 161 (1968); People v. Osborne, 78 IIl. App.
2d 132, 223 N.E.2d 243 (1966); People v. Smith, 74
Ill. App. 2d 458, 221 N.E.2d 68 (1966); Neam v. State,
14 Md. App. 180, 286 A.2d 540 (1972).
ni See, e.g., United States v. White, 446 F.2d 1280
(3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Saitta, 443 F.2d 830
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971); United
States v. Sanders, 412 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1969); United
States v. Romero, 388 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1968); Hudson
v. United States, 387 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 965 (1971); Leary v. United States,
383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), remanded, 431 F.2d 85
(5th Cir. 1970); Pickney v. United States, 380 F.2d
882 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 908 (1968);
United States v. Jackson, 344 F.2d 922 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 880 (1965); State v. Toppi, 275
A.2d 805 (Me. 1971); Commonwealth v. Flagg, 212
Pa. Super. 344, 242 A.2d 921 (1968); Holgin v. State,
480 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. 1972); Wood v. State, 478 S.W.2d
513 (Tex. 1972); Smith v. Commonwealth, 212 Va.
675, 187 S.E.2d 191 (1972); Land v. Commonwealth,
211 Va. 223, 176 S.E.2d 586 (1970).
2 See Butler v. United States, 408 F.2d 1103 (10th
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the dictionary definition of "moral turpitude" is "an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity .. .. ",21 the
courts have applied the term to offenses ranging
from fraud and prostitution to illegal entry.'"
There is general agreement, at least, that drunken-
ess is outside the ambit of the definition.2"5
Another common categorization is "felonies and
misdemeanors in the "crimen falsi" category." 6
Cir. 1969) (such cross-examination should be limited to
acts or conduct which reflects upon integrity or truth-
fulness, or pertains to personal turpitude such as would
indicate moral depravity or degeneracy); In re Huard,
125 Vt. 189, 212 A.2d 640 (1965) (question if witness
had ever been convicted of a felony was too broad
since it included crimes not involving moral turpitude).
See also United States v. Griffin, 378 F.2d 445 (6th
Cir. 1967); Paul v. State, 251 So. 2d 246 (Ala. 1971),
reh. denied, 265 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 1972); Caldwell v.
State, 282 Ala. 713, 213 So. 2d 919 (1968); McGovern
v. State, 44 Ala. App. 197, 205 So. 2d 247 (1967);
Baker v. State, 43 Ala. App. 550, 195 So. 2d 815 (1966),
vacated, 396 U.S. 198 (1968); Norman v. State, 121 Ga.
App. 753, 175 S.E.2d 119 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
956 (1971); Cambell v. State, 469 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn.
1971); McKenzie v. State, 462 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn.
1970); Courtney v. State, 424 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1968).
sn See BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1160 (1968).
2' See Surret v. United States, 421 F.2d 403 (5th
Cir. 1970) (defrauding the government of money);
United States v. Zubkoff, 416 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1038 (1970) (illegal entry, petty
larceny); United States v. Lloyd, 400 F.2d 414 (6th
Cir. 1968) (shoplifting); United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d
868 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947 (1966)
(impersonating a police officer with intent to defraud);
Mayberry v. State, 206 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1968) (larceny,
cutting with intent to kill, shooting with intent to kill);
Taylor v. State, 470 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1971) (procuring,
keeping a bawdy house, being a common prostitute, or
being the inmate of a house of fil-fame); Johnson v.
State, 453 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1970) (prostitution, solicit-
ing a male, vagrancy for prostitution); Dunlap v.
State, 440 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1969) (sex offenses). See
also State v. Ohson, 83 S.D. 260, 158 N.W.2d 526
(1968), where the court found that it was improper to
ask a witness if he had been convicted of a crime of
moral turpitude, since the witness could not possibly
have a clear definition of just what that means.
"' See Parker v. State, 280 Ala. 685, 198 So. 2d 261,
rev'd on other grounds, 281 Ala. 181, 200 So. 2d 481
(1967); Hoover v. State, 449 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. 1969).
Courts have held that certain other crimes do not in-
volve moral turpitude. See United States v. Smith,
420 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1970) (possessing alcoholic
beverages in a dry county); Thomas v. State, 47 Ala.
App. 28, 249 So. 2d 644 (1971) (marriage of minor with-
out parental consent); McGovern v. State, 44 Ala. App.
197, 205 So. 2d 247 (1967) (resisting arrest, assault,
liquor law violations); McKenzie v. State, 462 S.W.2d
243 (Tenn. 1970) (causing children under 18 to leave
school); Thomas v. State, 482 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1972)
(carrying weapons); Valdez v. State, 450 S.W.2d 664
(Tex. 1970) (aggravated assault unless committed on a
female); Stephens v. State, 417 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. 1967)
(driving while intoxicated and driving with a suspended
license).
"8 See United States v. Evans, 398 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1968) (disorderly person does not amount to crimen
"Crimen falsi" refers to crimes which involve the
element of falsehood and deceit such as forgery and
perjury.m A similar, but broader guideline is the
one adopted by the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence which allows impeachment with felonies
and misdemeanors involving dishonesty or false
statement.m Some courts, however, require that
all crimes used to impeach, even felonies, must in-
volve the element of dishonesty.us There is, of
course, no uniform view as to what crimes involve
dishonesty and hence credibility, but there is a gen-
eral consensus of opinion that burglary, larceny
and forgery would be included in any definition.1s0
There is much disagreement, however, whether
falsi); Commonwealth v. Butler, 213 Pa. Super. 388,
247 A.2d 794 (1968) (firearm violations do not amount
to crimen falsi). See also Commonwealth v. Maroney,
423 Pa. 589, 225 A.2d 236 (1967); Commonwealth v.
Felling, 214 Pa. Super. 207, 252 A.2d 200 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Riddick, 212 Pa. Super. 390, 243
A.2d 174 (1968).
"3 See BAck's LAw DIcrioNnY 446 (1968).
23See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 609. See also Ciravolo
v. United States, 384 F.2d 54 (Ist Cir. 1967).
21 See, e.g., State v. Gunzehnan, 502 P.2d 705 (Kan.
1972); Harris v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 68 (Ky.
1971); Cotton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky.
1970); Johnson v. State, 4 Md. App. 648, 244 A.2d
632 (1968); Robinson v. State, Md. App. 666, 240 A.2d
638 (1968); People v. Fair, 35 App. Div. 2d 519, 312
N.Y.S.2d 353 (1970); Taylor v. State, 188 S.E.2d 850
(S.C. 1972). Contra People v. Cantrell, 27 Mich. App.
210, 183 N.W.2d 401 (1970); State v. Hungerford, 54
Wis. 2d 744, 196 N.W.2d 647 (1972); State v. Driscoll,
53 Wis. 2d 699, 193 N.W.2d 851 (1972).
210 See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971) (petty
larceny and housebreaking); United States v. White,
427 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (housebreaking); United
States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971) (larceny and forgery);
United States v. Costa, 425 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970) (counterfeiting); Cira-
volo v. United States, 394 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1967)
(assault); People v. Carter, 7 Cal. App. 3d 332, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 546 (1970) (assault); People v. Petty, 3 Ill. App.
3d 951, 279 N.E.2d 509 (1972) (forgery); Cotton v.
Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970) (perjury,
forgery, fraudulent alterations, misappropriation of
funds, false personation, fraudulent concealment and
all felonies involving theft); Cook v. State, 8 Md. App.
243, 259 A.2d 326 (1969) (assault); Commonwealth v.
Amos, 445 Pa. 297, 284 A.2d 748 (1971) (burglary);
Commonwealth v. Holloway, 212 Pa. Super. 250, 242
A.2d 918 (1968) (all felonies and misdemeanors). Courts
have held that specific crimes do not involve dishonesty
and credibility. See United States v. Carr, 418 F.2d 1184
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1030 (1970)
(joyriding); Smith v. State, 194 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1966)
(conviction of a relative); Peaper v. State, 14 Md. App.
201, 286 A.2d 176 (1972) (bastardy charges); Taylor v.
State, 188 S.E.2d 850 (S.C. 1972) (unlawful weapons
violation, parole revocation, escape, manslaughter,
juvenile "trouble"); Barren v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 460,
198 N.W.2d 345 (1972) (drinking).
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crimes of violence such as assault are indicative of
diminished credibility.29'
Some jurisdictions have encouraged widespread
impeachment by prior conviction by allowing that
impeachment to be based upon "any crime." 
2 92
Other courts have established the more limited rule
that misdemeanor convictions may not be so em-
ployed.293 Whatever policy has been adopted by a
particular jurisdiction, convictions in the federal
courts or in the courts of other states which fall
within that jurisdiction's guidelines, are useable
for impeachment. 29 4 Prior convictions for crimes
291For crimes having no relation to credibility, see
Jones v. United States, 402 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(assault); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968) (crimes of
violence); Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (assault); State v. Gunzelman, 502 P.2d
705 (Kan. 1972) (assault and battery); Wilson v. Com-
monwealth, 403 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1966) (murder);
Taylor v. State, 188 S.E.2d 850 (S.C. 1972) (man-
slaughter). For crimes which do relate to credibility,
see People v. Carter, 7 Cal. App. 3d 332, 88 Cal. Rptr.
546 (1970) (assault); Hill v. State, 502 P.2d 1280
(Okla. 1972) (fighting).29 See Mss. CoDE Am., ch. 8, §§1692-3 (1956);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, ch. 9 §12-381 (1960). See also
People v. Payne, 27 Mich. App. 133, 183 N.W.2d 371
(1970); State v. West, 285 Minn. 188, 173 N.W.2d
468 (1969); Barlow v. State, 233 So. 2d 829 (Miss.
1970); Mangrum v. State, 232 So. 2d 703 (Miss. 1970);
State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,228 A.2d 682 (1966).
291 See United States v. Vasquez, 460 F.2d 202 (9th
Cir. 1972); State v. Johnson, 106 Ariz. 539, 479 P.2d
424 (1971); People v. Russel, 22 Cal. App. 3d 330, 99
Cal. Rptr. 277 (1971); People v. Covert, 249 Cal. App.
2d 81, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1967); Hawkins v. People,
161 Colo. 556, 423 P.2d 581 (1967); Dixon v. Common-
wealth, 487 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1972); fles v. Common-
wealth, 476 S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1972); State v. Rowe, 57
N.J. 293, 271 A.2d 897 (1970); Anderson v. State, 85
Nev. 415, 456 P.2d 445 (1969); Colle v. State, 85 Nev.
289, 454 P.2d 21 (1969); Ochoa v. State, 481 S.W.2d
847 (Tex. 1972). Contra, Gray v. State, 485 S.W.2d
537 (Ark. 1972); State v. Lipscomb, 289 Minn. 511,
183 N.W.2d 790 (1971); State v. Bond, 285 Minn. 291,
173 N.W.2d 347 (1969); Jones v. State, 241 So. 2d
829 (Miss. 1970); State v. Lafferty, 415 S.W.2d 792
(Mo. 1967); State v. Hunt, 49 N.J. 114, 228 A.2d 673
(1967); State v. Williams, 76 N.M. 578, 417 P.2d 556
(1969); State v. McNair, 272 N.C. 130, 157 S.E.2d
660 (1967); State v. Moe, 151 N.W.2d 310 (N.D. 1967);
Ruhm v. State, 496 P.2d 809 (Okla. 1972); State v.
Johnson, 1 Wash. App. 553, 463 P.2d 205 (1969); City
of Mercer Island v. Walker, 76 Wash. 2d. 607, 458
P.2d 274 (1969); State v. Woods, 184 S.E.2d 130 (W.
Va. 1971); Massen v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 245,163 N.W.2d
616, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 939 (1969).291 See McCo~mscn § 43. See also United States v.
Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
844 (1962); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 489 P.2d
44 (1971); State v. Wells, 10 Ariz. App. 89, 456 P.2d
409 (1969); People v. Asher, 273 Cal. App. 2d 876, 78
Cal. Rptr. 885 (1969); People v. Trent, 85 Ill. App. 2d
157, 228 N.E.2d 535 (1967).
which are identical to or similar to the charges in
the ongoing case also may generally be used.
295
In spite of conflicting policies and varying pro-
cedures, as a general matter, impeachment may be
accomplished with prior convictions for robbery,
296
burglary,297 larceny,29 forgery,299 auto theft"' and
narcotics offenses 10' Most courts will also allow
impeachment based upon crimes of violence such
299 See, e.g., United States v. Tubbs, 461 F.2d 43
(7th Cir. 1972); Inklebarger v. State, 481 S.W.2d 750
(Ark. 1972); Williford v. State, 479 S.W. 2d 244 (Ark.
1972); Wethington v. State, 3 Md. App. 237, 238 A.2d
581 (1968), affd, 7 Md. App. 79, 253 A.2d 523 (1969);
State v. Walter, 289 Minn. 309,184 N.W.2d 426 (1971);
State v. Rodea, 132 N.J.L. 199, 39 A.2d 484 (1944);
State v. Cook, 280 N.C. 642, 187 S.E.2d 104 (1972);
Lang v. State, 457, S.W.2d 882 (Tenn. 1970); Johnson
v. State, 456 S.W.2d 864 (Tenn. 1970); Menjares v.
State, 456 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. 1970); State v. Gandee,
73 Wash. 2d 978, 439 P.2d 400 (1968). Contra, United
States v. Smith, 256 A.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People
v. Eldridge, 17 Mich. App. 306, 169 N.W.2d 497 (1969).
The use of prior similar convictions was one of the fac-
tors weighed when determining whether to allow im-
peachment in the Luck line of cases at notes 346-49
infra. For the consequences of the possibility that the
jury will take the accused's prior record to be indicative
of a propensity to engage in unlawful behavior see note
273 supra.290 See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 954
(Ky. 1972); People v. Lewis, 31 Mich. App. 433, 188
N.W.2d 107 (1971); State v. Brakes, 1 Wash. App.
987, 465 P.2d 683 (1970).
29
7 See United States v. Bishop, 457 F.2d 260 (7th
Cir. 1972); People v. Walker, 272 Cal. App. 2d 252,
76 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1969); People v. Perrin, 247 Cal.
App. 2d 838, 55 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1967); Swann v. State,
7 Md. App. 309, 255 A.2d 457 (1969); State v. Haith,
7 N.C. App. 552, 172 S.E.2d 912 (1970); Sharp v. State,
421 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1967); State v. Brakes, 1 Wash.
App. 987, 465 P.2d 683 (1970).29 See Bowie v. State, 494 P.2d 800 (Alas. 1972);
Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App. 515,243 A.2d 879 (1968);
People v. White, 30 Mich. App. 97, 186 N.W.2d 27
(1971); State v. Brakes, 1 Wash. App. 987, 465 P.2d
683 (1970).2
1
99 See United States v. Griffin, 378 F.2d 445 (6th
Cir. 1967); Bowie v. State, 494 P.2d 800 (Alas. 1972);
People v. Petty, 3 Ill. App. 3d 951, 279 N.E.2d 509
(1972); Holgin v. State, 480 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. 1972).
3O See Mottram v. Murch, 458 F.2d 626 (1st Cir.
1972), where the error committed involved four of the
jurors at the second trial who knew of defendant's
record and his invoking the fifth amendment at the
first trial. See also Tucker v. United States, 409 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971);
les v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1972);
State v. Harless, 28 Utah 2d 128, 459 P.2d 210 (1969).
21 See United States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 14 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 951 (1971); United
States v. McIntosh, 426 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Durant v. United States, 292 A.2d 157 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Cobb v. United States, 252 A.2d 516 (D.C. Cir.
1969); People v. Von Latta, 258 Cal. App. 2d 329, 65
Cal. Rptr. 651 (1968); People v. Dempsey, 40 Mich.
App. 400, 199 N.W.2d 231 (1972); Smith v. State, 6
Md. App. 581, 252 A.2d 277 (1969).
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as murder, 02 assault"3 and rape. °4 Municipal ordi-
nance violations,"0 5 traffic violations3 06 and petty
offenses such as vagrancy' °7 typically cannot be
used for impeachment. The majority view is that
juvenile offenses are not properly useable for im-
peachment,30 but some courts relax that prohibi-
tion in light of the seriousness of the offense,
302 See, e.g., Norman v. State, 121 Ga. App. 753 175
S.E.2d 119 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 956 (19715.
m See Commonwealth v. Boudreau, 285 N.E.2d 915
(Mass. 1972); State v. King, 196 N.W.2d 595 (Minn.
1972); Crawford v. State, 512 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. 1967).304 See United States v. Huff, 442 F.2d 1145 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); People v. Eldridge, 17 Mich. App. 306,
169 N.W.2d 497 (1969).
305 See, e.g., Rainey v. State, 266 So. 2d 335 (Ala.
1972); Caldwell v. State, 282 Ala. 713, 213 So. 2d 919
(1968); Parker v. State, 280 Ala. 685, 198 So. 2d 261
(1967), rev'd on other grounds, 281 Ala. 181, 200 So. 2d
481 (1967); State v. Bond, 285 Minn. 291, 173 N.W.2d
347 (19695; Kansas City v. Roberts, 411 S.W.2d
847 (Mo. 1967); Hampshire v. City of Tulsa, 503 P.2d
577 (Okla. 1972); Torbett v. State, 449 P.2d 725
(Okla. 1969); State v. Gustafson, 248 Ore. 1, 432 P.2d
323 (1967); Barren v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 460, 198 N.W.2d
345 (1972). But see Scott v. State, 445 P.2d 39 (Alaska
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1082 (1969); State v. Bis-
well, 83 N.M. 65, 488 P.2d 115 (1971).
06 See, e.g., United States v. Perea, 413 F.2d 65 (10th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 945 (1970); State v.
Roth, 200 Kan. 677, 438 P.2d 58 (1968); Woodell v.
State, 2 Md. App. 433, 234 A.2d 890 (1967); Jones v.
State, 268 So. 2d 348 (Miss. 1972); State v. Waller, 80
N.M. 380, 456 P.2d 213 (1969). But see People v.
White, 30 Mich. App. 97, 186 N.W.2d 27 (1971);
People v. Vanderah, 11 Mich. App. 722, 162 N.W.2d
150 (1968); State v. Haith, 7 N.C. App. 552, 172 S.E.2d
912 (1970).
317 See Pickney v. United States, 363 F.2d 696 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Hawkins v. People, 161 Colo. 556, 423 P.2d
581 (1967); Mahaffey v. State, 471 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1018 (1972). But see Evans
v. State, 401 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1966).
Other crimes have been successfully employed in
impeachment. See Walker v. United States, 363 F.2d
681 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 922 (1967)
(weapons violations); State v. Blackwell, 276 N.C. 714,
174 S.E.2d 534, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946 (1970) (fight-
ing with parent and non-support); State v. Stallings,
4 N.C. App. 184, 166 S.E.2d 464 (1969) (cross burning).
808 See Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th
Cir. 1966); Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); Hammac v. State, 44 Ala. App. 459, 212
So. 2d 849 (1968); Stewart v. State, 221 So. 2d 155 (Fla.
1969); Shropshlre v. State, 279 N.E.2d 225, (Ind. 1972);
Noel v. State, .247 Ind. 426, 215 N.E.2d 539, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Cook v. State, 8 Md. App.
243, 259 A.2d 326 (1969); Westfall v. State, 243 Md.
413, 221 A.2d 646 (1966); People v. Warren, 23 Mich.
App. 20, 178 N.W.2d 127 (1970); People v. Luther, 20
Mich, App. 42, 173 N.W.2d 797 (1969); State v. Laws,
50 N.J. 159, 233 A.2d 633 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
971 (1968); State v. Broxton, 49 N.J. 373, 230 A.2d 489
(1967); Raper v. State, 501 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1972);
State v. Gustafson, 248 Ore. 1, 432 P.2d 323 (1967);
Aous v. State, 484 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1972); Guillory
v. State, 400 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1966); State v. Mathews,
6 Wash. App. 201, 492 P.2d 1076 (1971); Deja v. State,
43 Wis. 2d 488, 168 N.W.2d 856 (1969).
especially if the offenses have been adjudicated in a
regular criminal court.309 Minor military offenses
such as a few hours A.W.OJL. are not suitable for
impeachment,10 but offenses such as burglary or
larceny which would be useable if prosecuted in a
civilian court, will not be disallowed because they
arose under military jurisdiction.'
A conviction that is so remote that it has lost
any real relationship to a witness or defendant's
present credibility, may not be used to impeach.
The standards by which remoteness is judged are
quite flexible,au but with its adoption in the Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, the ten year limit
8o9 See, e.g., PROPosED Fxn. R. Evm. 609 (d):
The judge may, however, allow evidence of a
juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the
accused, if conviction of the offense would be ad-
missible to attack the credibility of an adult and
the judge is satisfied that admission is necessary for
a fair determination of the issue of guilt or in-
nocence;
See also State v. Alexander, 279 N.C. 527, 184 S.E.2d
274 (1971) (can impeach if the crime could have been
tried in adult court); State v. Miller, 281 N.C. 70, 187
S.E.2d 729 (1972) (can cross if it would be a crime if
committed by an adult). There is caselaw which holds
that juvenile convictions can be used to impeach. See
Bellew v. State, 246 Ark. 1191, 441 S.W.2d 453 (1969)
(stint in a boy's school); People v. Franklin, 74 Ill.
App. 2d 392, 220 N.E.2d 872 (1966); People v. Davies,
34 Mich. App. 19, 190 N.W.2d 694 (1971) (can cross a
prosecution witness but not a defendant); People v.
Vidal, 26 N.Y.2d 249, 257 N.E.2d 886 (1970); People
v. Geller, 27 App. Div. 2d 843, 278 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967)
(can impeach on a vicious or immoral act committed
while a juvenile); State v. Jeffries, 3 N.C. App. 218, 164
S.E.2d 398 (1968); See Commonwealth v. Katchmer,
220 Pa. Super. 231, 281 A.2d 747 (1971).
310 See United States v. Shumate, 429 F.2d 777 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Spare, 353 Mass. 263,
230 N.E.2d 798 (1967) (AWOL); Woodall v. State, 2
Md. App. 433, 235 A.2d 890 (1965); Huber v. State,
2 Md. App. 245, 234 A.2d 264 (1967) (AWOL).
311 See United States v. Booz, 325 F. Supp. 1280
(E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 451 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir. 1971) (larceny,
receiving stolen goods); People v. Helm, 40 Ill. 2d 39,
237 N.E.2d 433 (1968) (courts martial convictions of
infamous crimes); Huber v. State, 2 Md. App. 245, 234
A.2d 264 (1967) (military offenses involving moral
turpitude such as assault on a German national); Peo-
ple v. Lee, 35 App. Div. 2d 542, 313 N.Y.S.2d 139
(1970) (gand larceny and subsequent dishonorable
discharge); Ewing v. State, 174 Neb. 90, 116 N.W.2d
7 (1962) (desertion, but the court takes note of the split
in authority).
3 For convictions held too remote see United States
v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, (2d Cir. 1971) (narcotics-21
years); United States v. McCord, 420 F.2d 255 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (housebreaking-14 years); United States v.
Steinback, 402 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1082 (1969) (narcotics-25 years) Spaulding v.
State, 481 P.2d 389 (Alas. 1971) (unspecified charges
-35 and 37 years); State v. Ross, 107 Ariz. 240, 485
P.2d 810 (1971) (manslaughter-19 years); People v.




will probably gain acceptance as a general rule of
thumb."" When determining remoteness, the courts
look to the intervening conduct of the witness."
4
Therefore, a 1929 conviction for armed robbery
which would otherwise have been termed remote,
was useable for impeachment when it was followed
by convictions for breaking and entering in 1937,
receiving stolen property in 1945, breaking and
entering in 1946, and armed robbery in 1956.15 Ad-
ditionally, the courts look to the date that the
punishment was terminated rather than to the
date of the conviction for the actual offense."
6
To be used for impeachment, a judgment must
be final; that is to say, the sentence must have been
For convictions held not too remote see United
States v. Simpson, 445 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (rob-
bery-7 years); Weaver v. United States 408 F.2d
1269 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969) (rob-
bery-5 years); Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253
(5th Cir. 1968), a.ff'd, 434 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1970)
(Dyer Act-18 years); United States v. Aulet, 339 F.2d
934 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 974 (1965)
(conspiracy to overthrow United States Government-
18 years); State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz. 377, 430 P.2d 139
(1967) (Mann Act-10 years); People v. Moses, 19 Cal.
App. 3d 389, 97 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1971), afid, 24 Cal.
App. 3d 384, 100 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1972) (robbery-8
years); People v. Aristotle, 131 Ill. App. 2d 175, 268
N.E.2d 227 (1971) (robbery-20 years); People v.
Bradley, 131 I1. App. 2d 91, 266 N.E.2d 469 (1970)
(robbery-9 years); People v. Gilmore, 118 1l. App. 2d
100 254 N.E.2d 590 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 845
(190) (robbery-13 years); Bogre v. Commonwealth,
467 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1971) (tax conviction-18 years);
State v. Scott, 459 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1970) (unspecified
-7 years); Pejian v. State, 480, S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1972)
(armed robbery-approximate 6 years; burglary-ap-
proximately 8 years); Mitchell v. State, 436 S.W.2d 539
(Tex. 1968) (murder-parole ended 9 years prior);
State v. Robinson, 75 Wash. 2d 230, 450 P.2d 180
(1969) (unspecified-16 years).
" See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 609(b):
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not ad-
missible if a period of more than 10 years has
elapsed since the data of the release of the witness
from confinement imposed for his most recent con-
viction, or the expiration of the period of his parole,
probation, or sentence granted or imposed with
respect to his most recent conviction, whichever is
imposed with respect to his most recent convic-
tion, whichever is the later date.
See also People v. Bradley, 3 Ill. App. 3d 101, 278
N.E.2d 243 (1971); Penix v. State, 487 S.W.2d 86 r(Tex.
1972); Courtenay v. State, 424 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1968).
" 'See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 370 F.2d 485
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Crisp v. State, 470 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.
1971); Beard v. State, 456 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. 1970).
315 United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1969).
' See Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Holt v. State, 487 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. 1972);
Dorsey v. State, 485 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1972); Rawlins
v. State, 466 S.W.2d 308 ('Tex. 1971); Williams v.
State, 449 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. 1970); King v. State, 425
S.W.2d 356 (Tex. 1968).
imposed by the judge."7 Impeachment with a con-
viction that was not final at the time, but is final
when a defendant claims error based upon that im-
peachment, may well be harmless error" 8
The pendency of an appeal does not render a
conviction inappropriate for use in impeachment," 9
but a reversal of the verdict most certainly does.0 o
A pardon will normally not prevent the convic-
tion's use,"" but the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence provide that if the pardon is based on
rehabilitation, and the witness has not been con-
victed of a subsequent crime, or if the pardon is
based upon innocence, the conviction is no longer
useable for impeachment."' The imposition of pro-
bation as a sentence will not preclude the convic-
3' See Txx. STAT. Am. tit. 38, § 29 (1966). See also
United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.
1970); Revuelta v. State, 86 Nev. 205, 467 P.2d 105
(1970); State v. Frey, 459 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1970).
"09s See, e.g State v. Wells, 10 Ariz. App. 89, 456 P.2d
409 (1969) (no sentence imposed since defendant fled
the jurisdiction, may still impeach); Fairman v. State,
429 P.2d 63 (Nev. 1967) (harmless error); State v.
Bandy, 15 N.C. App. 188, 189 S.E.2d 773 (1972)
(guilty verdict of jury without sentence is proper to
impeach); State v. Bouthiller, 476 P.2d 209 (Ore. 1970)
(error cured when conviction becomes final).
319See PpoPosED FED. R. Evm. 609(e). See also
United States v. Allen, 457 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Hauff, 395 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1966),
a.ff'd, 436 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1970); People v. Souvens,
276 Cal. App. 2d 439, 81 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1969); People
v. Thompson, 48 Ill. 2d 41, 268 N.E.2d 369 (1971);
People v. Ledferd, 94 IIl. App. 2d 74, 236 N.E.2d 19
(1968); People v. Scott, 89 Ill. App. 2d 413, 232, N.E.2d
478 (1967); People v. Barney, 89 Ill. App. 2d 180, 232
N.E.2d 481 (1967); People v. Spears, 83 Ill. App. 2d 18,
226 N.E.2d 67 (1967); People v. Eldridge, 17 Mich.
App. 306, 169 N.W.2d 497 (1969); McCoy v. State,
466 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. 1971). Contra Neam v. State,
14 Md. App. 180, 286 A.2d 540 (1972); Bailey v. State,
263 Md. 424, 283 A.2d 360 (1971); Cleveland v. State,
12 Md. App. 712, 280 A.2d 520 (1971); State v. Blevins,
425 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1968); Salazar v. State, 432
S.W.2d 957 (Tex. 1968).
no See Howard v. Craven, 306 F. Supp. 730 (C.D.
Cal. 1968); Cunningham v. State, 239 So. 2d 21 (Fla.
1971)i People v. Shook, 35 Ill. 2d 597, 221 N.E.2d 290
(1966 ; People~ v. Crable, 33 Mich. App. 254, 189
N.W.2d 740 (1971); Cohron v. State, 413 S.W.2d 112
(Tex. 1967); Smith v. State, 409 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967). Contra, Suggs v.
State, 6 Md. App. 231, 250 A.2d 670 (1969); Nicholson
v. State, 254 So. 2d 881 (Miss. 1971); People v. Miller,
62 Misc. 2d 705, 309 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1970).
1
21 See McCopmacx § 43. See also United States v.
Denton, 306 F.2d 336 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
923 (1962); Spears v. State, 83 Ill. App. 2d 18, 226
N.E.2d 67 (1967). Contra, United States v. McCarthy,
445 F.2d 587 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S.
459 (1971).
m See PRoposED FED. R. EviD., 609(c) (a pardon
restores lost civil rights but does not affect credibility);
CAL. Evm. CODE: §788 (West 1966).
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tion's use,32 3 nor will the fact that the verdict was
reached after a guilty plea,
24 but there is conflict
over whether a judgment based upon a plea of nolo
contendere may impeach.
3 2 It has been held that a
minor charge which is settled by a forfeiture of
bond is not suitable for this purpose.
326 A constitu-
tionally infirm prior conviction such as a conviction
in which the accused was unrepresented by counsel
also may not be used to impeach.
33 2
=See People v. Hampton, 5 Ill. App. 3d 220, 282
N.E.2d 469 (1972); People v. Spears, 83 Ill. App. 2d 18,
226 N.E.2d 67 (1967); Valdez v. State, 462 S.W.2d 24
(Tex. 1970); Smith v. State, 455 S.W.2d 282 (Tex.
1970), aff'd, 465 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. 1971); State v.
Knott, 6 Wash. App. 436, 493 P.2d 1027 (1972). Contra,
State v. Frey, 459 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1970); Goad v.
State, 464 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1971).
m See United States v. Bray, 445 F.2d 178, 181 (5th
Cir. 1971), where the court stated:
The probative fact is not whether he denied or ad-
mitted committing the offense for which he was
convicted, but whether he committed the offense
at all.. a guilty plea is often as much a result of
an accused's realistic assessment of his chances to
be acquitted should he go to trial as it is a result of
any altruistic motive to come clean.
See also State v. Marquez, 160 Conn. 47, 273 A.2d 689
(1970); A guilty plea before a magistrate not within his
jurisdiction cannot be used. See People v. Burd, 18
N.Y.2d 447, 223 N.E.2d 24 (1966). Rule 410 of the pro-
posed federal rules provides that a guilty plea or an
offer to plead guilty which is later withdrawn may not
be used to impeach. PROPOSED FED. R. Evi. 410. See




See McCoxumcK §43 for cases holding that a plea
of nolo contendre can impeach. See also State of Okla-
homa ex rel. Nesbitt v. Allied Materials Corporation,
312 F. Supp. 130 (W.D. Okla. 1968). The proposed
federal rules provide that a plea of nolo contendre which
is later withdrawn may not be used to impeach. PRo-
rosED FED. R. Evrn. 410. See also Reynolds v. People,
172 Colo. 137, 471 P.2d 417 (1970).
ml See Smith v. State, 453 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1969);
State v. Willis, 4 Wash. App. 184, 480 P.2d 221 (1971).
This is an extension of the impropriety of the use
of a constitutionally infirm conviction for enhancement
enunciated in Burgett v. State, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
The leading case is Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972)
(the use of a prior invalid conviction to impeach the
defendant denies him due process). See also United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (Gideon viola-
tion); Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); People v. Coffey, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15 (1967); White v. State 11 Md.
App. 423, 274 A.2d 671 (1971); Johnson v. State, 9 Md.
App. 436, 265 A.2d 281 (1970). See generally Note, The
E ridentiary wse of Constitutionally Defective Prior Con-
victions, 68 CoLumEBiA L. Rxv. 1168 (1968); Note, Un-
counseled Prior Convictions, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 774
(1971). For cases holding that the improper impeach-
ment constituted harmless error see Subilosky v. Moore,
443 F.2d 334 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971);
United States v. Harold, 425 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970); Bates v. Nelson, 333 F.
Supp. 896 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (overwhelming evidence of
guilt); People v. Mulqueen, 9 Cal. App. 2d 532, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 235 (1970) (a compelling showing can render the
error harmless); People v. Patterson, 270 Cal. App. 2d
268, 75 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1969).
The fiat against impeachment with a legal in-
volvement not ending in a conviction3  precludes
the use of arrests,3 29 charges or indictments,," to
A defendant who has stipulated to the admission of a
prior conviction may waive the right to raise the claim
that it was constitutionally infirm. See Martin v. State,
463 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1971) (penalty stage); Shorter v.
United States, 412 F.2d 428 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 970 (1969) (conviction admitted on direct exam-
ination).
The burden rests with the state to show that the im-
peaching conviction was not without counsel. See John-
son v. State, 9 Md. App. 436, 265 A.2d 281 (1970);
Tucker v. State, 499 P.2d 458 (Okla. 1972); Chester v.
State, 485 P.2d 1065 (Okla. 1971). But see, People v.
Hagen, 6 Cal. App. 3d 35, 85 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1970);
Evans v. State, 401 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1966). The burden
was put on the defendant to prove indigency in Gill v.
State, 479 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. 1972).
May the violation of a statute which is later declared
unconstitutional be used for impeachment? An affirma-
tive answer was given in United States v. White, 463
F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1972), where an abortion conviction
was useable although the statute was subsequently re-
pealed. See also Holgin v. State, 480 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.
1972) (a prostitution conviction could impeach although
the vagrancy portion of the statute was struck down
as unconstitutional).
m See United States v. Roustio. 455 F.2d 366 (7th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Sposato, 446 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1971); United States v. Potts, 420 F.2d 964 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 941 (1970); Lee v. United
States, 368 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v.
Yarbrough, 352 F.2d 491 (6th Cir. 1965); Davidson v.
Boles, 266 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. W. Va. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 970 (1968); People v. Peabody, 37
Mich. App. 87, 194 N.W.2d 532 (1971); People v.
Ryan, 36 Mich. App. 129, 193 N.W. 2d 212 (191);
People v. Luther, 33 Mich. App. 551, 190 N.W. 2d 345
(1971); People v. Montevecchio, 32 Mich. App. 163,
188 N.W.2d 186 (1971); People v. Wasson, 31 Mich.
App. 638, 188 N.W.2d 55 (1971); State v. Stimpson,
279 N.C. 716, 185 S.E.2d 168 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Allen, 220 Pa. Super 403, 389 A.2d 476 (1972).
129 See State v. Tosatto, 107 Ariz. 231, 485 P.2d 556
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 (1971) (vulgar lan-
guage arrest, harmless error); Corbin v. State, 259
So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1972) (weapons arrets, harmless error);
People v. Vincent, 38 Mich. App. 116, 195 N.W.2d 792
(1972) (indecent exposure arrest, reversible error);
People v. McKinley, 39 App. Div. 2d 749, 332 N.T.S.2d
154 (1972). See also United States v. King, 378 F.2d 359
(6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 974 (1969);
Maguire v. United States, 358 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 870 (1966) (not reversed since
question was unanswered); People v. Sanders, 96 Ill.
App. 2d 166, 238 N.E.2d 180 (1968); People v. Harges,
87 Ill. App. 2d 376, 231 N.E.2d 650 (1967); People v.
James, 36 Mich. App. 550, 194 N.W.2d 57 (1971);
People v. James, 35 Mich. App. 627, 192 N.W.2d 517
(1971); State v. Ware, 449 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1970);
People v. Vernum, 28 App. Div. 2d 946, 281 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1967); Bolin v. State, 472 S.W.2d 232 (Tenn.
1971); State v. Cathey, 32 Wis. 2d 79, 145 N.W.2d 100
(1966). But see Mah v. United States, 348 F.2d 881
(10th Cir. 1965) (could cross defendant on prior arrests
as a preliminary to bringing out the convictions which
resulted from them): State v. Roddy, 270 So.2d 508
(La. 1972) (defendant could be crossed on prior arrests
out of the presence of the jury to explore his familiarity
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impeach. Similarly, a charge which was nolle
prossed is not useable for this purpose.m " A minority
view allows a witness or defendant to be asked if he
actually is guilty of a crime that may not have re-
sulted in a conviction. This practice is based upon
a distinction which is drawn between the personal
knowledge of the witness and the charges or ac-
cusations of others.P' There are also cases which
hold that the unlawful occupation of a witness may
be shown to attack his credibility."
The prosecutor may usually inquire as to the
name and location of a conviction' as well as its
with arrest procedures in order to determine the volun-
tariness of his confession).
A few courts have held that impeachment by arrest
is proper. See People v. Hoffman, 1 Mich. App. 557, 137
N.W.2d 301 (1965); People v. Shivers, 21 N.Y.2d 118,
233 N.E.2d 836 (1967).
no See Miller v. State, 261 So. 2d 447 (Ala.), cert.
denied, 288 Ala. 746, 261 So. 2d 451 (1972); People v.
Brown, 76 Ill. App. 2d 362, 222 N.E.2d 227 (1966);
a.f'd, 51 Ill. 2d 271, 281 N.E.2d 682 (1972); McLaughlin
v. State, 3 Md. App. 515, 240 A.2d 298 (1968); People
v. Eddington, 387 Mich. 551, 198 N.W.2d 297 (1972);
Johns v. State, 255 So. 2d 322 (Miss. 1971); Barlow v.
State, 233 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1970); State v. Long, 14
N.C. App. 508, 188 S.E.2d 690 (1972); People v. Har-
vey, 34 App. Div. 2d 857, 310 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1970);
State v. Crawford, 17 Ohio App. 2d 141, 244 N.E.2d
774 (1969). Questions regarding time spent in jail suffer
from the same infirmity as do those regarding the actual
arrest. See State v. Williams, 107 Ariz. 262, 485 P.2d
832 (1971); State v. Johnson, 106 Ariz. 539, 479 P.2d
424 (1971).
For cases holding that impeachment by charge or
indictment is permissible see People v. Miniear, 8 Mich.
App. 591, 155 N.W.2d 222 (1968); Stamps v. State, 83
Nev. 232, 428 P.2d 188 (1967); State v. Pillars, 280
N.C. 341, 185 S.E.2d 881 (1972).
ni People v. Frank, 31 Mich. App. 378, 188 N.W.2d
95 (1971) (no error since ample proper impeachment
discredited the accused).
" See Inklebarger v. State, 481 S.W.2d 750 (Ark.
1972) (indecent exposure); Polk v. State, 478 S.W.2d
738 (Ark. 1972) (auto theft); Sims v. State, 477 S.W.2d
825 (Ark. 1972) (larceny prostitution); Harrington v.
State, 473 S.W.2d 911 (Ark. 1971) (interstate trans-
portation of a stolen auto)- Black v. State, 250 Ark.
604, 466 S.W.2d 463 (1971) (rape); Hughes v. State,
249 Ark. 805, 461 S.W.2d 940 (1971) (theft); State v.
Shanklin, 193 S.E.2d 341 (N.C. 1972) (breaking and
entering); State v. Gainey, 280 N.C. 366, 185 S.E.2d
874 (1972) (fighting). Contra, Hayes v. United States,
407 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 972 (1969)
(prison escape); Tooley v. State, 448 S.W.2d 683 (Tenn.
1969), af'd, 477 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. 1971) (rape).
'See People v. Gibson, 272 N.E.2d 274 (Ill. 1971);
Green v. State, 451 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1970).
34See Beaudine v. United States, 368 F.2d 417 (5th
Cir. 1966), reh. denied, 418 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1969);
State v. Mendoza, 107 Ariz. 51, 481 P.2d 844 (1971);
People v. Boehm, 270 Cal. App. 2d 13, 75 Cal. Rptr.
590 (1969); People v. Dugas, 242 Cal. App. 2d 244, 51
Cal. Rptr. 478 (1966); Padillow v. State, 501,P.2d 837
(Okla. 1972); Brown v. State, 496 P.2d 395 (Okla.
1972).
The number of prior convictions may be inquired
into. See State v. Houston, 261 Iowa 1369, 158 N.W.2d
general nature,n 5 and the punishment imposed.P1
Some courts, however, limit the examiner to the
mere fact of a conviction and no further questions
may be asked.7 Others allow the examiner to es-
tablish the name of the crime only."s Even the
more liberal majority view does not permit broad
forays into the details of the crime.u 9 The latitude
given the witness to explain the prior conviction
may be broader than the examiner's ability to ex-
plore its details,40 but this has been termed a
"harmless charity."
158 (1968); Plunkett v. State, 84 N.M. 145, 437 P.2d
92 (1968); Pamanet v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 501, 182
N.W.2d 459 (1971).
','See, e.g., Peaple v. Wynn, 44 Cal. App. 2d 723,
112 P.2d 979 (1941)3; Maysv. People, 493 P.2d 4 (Colo.
1972); People v. Sevastos, 117 Ill. App. 2d 104, 252
N.E.2d 745 (1969); State v. Gravening, 289 Minn. 501,
182 N.W.2d 704 (1970). Contra, Sebastian v. Common-
wealth, 436 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1966).
"'See United States v. Ramsey, 315 F.2d 199 (2d
Cir.), cert. dnied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963); Gafford v.
State, 440 P.2d 405 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1120 (1969); Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App. 515,
243 A.2d 142 (1968); People v. Thomas, 36 Mich. App.
23,193 N.W.2d 189 (1971); State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435,
186 S.E.2d 384 (1972); Brown v. State, 496 P.2d 395
(Okla. 1972); Simmons v. State, 456 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.
1970); State v. Beard, 74 Wash. 2d 335, 444 P.2d 651
(1968). Contra, People v. White, 26 Mich. App. 35,
181 N.W.2d 803 (1970); Murray v. State, 266 So. 2d
139 (Miss. 1972); State v. Slay, 406 S.W.2d 575 (Mo.
1966); State v. McNair, 272 N.C. 130, 157 S.E.2d 660
(1967).
17 See State v. Shephard, 94 Idaho 227, 486 P.2d 82
(1971); Cowan v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 695
(Ky. 1966); Harmon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 442,
185 S.E.2d 48 (1971); State v. Cathey, 32 Wis. 2d 79,
145 N.W.2d 100 (1966).
-'s See, e.g., State v. Coca, 80 N.M. 95, 451 P.2d 999
(1969); State v. Hungerford, 54 Wis. 2d 744, 196
N.W.2d 647 (1972).
"'See United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246 (7th Cir.
1972) (improper to ask about violence when the crime
was committed); United States v. Rispo, 338 F. Supp.
662 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (improper to ask as to types of
goods stolen and the name of the victim). See also
United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1970);
Beaudine v. United States, 368 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1966),
reh. denied, 418 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Smith, 353 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1965); Gafford v.
State, 440 P.2d 405 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1120 (1969); People v. Knighton, 250 Cal. App. 2d
221, 58 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1967); Johnson v. Common-
wealth, 445 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. 1969); Huber v. State,
2 Md. App. 245, 234 A.2d 264 (1967); State v. West,
285 Minn. 188, 173 N.W.2d 468 (1969); Benedetti v.
State, 249 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1971); Mangrum v. State,
232 So. 2d 703 (Miss. 1970); State v. Scott, 459 S.W.2d
321 (Mo. 1970); Brown v. State, 496 P.2d 395 (Okla.
1972); State v. White, 53 Wis. 2d 549, 193 N.W.2d 36
(1972). Contra, People v. Von Latta, 258 Cal. App. 2d
329, 65 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1968).
"o See, e.g., United States v. Bray, 445 F.2d 178 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1002 (1972), where the
court held that a witness cannot be cut off from ex-
plaining or extenuating the conviction or denying his
guilt. See also United States v. Crisafi, 304 F.2d 803 (2d
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The prosecutor is of course held to a good faith
standard when impeaching a witness.1 The failure
to have the record of the conviction at his disposal
is not necessarily erroneous when good faith is pre-
sent.m Some jurisdictions do not allow any cross-
examination at all on prior convictions and instead
require introduction of the record to impeach.'
Cir. 1962); Wittenberg v. United States, 304 F. Supp.
744 (D. Minn. 1969); State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598,
174 S.E.2d 487 (1970), remanded for resentencing, 279
N.C. 389, 183 S.E. 2d 107 (1971).
34 See WiGmoRE § 1117.
3' See, e.g., People v. Foster, 271 Cal. App. 2d 763,
76 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1969); People v. Korn, 40 App. Div.
561, 334 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1972); State v. Hill, 192 S.E.2d
610 (N.C. 1972). In People v. DeArkland, 262 Cal.
App. 2d 802, 69 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1968), the court held
that reference to an attempted armed robbery as an
armed robbery was a good faith mistake. Where bad
faith was present see People v. Comnor, 243 Cal. App.
2d 38, 52 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1966) (bad faith found because
no proof of conviction was found); People v. McKinley,
39 App. Div. 2d 749, 332 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1972) (bad
faith found where prosecutor failed to substantiate
record, and failed to allow defense counsel to look at
arrest sheet he was using); People v. Nasti, 37 App.
Div. 2d 980, 327 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1971) (bad faith pre-
sumed because the prosecutor refused to delay im-
peachment until the information could be verified);
People v. Sanza, 37 App. Div. 2d 632,323 N.Y.S.2d 632
(1971) (bad faith presumed when two charges used to
impeach had been dismissed and a third was a juvenile
offense).
83 See United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 525 (9th Cir.
1972); United States v. Booz, 325 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D.
Pa. 1971); rev'd, 451 F.2d 719 (3d Cir 1971); People v.
Hall, 5 Cal. App. 3d 116, 85 Cal. R'ptr. 188 (1970);
People v. Hays, 250 Cal. App. 2d 373, 58 Cal. Rptr. 293
(1967); Warren v. State, 270 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972); Peo-
ple v. Brown, 34 Mich. App. 45, 190 N.W.2d 701 (1971);
People v. Cybulski, 11 Mich. App. 244, 160 N.W.2d
764 (1968); State v. Charlton, 465 S.W.2d 502 (Mo.
1971); State v. Paul, 80 N.M. 521, 458 P.2d 596 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1044 (1970); State v. Garcia, 80
N.M. 247,453 P.2d 767 (1969); Scott v. State, 471 P.2d
470 (Okla. 1970).
The failure to produce a record of conviction has
been held improper. See State v. Van Winkle, 106 Ariz.
481, 478 P.2d 105 (1970); People v. Bryson, 257 Cal.
App. 2d 201, 64 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1967); People v. Perez,
23 Cal. Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617 (1962); Dixon v. Com-
monwealth, 487 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1972); Wodell v.
State, 2 Md. App. 433, 234 A.2d 890 (1967); State v.
Toppi, 275 A.2d 805 (Me. 1971); Johns v. State, 255
So. 2d 322 (Miss. 1971); Boley v. State, 85 Nev. 466,
456 P.2d 447 (1969); State v. Miner, 128 Vt. 55, 258
A.2d 815 (1969).
The use of "rap-sheets" in cross-examination have
been upheld. See People v. Perez, 37 Mich. App. 414,
195 N.W.2d 414 (1971); Bailey v. State, 479 S.W.2d 829
(Tenn. 1972). See also Shaddox v. State, 243 Ark. 55,
418 S.W.2d 780 (1967), aff'd, 244 Ark. 747, 427 S.W.2d
198 (1968). The use of "rap-sheets" has been held to
be improper. See People v. Council, 36 Mich. App. 682,
194 N.W.2d 34 (1971); Colle v. State, 85 Nev. 289, 454
P.2d 21 (1969); State v. Williams, 76 N.M. 578, 417
P.2d 62 (1966), aff'd, 80 N.M. 63, 451 P.2d 556 (1969).
3" See United States ex rel. Schartner v. Pizzo 336,
F. Supp. 1192 (M.D. Pa. 1972); People v. Harris, 38
Others allow for cross-examination but hold that
after a witness denies a conviction the questioning
on that subject should be terminated and the im-
peachment continued with the introduction of the
record,4 5 while some advocate very thorough or
"sifting" cross-examination.us Typically, a witness
or defendant may invite inquiry by opening the
door to his prior convictions on direct examina-
tion.17
Ill. 2d 552, 232 N.E.2d 721 (1967); People v. Harter, 4
Mll. App. 3d 772, 282 N.E.2d 10 (1972); People v. San-
ders, 96 111. App. 2d 166, 238 N.E.2d 180 (1968); People
v. Ring, 89 l. App. 2d.161, 232 N.E.2d 23 (1967);
People v. Webb, 80 Il. App. 2d 445, 225 N.E.2d 679
(1967); People v. Walker, 84 Il. App. 2d 264, 228
N.E.2d 597 (1967); People v. Brown, 89 flI.App. 2d 231,
231 N.E.2d 262 (1967); People v. Snell, 74 Ill. App. 2d
12, 219 N.E.2d 554 (1966); People v. Arbuckle, 69 Ill.
App. 2d 251, 215 N.E.2d 825 (1966); But see State v.
Robinson, 272 N.C. 271, 158 S.E.2d 23 (1967) (prior
convictions cannot be proved up with independent
evidence).
341 See Graham v. State, 13 Md. A pp. 171, 282 A.2d
162 (1971); People v. Luoni, 40 Mich. App. 457, 198
N.W.2d 887 (1972).
146 See Dorroh v. State, 229 Miss. 315, 90 So. 2d 653
(1956); State v. Redfern, 12 N.C. App. 230, 185 S.E.2d
6 (1971), cert. denied, 186 S.E.2d 177 (1972).
347 See, e.g., United States v. Reddington, 433 F.2d
997 (4th Cir. 1970) (when defendant painted himself on
direct examination as disapproving of narcotics, he
opened himself up to impeachment on narcotics con-
viction); United States v. Leach, 429 F.2d 956, (8th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971) (when
felony conviction was admitted on direct, prosecutor
could ask how many convictions); United States v.
Windes, 413 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
933 (1969) (when defense witness admitted three con-
victions on direct, prosecutor could cross as to six);
Suggs v. United States, 407 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(when drunkenness was offered to show lack of intent,
it could be used to impeach); Burrows v. United States,
371 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1967) (when defendant testified
he went to California to join the marines, he could be
crossed on his parole violation which made him in-
eligible); United States v. Taylor, 312 F.2d 159 (7th
Cir. 1963) (witness' denial that he lent his apartment
to a narcotics dealer opened the door to cross-examina-
tion on his narcotics addiction); State v. Poole, 500 P.2d
726 (Ore. 1972) (when defendant tried to minimize a
prior guilty plea by stating that he was told that it was
the only way he could get out of jail, it was proper to
show that the charge was reduced to petty larceny from
burglary). See also People v. McClaine, 132 111. App. 2d
669, 270 N.E.2d 176 (1971); People v. Somerville, 88 Ill.
App. 2d 134, 231 N.E.2d 701 (1967), aj'd, 48 Ill. 2d 346,
270 N.E.2d 16 (1971); Shockley v. Commonwealth, 415
S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1967); People v. Bearden, 29 Mich.
App. 416, 185 N.W.2d 438 (1971); Leroy v. State 503
P.2d 249 (1972); Bradley v. State, 414 S.W.2d 673 (Tex.
1967).
Wisconsin courts hold that if a defendant admits his
prior conviction on direct examination, cross-examina-
tion is thereby precluded. See Nicholas v. State, 49
Wis. 2d 683, 183 N.W.2d 11 (1971); State v. Hancock,
48 Wis. 2d 687, 180 N.W.2d 517 (1970). When the de-
fendant admits his prior conviction on cross-examina-
tion, it has been held that further inquiry is then fore-
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There is no standard form for the questions that
are asked of a witness undergoing impeachmentY8
Usually, the defense attorney must preserve his ob-
jection to the form or nature of the question for
purposes of appeal." 9 Also, where the witness is the
defendant, it is the responsibility of the defense to
offer an instruction limiting the conviction to im-
peachment use only.35
In 1965 the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia held in Luck v. United States3 ' that it
was not bound to allow the impeachment of a
defendant based upon his prior criminal convic-
tions. The court decided instead that the decision
whether to allow impeachment was a discretionary
one based upon the weighing of the probative value
of the convictions against their possible prejudicial
effect. Luck and its progeny 352 looked to the num-
closed. See Cowan v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 695
(Ky. 1966). But see Barbosa v. Craven, 431 F.2d 698
(9th Cir. 1970); State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d
603, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969); State v. Garten,
277 N.C. 236, 176 S.E.2d 778 (1970).
Partial answers given on direct examination can be
explored to completion by the cross-examiner. See
People v. Kildow, 19 Mich. App. 194, 172 N.W.2d 492
(1969); People v. Baker, 7 Mich. App. 7, 151 N.W.2d
217 (1967).
Questions may be repeated to a reluctant defendant
or witness. See Swan v. State, 245 Ark. 154, 431 S.W.2d
475 (1968); Ferril v. State, 267 So. 2d 813 (Miss. 1972);
State v. Weaver, 3 N.C. App. 439,165 S.E.2d 15 (1969);
State v. Johnson, 69 Wash. 2d 264,418 P.2d 238 (1966).
The prosecutor is not bound by the answer of the
witness. See Mumsq. CODE Am. § 595.07 (1966); Mo.
STAT. § 491.050 (1952); WASr CODE AqNw. § 10.52.030
(1962). But see Stout v. State, 244 Ark. 676, 426 S.W.2d
800 (1968), aff'd, 247 Ark. 948, 448 S.W.2d 636 (1970);
State v. Garten, 277 N.C. 236, 176 S.E.2d 778 (1970).
M See Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968) ("Are you
the same Allan U. Forte who, in March of 1942, under
the name of A. U. Forte in North Carolina was con-
victed of abortion?" was proper); State v. Warren, 4
N.C. App. 441, 166 S.E.2d 858 (1969) ("What have
you been convicted of?" was proper). See also Shorter
v. State, 257 So. 2d 236 (Miss. 1972); Merx v. State,
450 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1970).349 See Green v. United States, 397 F.2d 643 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Lewis v. United States, 381 F.2d 894 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Tyson v. State, 46 Ala. App. 398, 243 So. 2d
382, cert. denied, 286 Ala. 741, 243 So. 2d 384 (1970);
People v. Jones, 47 Ill. 2d 135, 265 N.E.2d 125 (1970);
State v. Kelley, 262 La. 143, 262 So. 2d 501 (1972);
Frazier v. State, 7 Md. App. 165, 253 A.2d 919 (1969);
Gill v. State, 149 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. 1972).
150 See United States v. De La Mottee, 434 F.2d 289
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971); Harris
v. United States, 384 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1967); State v.
Alexander, 16 N.C. App. 95, 191 S.E.2d 395 (1972);
State v. Goodsen, 273 N.C. 128, 159 S.E.2d 310 (1968);
Smith v. State, 455 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1970), af'd, 465
S.W.2d 163 (1971).
25 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See generally Mc-
Gowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior
Convictions, 197.0 LAw AND ME SOCIAL OaRER 1 (1970).
3a See United States v. Thomas, 452 F.2d 1373 (D.C.
ber and nature of the prior convictions as well as
their similarity to the instant charge. They also
considered the importance to the case of the de-
fendant's testimony and credibility. While this
exercise of discretion was followed by a number of
courts,31s it was specifically rejected by others.
Finally Congress stepped in to clarify in what was
rapidly becoming an uncharted and unpredictable
area by rewriting the section of the District of
Columbia Code pertaining to impeachment so that
it conformed with the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence. 355 That section now provides that prior
convictions falling within the purview of the code
(discussed previously) "shall" be admitted by
cross-examination or by evidence.
Cir. 1971); United States v. Isaacs, 449 F.2d 1040
(D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Baber, 447 F.2d
1267 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 (1971);
Davis v. United States, 433 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
United States v. Bailey, 426 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir.
1970); United States v. McIntosh, 426 F.2d 1231 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); United States v. Coleman, 420 F.2d 1313
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 453
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Stith v. United States, 256 A.2d 403
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Moss v. United States, 250 A.2d 567
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Smith v. United States, 406 F.2d 667
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963 (1969);
Jones v. United States, 404 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 907 (1969); Williams v. United
States, 394 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Barber v. United
States, 392 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Bullock v. United
States, 243 A.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Brooke v. United
States, 385 F.2d 279 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Gordon v. United
States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390
U.S. 1029 (1968); Burroughs v. United States, 236 A.2d
319 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Jackson v. United States, 232
A.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Blaclmey v. United States,
225 A.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Brown v. United States,
370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Trinlde v. United States,
369 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Hood v. United States,
365 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
30 See United States v. Hildreth, 387 F.2d 328 (4th
Cir. 1967); Spaulding v. State, 481 P.2d 389 (Alaska
1971); People v. Montgomery, 49 Ill. 2d 510,268 N.E.2d
695 (1971); State v. Sibold, 83 N.M. 678, 496 P.2d 738
(1972). In People v. Beagle, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d
1 (1972), the California court held that the wording of
the California evidence code conferred Luck discretion
upon the trial judge. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 788 (West
1966).
M See, e.g., United States v. Gornick, 448 F.2d 566
(7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cacchillo, 416 F.2d
231 (2d Cir. 1969); Shorter v. United States 412 F.2d
428 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969);
Dickerson v. State, 46 Ala. App. 183, 239 So. 2d 235
(1970); Commonwealth v. West, 258 N.E.2d 22 (Mass.
1970); People v. Cantrell, 27 Mich. App. 210, 183
N.W.2d 401 (1970); State v. Busby, 486 S.W.2d 501
(Mo. 1972); People v. Pritchett, 69 Misc. 2d 67, 329
N.Y.S.2d 147 (1972); State v. Adams, 50 N.J. 1, 231
A.2d 605 (1967); Howard v. State, 480 S.W.2d 191
(Tex. 1972). But see United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d
407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 (1969).
151 D.C. CODE § 14-305 (1970). For the effect of this
statute, see White v. United States, 283 A.2d 21 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Taylor v. United States, 280 A.2d 79 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
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IX I11PEACH-IENT BY MiscoNDUCT NOT
RESULTING IN CONVICTION
Nowhere is there so little uniformity of practice
among the various jurisdictions as there is in the
area of impeachment by misconduct not resulting
in a conviction. While some courts refuse to allow
this type of impeachment 3 6 (but often find that it
amounts to only harmless error), 357 others permit
the prosecutor to question both defendants'1 and
defense witnesses 59 in this manner. Courts may
distinguish between the two, however, in light of
the greater possibility of prejudice when examining
316 See United States v. Davenport, 449 F.2d 696 (5th
Cir. 1971) (error to cross-examine the defendant about
an insurance law suit tending to show fraudulent in-
tent); Courtney v. United States, 390 F.2d 520 (9th
Cir.), reh. denied, 393 U.S. 922 (1968) (failure to file
income tax returns could not be used); State v. Gold-
smith, 104 Ariz. 226, 450 P.2d 684 (1969) (improper to
cross concerning unnatural acts); People v. Sawyer, 256
Cal. App. 2d 66, 63 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1967) (improper to
ask about possessing a pistol); Pankey v. Common-
wealth, 485 S.W. 2d 513 (Ky. 1972) (improper to allude
to possibility of defendant being a professional robber);
State v. Wyman, 270 A. 2d 460 (Me. 1970) (improper
to ask about marital infidelity); Wood v. State, 257
So. 2d 193 (Miss. 1972) (improper to ask about number
of marriages and discipline problems with son); People
v. Johnson, 27 N.Y.2d 119, 261 N.E.2d 644 (1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 966 (1971) (impeachment not made
in good faith); Thrash v. State, 482 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.
1972) (proper to refuse to allow the defense to show that
a government witness was a homosexual); State v.
Beyor, 129 Vt. 472, 282 A.2d 819 (1971) (improper to
ask about domestic relations, an illicit affair, delin-
quency in support payments and financial difficulties);
State v. Lampshire, 74 Wash. 2d 888, 447 P.2d 727
(1968) (improper to ask about overdue phone bill).
See also Craft v. United States 403 F.2d 360 (9th Cir.
1968), aff'd, 421 F.2d 693 (1970); State v. Nevarey, 108
Ariz. 414, 499 P.2d 709 (1972); State v. Cadena, 9
Aria. App. 369, 452 P.2d 534 (1969); People v. Mc-
Carthy, 88 Cal. App. 2d 883, 200 P.2d 69 (1948); People
v. Garcia, 90 111. App. 2d 396, 232 N.E.2d 810 (1967);
State v. Taylor, 198 Kan. 290, 424 P.2d 612 (1967);
Garcia v. State, 454 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1970); Renesto
v. State, 452 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1970).
3See United States v. De Sapio, 456 F.2d 644 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Claridy v.
State, 270 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1972); Jessup v. State, 43
Ala. App. 517, 194 So. 2d 570 (1966); State v. Skinner,
4 Ariz. App. 584, 422 P.2d 415 (1967); People v. Pierce,
11 Cal. App. 3d 313, 89 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1970); People v.
Jones, 7 Cal. App. 3d 48, 86 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1970);
People v. Nieto, 268 Cal. App. 2d 231, 73 Cal. Rptr.
844 (1969); Mitchell v. State, 455 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.
1966).
m See Hug v. United States, 329 F.2d 475 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 818 (1964); Wright v. State, 243
Ark. 221, 419 S.W.2d 320 (1967); State v. Stout, 83
N. M. 624, 495 P.2d 802 (1972); Stewart v. State, 484
S.W.2d 77 (Tenn. 1972); Wood v. State, 486 S.W.2d
771 (Tex. 1972).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Farries, 459 F.2d 1057
(3d Cir. 1972); State v. McFerran, 80 N.M. 622, 459
P.2d 148 (1969); State v. Lassiter, 193 S.E.2d 265
(N.C. 1972).
the accused. 360 In any event, the examiner's ques-
tions must be based upon good faith3 n
Acts of misconduct useable for impeachment
may be limited to those which are relevant to
credibility."' This is similar to the "probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness" requirement of the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.1S A broader
approach is taken by courts which allow impeach-
ment based upon any vicious or immoral act tend-
ing to relate to credibility.U4
Professor McCormick suggests that courts may
look to five factors when determining whether or
not to allow impeachment by acts of misconduct.
Those factors are:
1) whether the testimony of the witness under
the attack is crucial or unimportant,
2) the relevancy of the act of misconduct to
truthfulness....
3) the nearness or remoteness of the miscon-
duct to the time of trial,
4) whether the matter inquired into is such as
to lead to time-consuming and distracting
explanations on cross-examination or re-
examination,
5) whether there is undue humiliation of the
witness and undue prejudice.365
Bad acts which tend to show bias, however, are
generally admissible3 6  (Impeachment to show
bias is discussed in Section X.)
565 See Heath v. State, 249 Ark. 217, 459 S.W.2d 420
(1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 910 (1971); State v.
Hyleck, 286 Minn. 126, 175 N.W.2d 163 (1970).
3"'The presence of a good faith belief that the mis-
conduct has a reasonable basis in fact may allow the act
to be used for impeachment. See People v. Brown, 26
N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16 (1970); State v. Mack, 193
S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1972). But see People v. Nuccio, 43
Ill. 2d 375, 253 N.E.2d 353 (1969).
' See, e.g., Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788 (9th
Cir. 1963); Touhy v. United States, 88 F. 930 (8th Cir.
1937); People v. Bemette, 45 III. 2d 227, 258 N.E.2d
793 (1970), remanded for resentencing, 403 U.S. 947
(1971). The presence of moral turpitude may give rise
to bad act impeachment. See Wilson v. State, 452
S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1969).
36 PROPOSED FEn. R. Evm. 608(b). The note ac-
companying the rule advises that the fifth amendment
is not waived just by the act of taking the witness
stand.
8
64 See People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16
(1970) (knife fighting); People v. Schwartzman, 24
N.Y.2d 241, 247 N.E.2d 642, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846
(1969) (passing worthless checks); People v. Alamo, 23
N.Y.2d 630, 246 N.E.2d 496, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879
(1969) (robberies); People v. Canty, 31 App. Div. 2d
976, 299 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1969) (adultery).
311 McCoPaicx § 42.
566 See, e.g., McCracken v. State, 439 P.2d 448
(Alaska 1968); State v. Cadena, 9 Ariz. App. 369, 452
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Impeachment attempts which are founded in
conduct that has at best, a remote bearing upon
credibility, are frequently held to be improper. The
most common of these is the attempt to discredit a
defendant or defense witness through inquiry into
an extra-marital affair or the birth of illegitimate
children.an Forays into patterns of conduct such as
homosexuality, drinking and fighting, or into an
individual's personal associations also occur with
regularity.f
There is a clear division of authority over
whether narcotics addiction is a proper subject of
cross-examination. Those courts favoring a broad
range of inquiry in this regard cite the inherent
unreliability of narcotics addicts as support for
this position. 69 Other courts hold that the use of
narcotics may be a subject of cross-examination
only when there is reason to believe that the person
being examined was under the influence of drugs at
the time of the events in question.7 0
Acts of misconduct are proper subjects of inquiry
when they tend to show the state of mind, motive
or intent of the accused.m Of course they may not
P.2d 534 (1969). In Smith v. State, 431 P.2d 507,
(Alaska 1967), the court noted:
When the main objective to be served by cross-
examination is legitimate and permissible as it is
here, then the fact that particular wrongful acts are
also suggested or established would be merely
incidental and should not prevent the primary
and legitimate objective of impeachment by
showing bias from being accomplished.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Marchesani, 457 F.2d
1291 (6th Cir. 1972) (unmarried cohabitation); Moore
v. United States, 394 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1030 (1969) (illegitimate children);
People v. Simons, 202 N.W.2d 575 (Mich. 1972) (illicit
affair); State v. Spencer, 472 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1971)
(illegitimate children).
16 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ransom, 266 N.E.2d
304 (Mass. 1971) (fighting); People v. Simons, 202
N.W.2d 575 (Mich. 1972) (fighting Lay v. State, 248
So. 2d 794 (Miss. 1971) (drinking); State v. Taylor,
473 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1971) (associations); Thrash v.
State, 482 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. 1972) (homosexuality);
Booty v. State, 456 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1970) (homo-
sexuality).
369 See People v. Perez, 239 Cal. App. 2d 1, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 596 (1965); People v. Smothers, 53 Ill. 2d 95,
290 N.E.2d 201 (1972); People v. Talaga, 37 Mich.
App. 100 194 NW.2d 462 (1971). Contra Fields v.
State, 48 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1971); People v. Smith,
38 Ill. 2d 237, 231 N.E.2d 185 (1967).
370 See, e.g., Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971);
State v. Ballesteros, 100 Ariz. 262, 413 P.2d 739 (1966);
People v. Ortega, 2 Cal. App. 3d 890, 83 Cal. Rptr. 260
(1969); State v. Goodin, 492 P.2d 287 (Ore. 1971).
,"See United States v. Kaufman 453 F.2d 306 (2d
Cir. 1971) (false income tax returns5; United States v.
Munchak, 443 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1971) (prior similar
acts); United States v. Hall, 342 F.2d 849 (4th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 812 (1965) (receipt of
bribes); People v. Garcia, 90 Ill. App. 2d 396, 232
be used to demonstrate that the defendant has a
propensity to engage in criminal conduct. 72 Fre-
quently, prior acts not otherwise admissible may
be made so when put in issue on direct examina-
tion.rn
X IMPEAc MNT ON GRouNms OF BiAs, INTEREST,
HosTILITY Am CAPACITY
The prosecutor has traditionally been allowed
very broad latitude when cross-examining a wit-
ness to demonstrate bias, interest, hostility or lack
of competence. 74 All of these qualities are viewed
as having a bearing on the credibility of the witness'
testimony.
Bias in favor of the defendant may be explored
through inquiry into the witness' family ties,
75
N.E.2d 810 (1967) (prior fights); People v. Talaga, 37
Mich. App. 100, 194 N.W.2d 462 (1971) (heroin addic-
tion); Coleman v. State, 442 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1969)
(gambling and wife beating).
m See Commonwealth v. Ransom, 266 N.E.2d 304
(Mass. 1971); People v. Simons, 202 N.W.2d 575 (Mich.
1972). See also note 272 supra.
SSee, e.g., Suh v. United States, 390 F.2d 547 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 964 (1968) (fraudulent
intent in mail fraud put in issue on direct); State v.
Nevarey, 108 Ariz. 414, 499 P.2d 709 (1972) (details of
a resisted arrest opened on re-direct); People v. Tarry,
85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961 (1970) (sexual rela-
tionship put in issue); Whitaker v. State, 421 S.W.2d
905 (Tex. 1967) (testimony that defendant could drink
twelve beers before getting drunk opened his prior
driving record); State v. Bassett, 4 Wash. App. 491,
481 P.2d 939 (1971) (after defendant's wife testified
that their sex life was normal, it was proper to cross
with her prior statement that the defendant forced her
at gunpoint to stand nude under a street lamp). But see
State v. Storms, 244 Ore. 357, 418 P.2d 261 (1966)
(state could not damage defendant's reputation after
he had thoroughly blackened it on direct).3
1
74 See MicH. STAT. ANN. §27A.2158 (1962); See also
United States v. Strong, 452 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Fontana, 231 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1956);
Williams v. State, 44 Ala. App. 503, 214 So. 2d 712
(1968); Maples v. State, 44 Ala. App. 491, 214 So. 2d
700 (1968); State v. DeNunzio, S Conn. Cir. 608, 259
A.2d 768 (1969); Taylor v. State, 249 Ind. 238, 231
N.E.2d 507, (1967); Jenckins v. State, 14 Md. App. 1,
285 A.2d 667 (1967); Commonwealth v. Redmond, 258
N.E.2d 287 (Mass. 1970); Lloyd v. State, 85 Nev. 576,
460 P.2d 111 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 932 (1970);
Rodgers v. State, 486 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1972). It has
been held that a foundation must be laid before im-
peachment showing bias can take place. See People v.
Peyton, 72 11. App. 2d 240, 218 N.E.2d 518 (1966);
Taylor v. State, 249 Ind. 238, 231 N.E.2d 507 (1967).
It has also been held that a witness must be afforded an
opportunity to explain a prior statement which is indi-
cative of bias. See United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d
944 (2d Cir. 1968).
75 See, e.g., Adams v. State, 280 Ala. 678, 198 So. 2d
255 (1967) ("Do you love your father?"); Jenckins v.
State, 14 Md. App. 1, 285 A.2d 667 (1971) (inquiry of
defendant's wife regarding an affair the deceased was
having with her daughter). See also Williams v. State,
44 Ala. App. 503, 214 So. 2d 712 (1968); People v.
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friendship" 6 or romantic involvement with the ac-
cused.Ya In spite of the very real possibility of
prejudice, a homosexual relationship between the
defendant and the witness is a customary and
proper subject of cross-examination.w Employ-
ments and financial tiesa as well as the existence
Jones, 7 Cal. App. 3d 48, 86 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1970);
Ward v. State, 474 S.W.2d 471, (Tex. 1971); MAcH.
STAT. Amx. §27A.2158 (1962); Mo. Amw. STAT. §546.260
(1953).
16 See, e.g., People v. Faulkner, 36 Mich. App. 101,
193 N.W.2d 178 (1971) (witness questioned about re-
lationship with a group called the Black Messengers);
People v. Casper, 25 Mich. App. 1, 180 N.W.2d 906
(1970) (witness questioned as to drinking and card
playing with defendant); State v. Franklin, 185 Neb.
62, 173 N.W.2d 780 (1971) (witness questioned about
association with defendant in jail); State v. Guerrero,
501 P.2d 998 (Ore. 1972) (witness questioned about
friendship in penitentiary). But see Jessup v. State, 43
Ala. App. 517, 194 So. 2d 570 (1966); Commonwealth
v. White, 447 Pa. 331, 290 A.2d 246 (1972).
3n See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 246 F.2d 1112
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842 (1970) (fiancee);
People v. Jones, 7 Cal. App. 3d 48, 86 Cal. Rptr. 751
(1970) (girlfriend); People v. Ogg, 258 Cal. App. 2d
841, 66 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1968) (person with whom
defendant had extramarital relationship); People v.
Escobedo, 250 Cal. App. 2d 417, 58 Cal. Rptr. 426
(1967) (person with whom defendant had extramarital
relationship); People v. Ellison, 121 Ill. App. 2d 149,
257 N.E.2d 199 (1970) (witness questioned as to extra-
marital relationship with defendant); People v. Somer-
ville, 88 i1. App. 2d 212, 232 N.E.2d 115 (1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 823 (1968) (extramarital relationship);
State v. Metcalf, 203 Kan. 63, 452 P.2d 842 (1969)
(witness questioned about illicit relationship with de-
fendant); People v. Payne, 13 Mich. App. 116, 163
N.W.2d 650 (1968) (witness asked if defendant lived
at her home); Lloyd v. State, 85 Nev. 576, 460 P.2d
111 (1969) (witness asked if she spent the night with
defendant and previously testified for him); State v.
Berger, 148 N.W.2d 331 (N.D. 1966) (witness asked if
she dated, drank with, was supported by, stayed over-
night with and falsely registered in motel with de-
fendant). But see People v. Laurry, 5 Ill. App. 3d 713,
283 N.E.2d 895 (1972) (improper to ask a defense wit-
ness about her marital status and the paternity of her
child, although an illicit sexual relationship with the
defendant was implied).
378 See, e.g., Tinker v. United States, 417 F.2d 542
(D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969);
United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968); Thompkins v. United
States, 236 A.2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v.
Peters, 23 Cal. App. 2d 522, 101 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Cheatham, 429 Pa. 198, 239 A.2d
293 (1968).
379 See State v. DiNunzio, 5 Conn. Cir. 608, 259 A.2d
768 (1969); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 350 Mass. 664,
216 N.E.2d 558 (1966).
M See United States v. Kerr, 464 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir.
1972); Battles v. State, 44 Ala. App. 635, 218 So. 2d
695 (1968); McCracken v. State, 439 P.2d 448 (Alaska
1968); Smith v. State, 431 P.2d 507 (Alaska 1967);
State v. Metcalf, 203 Kan. 63, 452 P.2d 842 (1969);
Garcia v. State, 454 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1970).
of a partnership in crime"' may also be developed
by the examiner.
The prosecutor may show through cross-exami-
nation that testimony which is favorable to the ac-
cused may have been influenced by the witness'
fear for his physical safety.n 2 Hostility to the
policean or to a government witness'" may also be
exposed as a motive for the witness' testimony.
Cross-examination may test the memory ma and
perceptual ability of a witness' senses, but courts
are apt to disallow courtroom experimentsms The
mental health of a witness may also be inquired
into insofar as it relates to the credibility of the
witness.an
nl See McCracken v. State, 439 P.2d 448 (Alaska
1968); Smith v. State, 431 P.2d 507 (Alaska 1967);
Bosnick v. State, 248 Ark. 1289,455 S.W.2d 688 (1970);
Herzig v. State, 213 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1968); Common-
wealth v. Arsenault, 280 N.E.2d 129 (Mass. 1972);
State v. Good, 492 P.2d 287 (Ore. 1971).
m See, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908
(2d Cir. 1972) (witness asked if the defendant threat-
ened him); People v. Hathcock, 8 Cal. App. 3d 509, 504
P.2d 476, 105 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1973) (fear of retaliation
by defendant's brother); State v. Chambers, 270 So. 2d
514 (La. 1972) (witness asked what would happen to
him when he returned to prison if he implicated the
defendant); State v. DiRenzo, 53 N.J. 360, 251 A.2d
99 (1969) (witness feared defendant).
m See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 446 F.2d 1115
(5th Cir. 1971) (witness extensively examined about his
feeling towards the coast guard in a trial for assaulting
coast guard officers); United States v. Littlepage, 435
F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915, reh.
denied, 402 U.S. 1013 (1971) (hostility to the govern-
ment shown by a pending indictment for the same
charge as in the instant case); McKay v. State, 489 P.2d
145 (Alaska 1971) (witness asked if he was presently
under charges arising from the work of the same under-
cover agent who was responsible for the instant case);
State v. Goff, 195 N.W.2d 521 (S.D. 1972) (witness
questioned if her children were taken away by court
proceedings in which the state's attorney had some in-
volvement).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964). The defense
has a very broad range of permissible inquiry when
examining a government witness who may be biased.
See United States v. Kartman, 417 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
1969). Wide latitude is also allowed when cross-ex-
amining a co-conspirator who testifies for the state.
See State v. Zwilman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 270 A.2d 284
(1970), cert. denied, 57 N.J. 604, 274 A.2d 56 (1971).
ml See United States v. Allegretti, 340 F.2d 254 (7th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911, reh. denied, 381
U.S. 956 (1965); Rush v. State, 254 Miss. 641, 182 So.
2d 214 (1966); Wright v. State, 466 P.2d 1014 (Wyo.
1970).
136 See Bryant v. State, 4 Md. App. 572, 244 A.2d
446 (1968); Wood v. State, 257 So. 2d 193 (Miss. 1972);
State v. Pevear, 110 N.H. 445, 270 A.2d 598 (1970).
m7 See People v. Fort, 273 N.E.2d 439 (Ill. Ct. App.
1971) (proper to question a thirteen year old boy to
determine his competency and ability to tell the truth);
People v. Chupich, 270 N.E.2d 106 (III. Ct. App. 1971)
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X CROSS-ExAmNATION BY USE OF
PHvsicAL EVIDENCE
Within the limitations of reasonableness and
propriety, cross-examination may include more
than just a series of questions and answers devoid
of movement or physical activity.P The most com-
mon source of physical interaction is the use of
documents which have been introduced as evidence
or have been used to refresh the witness' recollec-
tion on direct examination.n9 These may be shown
to the witness and questions based upon them may
(proper to ask a witness if he was ever in a mental
institution); State v. Miskell, 161 N.W.2d 732 (Iowa
1968) (proper to ask about whether witness declared
incompentent); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 276 N.E.2d
705 (Mass. 1971) (proper to inquire about mental
infirmities and idiosyncracies as well as a medical
discharge from the army); State v. Vigliano, 47 N.J.
504, 221 A.2d 733 (1966) (error to refuse to allow the
defense to examine a government witness as to his
commitment for psychiatric observation); Sturdevant
v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 142, 181 N.W.2d 523 (1970) (proper
to examine regarding intelligence and physical or
mental condition when relevant to credibility). But see
State v. Crow, 486 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972) (not error to
refuse to allow defense to examine a state witness re-
garding his treatment for mental illness, and his
masquerading as an Edwardian English fop and an
Arabian sultan).
318 See Harris v. State, 120 Ga. App. 359, 170 S.E.2d
743 (1969). The actions of a prosecutor who placed the
murder weapon in his belt the way the defendant had
carried it, and went about his cross-examination has
been upheld. See Crawford v. State 264 So 2d 554,
cert. denied, 264 So. 2d 559 (Ala. 19723.
131 See PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 612. See also Marcus
v. United States, 422 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Gober, 337 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Okla. 1971);
State v. Oswald, 197 Kan. 251, 417 P.2d 261 (1966);
State v. Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 141 N.W.2d 815
(1966); State v. Scott, 31 Ohio St. 2d 1, 285 N.E.2d 344
(1972); Fox v. State, 441 S.W.2d 491 (Tenn. 1968). The
propriety of refreshing a witness' recollection while on
cross-examination is within the judge's discretion. See
United States v. Baratta, 397 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 939, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 1045
(1969).
Documentary evidence not used on direct examina-
tion may be employed on cross. See Daugherty v. State,
225 Ga. 274, 168 S.E.2d 155 (1969) (documents not
offered into evidence can be used to remind the witness
of her marriage date)- People v. White, 38 Mich. App.
651, 197 N.W.2d 121 (1972) (bluffing an alibi witness by
inferring that a piece of paper was a contrary statement
that he made to police was improper because the
prosecutor refused to show the paper to defense coun-
sel); State v. Kuske, 109 N.J. Super. 575, 264 A.2d 227
(1970) (inflammatory letters and a telegram written by
the defendant to the complaining witness in a sodomy
prosecution could be used to impeach his denials that
the acts took place).
It is proper to offer documents into evidence on cross-
examination. See Stiles v. People, 159 Colo. 499, 414
P.2d 468 (1966); People v. Smith, 15 Mich. App. 173,
166 N.W.2d 504 (1968).
be tendered. Similarly, photographs may be shown
to the witness and his responses elicited." 0
A most interesting area of the art of cross-exami-
nation is the involvement of the witness (usually
the defendant) in demonstrations while on the wit-
ness stand. While a witness cannot be required to
do embarrassing or humiliating things before the
jury,39' within the bounds of relevance, he may be
required to perform certain acts. Typically, he
might be compelled to demonstrate to the jury the
truth of a claim he has made on direct examination,
such as that a weapon fired accidentally. 9' Most
commonly, a defendant may be required to briefly
don a certain garment found at the crime scene
such as a hat39' or a jacket 9 4 to demonstrate proper
fit and hence the likelihood of ownership. Defend-
ants are also often called upon to produce hand-
writing exemplars on cross-examination when that
is an issue in the case. 95
390 See Comdon v. State, 498 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1972)
(photographs of bruised wife shown to defendant);
Commonwealth v. Izzof-357 Mass. 39, 267 N.E.2d 631
(1971) (photograph of defendant wearing a beard, a
German helmet and a swastika-laden motorcycle
jacket was shown to defense witnesses); State v. Rhine-
hart, 70 Wash. 2d 649, 424 P.2d 906, cert. denied, 389
U.S. 832 (1971) (defendant cross-examined using pic-
tures of nude males ostensibly found in his apartment).
391 See Doremus v. United States, 414 F.2d 252 (6th
Cir. 1969). It has been held to be within the court's
discretion to refuse to compel a government witness to
display his arms to the jury after he claimed he no
longer used narcotics. See United States v. Lawler, 413
F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046
(1970). See also People v. Brocato, 17 Mich. App. 277,
169 N.W.2d 483 (1969), in which the defendant was
required to strip to the waist to demonstrate the amount
of hair he had on his body as a means of identification.
192 See State v. Patterson, 200 Kan. 176, 434 P.2d 808
(1967) (defendant was asked to demonstrate how a
cocked weapon with the cylinder open accidentally
discharged and killed his wife); Stevens v. Common-
wealth, 462 S.W.2d 182 (Ky. 1970) (defendant's wife
was required to show how a shotgun barrel struck a
car door during the shooting in question). See also
State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208,117 P. 58 (1911).
393 See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85, 407 P.2d
59 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 979 (1966); State v.
Dean, 400 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1966).394 See Howard v. Sigler, 325 F.Supp. 272 (D. Neb.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 454 F.2d 115 (8th Cir.
1972); Mason v. State, 8 Md. App. 579, 261 A.2d 197
(1970); State v. Howard, 184 Neb. 461, 168 N.W.2d
370 (1969). But see State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208, 117
P. 58 (1911), where the court held that dressing the
defendant up in a hat, overalls, covering his face with a
handkerchief and having him hold a gun could have no
purpose other than to disturb and arouse the jury.
395 See United States v. Doremus, 414 F.2d 252 (6th
Cir. 1969); State v. Vroman, 188 N.W.2d 746 (S.D.
1972); Long v. State, 48 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1931). It
has also been held that a defendant may be cross-
1974
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XII GENERAL PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
The responsibility of the prosecutor to engage in
cross-examination in a fair and ethical manner in-
volves matters of judgment, taste and judicial dis-
cretion which do not readily lend themselves to
compartmentalization.3 16 The propriety of a par-
ticular area or mode of examination is rarely so
clearly defined as it was in the classic case of prose-
examined on his refusal to provide handwriting ex-
emplars. See People v. Stokley, 266 Cal. App. 2d 930,
72 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 914
(1969). The production of other evidence on cross-
examination may be required. See Ziegler v. United
States, 174 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
822 (1949) (cancelled checks).316 See Roller v. State, 268 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1972),
where the court held that the prosecutor cannot exceed
fairness or propriety, or resort to methods to produce
a wrongful conviction. A prosecutor should not inject
his personal opinions into a case. See People v. Brocato,
17 Mich. App. 277, 169 N.W.2d 483 (1969). It is
improper to infringe upon a witness' privileges, such as
the attorney-client privilege, or the husband-wife
privilege. See Watson v. State, 190 So. 2d 161 (Fla.
1966); People v. Bussell, 28 Mich. App. 522,184 N.W.2d
502 (1970); People v. Brocato, 177 Mich. App. 277, 169
N.W.2d 483 (1969). It is also improper to cross-examine
a witness with an aim toward forcing him to take the
fifth amendment and thus prejudice the defendant. See
United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
It is generally improper to cross-examine regarding
the failure to produce witnesses who were equally
accessible to the prosecutor. See People v. Pearson, 2
Ill. App. 3d 861, 277 N.E.2d 544 (1972). But see United
States v. Chapman, 435 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 912 (1971). If the witness is not equally
accessible, comment is permitted. See Stallings v. State,
476 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1972).
There are few cases which discuss whether or not a
witness may be asked to speculate on why witnesses who
have contradicted him would lie. See Sizemore v. State,
499 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1972) (improper to ask why wit-
nesses would falsely accuse the defendant of theft);
Gunn v. State, 487 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. 1972) (proper to
ask the defendant if a man of the gospel for forty years
would lie). It has been held that a prosecutor may ask
a defendant if he cared to reconsider his testimony in
light of the other evidence. See Carpenter v. United
States, 264 F.2d 565 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
936 (1959).
A mere lack of effective purpose does not amount to
misconduct. See People v. Messer, 276 Cal. App. 2d
300, 80 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1969).
What standards are to be applied to the examination
of a witness whom the prosecutor believes to be telling
the truth? Consider the A.B.A. STAmDARDs RELATNG
To =m PRoSEcu O FUxcTIoN 5.7 (b):
The prosecutor's belief that the witness is telling
the truth does not necessarily preclude appropriate
cross-examination in all circumstances but may
affect the method and scope of cross-examination.
He should not misuse the power of cross-examina-
tion or impeachment to discredit or undermine a
witness if he knows the witness is testifying truth-
fully.
cutorial misconduct, Berger v. United States.an In
Berger, the prosecutor
a) misstated facts,
b) put answers in the mouths of witnesses which
they hadn't uttered,
c) assumed facts unsupportable by the evidence,
d) pretended to misunderstand witnesses' an-
swers and continued to cross-examine them
on that basis,
e) suggested that statements had been made to
him outside the court, when in fact none had,
f) bullied and argued with witnesses.
The Berger case provides a fairly complete outline
of the "foul blows" that a prosecutor must refrain
from striking, no matter how odious the deeds of
the defendant might have been.
While a good faith limited entry into a question-
able area generally does not require the reversal of a
verdict,In8 cross-examination which tends to inflame
the passions of the jury and thereby divert them
from proper consideration of the issues at hand is
another matter. Dwelling unnecessarily on a vic-
tim's pleas for mercy, 99 or asking a defendant
charged with rape if he likes to rape little girls, or
why he specializes in little girls,400 may well be ex-
pected to prejudice a jury. Cross-examination
which humiliates or degrades the accused is also
condemned as improper. For example, to refuse to
call a defendant "Mr." 401 or to call attention by
897 295 U.S. 78 (1935). See also Mason v. State, 8 Md.
App. 579, 26 A.2d 197 (1970).
3n See People v. Moran, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411, 463 P.2d
763 (1970) (prosecutor referred to marijuana as LSD);
People v. Helfend, 1 Cal. App. 3d 873, 82 Cal. Rptr.
295 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 967 (1970) (prosecutor
said "after you killed Max Levin" instead of saying
"after Max Levin was killed"); Zilmbi v. State, 39
Wis. 2d 607, 159 N.W.2d 669 (1968) (unintentional
misstatement of fact).
399See People v. Montgomery, 51 Ill. 2d 198, 282
N.E.2d 138 (1972).
400See People v. Dennis, 25 App. Div. 813, 270
N.Y.S.2d 119 (1966). See also United States v. Greene,
400 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1968); Petition of Wright, 282
F. Supp 999 (W.D. Ark. 1968); Richmond v. State, 124
Ga. App. 650, 185 S.E.2d 560 (1971); Stevenson v.
State, 497 P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1972).
The effect of minor prejudicial conduct is usually
minimized by courts. See United States v. American
Radiator and Stand Son Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); People v.
Havigrove, 18 Cal. App. 3d 606, 96 Cal. Rptr. 142
(1971); State v. Bausman, 162 Conn. 308, 294 A.2d
312 (1972); State v. Williams, 17 N.C. App. 31, 193
S.E.2d 478 (1972); State v. Syddall, 21 Utah 2d 276,
444 P.2d 753 (1968).401 See Armstead v. United States, 347 F.2d 806 (D.C.
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forty-four separate references to the fact that an
armed robbery defendant is a prostitute0 2 is re-
versible error. The form of the question may be
cause for appellate castigation if it is argumenta-
tive40 accusatory, 4 1 or if it is calculated to intim-
idate the witness.
40 5
Cir. 1965). See also Pendergrast v. United States, 416
F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir.), cerf. denied, 395 U.S. 926 (1969),
where reversal was not warranted because prosecutor
referred to the defendant as "Mr. defendant."41 See State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904, 478 P.2d 284
(1970). Guidelines in this area have been propounded
although precision in definition is, of course, lacking.
See A.B.A. STrmDAs RELATNG To mE PROSECUTON
FmxcnON 5.7(a):
[The examination of all witnesses should be con-
ducted fairly, objectively and with due regard for
the dignity and legitimate privacy of the witness,
and without seeking to intimidate or humiliate the
witness unnecessarily. Proper cross-examination
can be conducted without violating rules of
decorum.
See also Burton v. State, 267 So. 2d 503 (Ala. 1972)
(improper to ask defendant's wife how many times she
had been raped); Wells v. State, 46 Ala. App. 342, 241
So. 2d 901 (1970) (error to cross defendant with
amorous letters written by a woman twenty years his
senior who had undergone psycho-therapy); People v.
Jones, 273 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. 1971) (error to ask de-
fendant "Did it make you feel big to kill a man, Mrs.
Jones?"); People v. Smothers, 2 Il. App. 3d 513, 276
N.E.2d 427 (1971) (proper to ask a question regarding
the mature side of the defendant's face); Common-
wealth v. Lytes, 209 Pa. Super 436,228 A.2d 922 (1967)
(improper to ask defendant if he was in the presence of
four lesbians putting on a "queer show"); Craft v.
State, 271 So. 2d 735 (Miss. 1973) (improper to ask
questions which embarrass or humiliate).
In State v. Daye, 281 N.C. 592, 189 S.E.2d 481
(1972), the court stated that although a witness cannot
be badgered or humiliated with insulting or impertinent
questions, he can be asked degrading questions which
tend to disparage him. No definition of those terms were
provided.
4103 See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 417 F.2d 1271
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914 (1970)
(argumentative to ask "why is it that you elected to
plead not guilty?"); State v. Taylor, 198 Kan. 290, 424
P.2d 612 (1967) (argumentative to ask defendant if he
had ever done a dishonest thing, ever lied, or ever broke
into places); Barlow v. State, 233 So. 2d 829 (Miss.
1970) (argumentative to ask: 'ou made enough
money there that you could have been honest? Wouldn't
you agree with me that justice of the peace making
that kind of money at the expense of the taxpayer
ought to be honest"). But see Hooks v. State, 197 So. 2d
238 (Miss. 1967) (not error to state, "are you going to
sit there and face these people while under oath? Face
your lord now and tell the truth... you see, it breaks
out all over your face, come on, I'm waiting for your
answer.").
404 See, e.g., State v. Hyleck, 286 Minn. 126, 175
N.W.2d 163 (1970); Sensabaugh v. State, 426 S.W.2d
224 (Tex. 1968).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 446 F.2d 1226
(8th Cir. 1971), a.f'd, 461 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1972);
People v. Pena, 383 Mich. 402, 175 N.W.2d 767 (1970).
Probably the most frequent instances of prose-
cutorial misconduct occur when questions either
insinuate0 0 or actually state propositions which
are unsupportable by evidence in the case.4 These
practices have been widely criticized. Also not al-
lowable are questions delving into a defendant's
financial condition if it tends to show that his
economic limitations presented a motive for crimi-
nal conduct,4°s and questions which attempt to at-
416 See United States v. Puco, 436 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.
1971) (prosecutor held a piece of paper implying that
it was a prior inconsistent statement); State v. Stevens,
93 Idaho 48, 454 P.2d 945 (1969) (no proof followed a
question of the defendant asking him whether he asked
a girl to lie for him); People v. Saunders, 132 Ill. App.
2d 701, 270 N.E.2d 217 (1971) (inference of prior
inconsistent statement not substantiated); People v.
Somerville, 71 Il1. App. 2d 381, 219 N.E.2d 116 (1966)
(insinuation that defendant had confessed his guilt);
State v. Carey, 165 N.W.2d 27 (Iowa 1969) (prosecutor
insinuated that the defendant was responsible for the
failure of a prosecution witness to appear); Stevens v.
State, 263 So. 2d 755 (Miss. 1972) (prosecutor in-
sinuated that the defendant was a burglar by asking
him where he had worked and then asking if those
places had been burglarized); Davis v. State, 413 P.2d
920 (Okla. 1966) (inference that defendant obtained
illegally money in a bank account).
4o7 See A.B.A. STAmApm RErATING To TE PROsEcU-
TION FuI'cTIoN:
It is improfessional conduct to ask a question
which implies the existence of a factual predicate
which the examiner knows he cannot support by
evidence.
See also State v. Enriquez, 102 Ariz. 402, 430 P.2d
422 (1967) (defendant was questioned about wearing a
mask which implied he was a robber, but the prose-
cutor never offered to prove it); People v. Perez, 253
Cal. App. 3d 288, 61 Cal. App. 2d 785 (1967) (improper
to ask defendant if he was preparing to take a fix when
he was arrested); Marsh v. State, 202 So. 2d 222 (Fla.
1967) (defendant asked about unproved prior admis-
sions); People v. Pollard, 33 Mich. App. 114, 189
N.W.2d 855 (1971) (questions which assume unproven
facts are objectionable). The error is often a harmless
one. See Plumley v. State, 4 Md. App. 671, 245 A.2d
111 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969) (witness, a
sheriff, was asked if he kept an assassination fund);
State v. Thompson, 472 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. 1971) (de-
fendant asked if his attorney told him to play dumb);
Commonwealth v. Hill, 223 Pa. Super. 42, 296 A.2d
860 (1972) (defendant gave a negative reply to a ques-
tion about a non-existent prior inconsistent state-
ment); State v. Hamric, 151 W.Va. 1, 151 S.E.2d 252
(1966) (jury told to disregard questions of the defendant
dealing with conversations he had with the deceased);
Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370
(1967) (prosecutor implied that the defendant had
confessed).
408 See Davis v. United States, 433 F.2d 1222 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173
(2d Cir. 1966); State v. Mathis, 47 N.J. 455, 221 A.2d
529 (1966),-rev'd. 403 U.S. 946 (1970), reh. denied, 404
U.S. 876 (1971); State v. Beyor, 129 Vt. 472, 282 A.2d
819 (1971). Under certain circumstances, financial con-
dition is properly brought out. See United States v.
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tack a witness' credibility based upon his religious
affiliation." 9 Quite obviously, questions which
include racial slurs or attempts to curry favor with
any racially prejudiced members of the jury are
prohibited.41 °
A permissible line of inquiry which is often
undertaken is one composed of questions regarding
the persons to whom the witness has spoken about
the case.a' Witnesses may also be questioned about
their understanding of perjury if it is not calcu-
lated to prejudice the jury against a particular
witness.0' 2 Finally, rephrased or repetitious ques-
tions are permitted within the judge's discretion,
but they should not tend to prejudice the jury.A'
XIII THE COLLATERAL IMPEACHMENT RU.E
Any complete discussion of cross-examination
must make reference to the collateral impeachment
rule. This rule provides that in order to avoid need-
less time-consuming inquiries into "collateral" mat-
Graydon, 429 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Polansky, 418 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1969); People v. Hig-
gins, 28 Cal. App. 3d 771, 104 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1972).M0 0 See PROPosED FxD. R. Evm. 610:
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on
matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose
of showing that by reason of their nature his
credibility is impaired or enhanced.
See also People v. Williams, 39 Mich. App. 458, 197
N.W.2d 858 (1972); McCoamcc §48; CAL. Evm.
CODE §789 (West 1966). All references to religion, how-
ever, are not necessarily improper. See United States
v. Rucker, 435 F.2d (8th Cir. 1971) (defense witness
asked what other laws besides selective service could
not be obeyed by a Jehovah's Witness); People v.
Nicolaus, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967)
(proper to ask a witness if he believed in God after he
took the oath); People v. Falkner, 36 Mich. App. 101,
193 N.W.2d 179 (1971) (not improper to ask "Have
you heard of the Black Muslims?").
o00 See, e.g., United States v. Seiffert, 463 F.2d 1089
(5th Cir. 1972) (prosecutor asked a defense witness if
the defendant said that if a bank board member could
not get a loan, only Mexicans would serve on the
board); United States v. Grey, 422 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970) (a character witness was
asked if he knew the defendant, a Negro, was running
around with a White go-go dancer).
4u See McConmcx §29. See also People v. Terezak,
96 Ill. App. 2d 373, 238 N.E.2d 626 (1968); State v.
Williams, 263 La. 757, 269 So. 2d 232 (1972); People v.
Payne, 13 Mich. App. 116, 163 N.W.2d 650 (1968).
Similarly, witnesses may be asked if they have testified
in court previously, but if there is no reason to doubt
the witness' veracity, the question may be improper.
See Clark v. State, 246 Ark. 1151, 442 S.W.2d 225
(1969); State v. Elli, 267 Minn. 185, 125 N.W.2d 738
(1964).402 See United States v. Ross, 452 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.
1971); Turner v. State, 289 Ala. 97, 265 So. 2d 883,
a.ff'd, 265 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1972).411 See State v. Jones, 270 So. 2d 489 (La. 1972);
Shows v. State, 267 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 1972); Coleman
v. State, 442 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1969).
ters, the cross-examiner is bound by the witness'
answer and extrinsic evidence may not be offered
to contradict the witness.
414
Matters are not considered collateral if they are
related to the central substantive issues of the
case,41 5 or if they are subject to being proved up
with extrinsic evidence in the case-in-chief. 41 Bias,
interest, prejudice and conviction of a crime fall
within the latter test, and are therefore not subject
to the prohibition against collateral impeach-
ment.P7 Misconduct, however, is termed a col-
lateral issue and the prosecutor is, therefore, bound
by his answer when impeaching a witness on that
basis.4'
CONCLUSION
As has been noted throughout this article, many
entries into an area of "improper" cross-examina-
tion result in harmless error. juries are instructed
to disregard,41 9 questions are answered in the nega-
4 See McCosmcn" §§36, 47. See also United States
v. Browning, 439 F.2d 813 (1st Cir. 1971); Tinker v.
United States, 417 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 804 (1969); State v. Long, 280 N.C. 633, 187
S.E.2d 47 (1972); Noon v. State, 475 P.2d 410 (Okla.
1970); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 447 Pa. 405, 290 A.2d
262 (1972); State v. Jackson, 126 Vt. 250, 227 A.2d 280
(1967), a'd, 127 Vt. 237, 246 A.2d 829 (1968).
In State v. Scott, 192 S.E.2d 669 (S.C. 1972), the
court held that while a negative answer precludes refu-
tation with extrinsic evidence, further cross-examina-
tion may be warranted. It is improper to overemphasize
collateral matters. See People v. Wilson, 40 Mich. App.
290, 198 N.W.2d 424 (1972); Davis v. State, 413 P.2d
920 (Okla. 1966).41
5 See McCoMUc" §§36, 47. See also United States
v. Quinn, 454 F.2d 29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
911 (1972); United States v. Budzanoski, 331 F. Supp.
1201 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 462 F.2d 443 (3d Cir.
1972); People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247
N.E.2d 642 (1969); State v. Long, 280 N.C. 633, 187
N.E.2d 47 (1972).410 See McCoRMIcy §§36, 47. See also United States
v. Lambert, 463 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1972); State v. Long,
280 N.C. 633, 187 S.E.2d 47 (1972); State v. Scott, 192
S.E.2d 669 (S.C. 1972).
47See McCoasncx §§36, 40, 47; United States v.
Schennault, 429 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1970); People v.
Pierce, 269 Cal. App. 2d 193, 75 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1969),
af'd, 11 Cal. App. 3d 313, 89 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1970).
See also Dillon v. United States, 391 F.2d 433 (10th
Cir. 1968), aY'd, 432 F.2d 1030 (10th Cir. 1970);
Ederington v. State, 244 Ark. 1096, 428 S.W.2d 271
(1968).4
18 See McCoRMncx" §§40, 42; WomoRE §977; United
States v. Keefer, 464 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1972).
419 See, e.g., United States v. ifkin, 451 F.2d 1149
(2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d
472 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971);
United States v. Justice, 431 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1970);
Alexander v. Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 334 (Ky.
1971); State v. Smith, 478 P.2d 417 (Ore. 1970);
Stover v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789, 189 S.E.2d 504
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tive20 or not at all,4 and defense attorneys fail to
object and thereby do not preserve the record for
appealA2 The presence of overwhelming evidence
of guilt regularly prevents the reversal of a verdict
that may be tainted with improper cross-examina-
tion.
The individual prosecutor must consider these
realities along with the guidelines previously dis-
cussed. He must view it all in light of his responsi-
bilities to the public as well as the accused, and he
(1971). In White v. State, 444 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex.
1969), the court stated the applicable rule:
[A]n error in asking an improper question or in
admitting improper testimony can generally be
cured or rendered harmless by a withdrawal of
such testimony and an instruction to disregard the
same except in extreme cases where it appears
that the question is clearly calculated to inflame
the minds of the jury and is of such character as
to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the
impression produced on their minds.
420See Vernon v. State, 12 Md. App. 157, 277 A.2d
635 (1971); State v Ross 275 N.C 550 169 S.E.2d
875 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1970).
enSee United States v. Baum, 435 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971); Daily v.
must then determine how he shall wield the sword
of justice.
State, 250 Ark. 965 468 S.W.2d 238 (1971); State v.
Smith, 478 P.2d 40 (Ore. 1970).
m See Mikus v. United States, 443 F.2d 719 (2d
Cir. 1970); United States v. Goff, 430 F.2d 396 (7th
Cir. 1970); People v. Harris, 7 Cal. App. 3d 922, 807
Cal. Rptr. 46 (1970); Thumann v. State, 466 S.W.2d
738 (Tex. 1971). Reversals have been avoided for
numerous other reasons. See Devine v. United States,
403 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1003
(1969) (only conduct which influences the verdict re-
quires reversal); United States v. Williams, 401 F.2d
901 (9th Cir. 1968) (improper question was helpful to
the defendant); Rapue v. State, 171 Colo. 324, 466
P.2d 925 (1970) (no reversal because cross-examination
went a trifle too far); McGhee v. State, 460 S.W.2d 875
(Tenn. 1970) (matter already brought out); State v.
Todd, 78 Wash. 2d 362, 474 P.2d 542 (1970) (improper
questioning brought before the jury matters already
aired). The asking of only one improper question will
generally not require reversal. See Smith v. State, 241
Ark. 748, 410 S.W.2d 126 (1967); Walker v. People,
489 P.2d 584 (Colo. 1971); People v. Bergin, 16 Mich.
App. 443, 168 N.W.2d 459 (1969); State v. Ward, 9
N.C. App. 684, 177 S.E.2d 317 (1970), cerl. denied, 277
N.C. 459, 178 S.E.2d 226 (1971); Smith v. State, 457
S.W.2d 58 (Tex. 1970). See also United States v. Balis-
trieri, 403 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 953 (1971).
